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ABSTRACT

Even though organized labor in the United States has
been primarily concerned with such goals as higher wages,
shorter hours, and better working conditions, it has also
indicated an interest in many other economic, social and
political problems.
*»

The purpose of this study has been to show the
attitude of organized labor toward monetary reform and
monetary policy i,n the United States from 1866-1965.

The

views of the peak organizations, such as the National
Labor Union, Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood,
Knights of Labor, American Federation of Labor, Congress
of Industrial Organizations, and the merged AFL-CIO have
been selected as representative of American organized labor.
Labor union convention proceedings, organized labor
publications, governmental hearings, and the works of
scholars in the fields of labor and money and banking have
been utilized in the research.
The development of organized labor's attitude toward
monetary policy and monetary reform has been in three
vi

primary stages:

1866-1928, limited knowledge and under

standing; 1929-1945, expansion and learning; 1946-1965,
increased maturity and involvment.
Prom 1866 to 1929, organized labor suffered from a
basic lack of understanding of the United States monetary
system and a clear definition of money.

Yet, the plat

forms of the early national labor unions include.d monetary
reform proposals which were limited in depth and somewhat
radical by nature.

The defects of the National Banking

System perhaps justified organized labor's proposals for
monetary reform.

Even when the enactment of the Federal

Reserve System attempted to overcome these defects,
organized labor did not exhibit its opinion toward the new
system; however, it pragmatically supported amendments
which would be beneficial to the laboring class.

Deep-

rooted fears of bankers resulted in organized labor's
efforts to by-pass commercial banks whenever possible by
the use of postal savings and labor banks.
In the 1929-1945 period, organized labor expanded
its knowledge of the operations of the United States'
monetary system and its interest into the area of
international monetary reform.

The Great Depression

brought to organized labor leaders a realization of the
vii

need for exploration in this area.

No doubt influenced

by financial experts1 articles which appeared in organized
labor publications, it supported those legislative
measures which sought to strengthen, centralize and
regulate the banking system.

Although organized labor was

not critical of the Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy
in the 1930's, it advocated stronger government action to
achieve business recovery.
In the pfcist World War II era, organized labor has been
more actively involved with monetary reform legislation
and has deepened- its analysis of monetary policy.

It

felt that the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy was
executed to fight a "phantom inflation" at the expense of
high levels of employment and production.

Because of its

desire that the objectives of the Employment Act of 1946
be achieved, organized labor has offered proposals con
cerning the methods by which the Federal Reserve could
strengthen and use more judiciously the instruments of
monetary control.

It has recommended that changes be made

in the structure and composition of the Federal Reserve
System with primary emphasis on the inclusion of organized
labor's representation.

In view of the progress organized labor has made in
its understanding of the United States monetary system,
no doubt the future will bring an even greater partici
pation on its part.

If Congress should abrogate the

independence of the Federal Reserve and bring it under
closer control, organized labor may well achieve its
desired place within the System's composition.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nature of the Problem
From its meager beginnings almost 200 years ago,
American unionism has grown into a varied and complex
constituent of today's society.

Although organized

labor throughout the years has shown primary interest in
such matters as higher wages, better working conditions,
and shorter working hours, there have been many other
economic, social and political problems that have come
to its attention.

Some of them have received little more

than passing notice; others at times have greatly agitated
organized labor and caused active exertion on its part.
One economic area which has attracted the interest of organ
ized labor is monetary policy and monetary reform because
changes in these areas have a decided effect on the
laboring man.
Even though the average worker has little or no under
standing of monetary policy and .reform as it pertains to
1

the economy, he may be concerned with the cost of borrowing
money, the purchasing power of his dollar, or the security
of his savings.

Therefore, in order to protect the interests

of their members, labor leaders have become involved with the
"money question" by expressing their thoughts in pamphlets,
newspaper and journal articles, convention resolutions and
in government hearings.

They have brought forth their

views to the members of their associations and to the public
at large.
Purpose
Histories of organized labor have been written wherein
labor's position on monetary reform and policy have been
briefly mentioned or incorporated to some extent.

However,

to the knowledge of this writer, a thorough inyestigation
of labor's attitude toward this subject has not been made.
The purpose of this dissertation is to present an
explanatipn of organized labor's attitude toward the changes
that have taken place in the United States monetary system
and monetary policies.

The study delves into the reasoning,

thoughts, and justifications of labor's position toward
monetary policy and monetary reform.

The various proposals

set forth by organized labor as their solutions to the

3
monetary problemswill be examined with special notice to
its continued growth of awareness and concern.

Sources
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, today and prior to the merger of
1955, have issued various publications voicing labor's
attitude toward monetary policy and monetary reform.
following are examples:

The

The American Federationist (AFL;

also AFL-CIO), Economic Trends and Outlook (AFL-CIO),
Industrial Union Department Bulletin and Digest (AFL-CIO),
Labor1s Economic Review (AFL-CIO), AFL Weekly Newsletter
(AFL), Labor1s Monthly Survey (AFL) and Economic Outlook
(CIO).

These, in addition to statements presented by the

AFL-CIO, are used quite extensively in the dissertation.
Further significant sources which state formally the
attitude of organized labor are convention proceedings and
government hearings.

Other government documents are

incorporated in the study as they pertain to specific acts
and bills, along with the works of authors in the fields
of labor and money and banking.

Method of Approach and Organization
This dissertation will concentrate on the views of the
peak organizations such as the National Labor Union,
Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood, Knights of
Labor, American Federation gf Labor, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, and the merged AFL-CIO as repre
sentative of American organized labor.
The study will:
1.

Trace the viewpoint of post Civil War labor organ

izations toward monetary reform from 1866 to 1900.
2.

Present a picture of the significant changes in the

banking system from 1900 to 1928 and the position taken by
organized labor.

Special consideration is given to the

Federal Reserve, Postal Savings Banks, and Labor Banking.
3.

Examine the basic monetary reforms that were

initiated during the Great Depression and the reaction to
these reforms and the proposals offered by organized labor;
4.

Set forth the basic monetary policy of the Federal

Reserve from 1914 to 1965 and the effects on and concern by
organized labor.
5.

Show recent participation of organized labor in

Bretton Woods and Federal Reserve legislation.

6.

Evaluate the historical stand taken by American

organized labor toward monetary policy and monetary reform
and determine what their expected position could be in the
future.

CHAPTER II

MONEY, LABOR AND POLITICS, 1866-1900

The Post-Civil War proponents of monetary reform in
the ranks of the labor movement derived their ideas largely
from Edward Kellogg.'*'

After losing his fortune in the Panic

of 1837, he studied the monetary system and developed a
plan for financial reform.

Kellogg argued that the nation's

monetary laws were oppressive to labor because bankers were
permitted to create and loan money.
scarcity and high interest rates.

The result was money
Kellogg felt that a

fundamental reform was needed, and to achieve this, he
recommended that the government establish a "National
Safety Fund" with one or more branches to make public
loans in every state.

Through real estate mortgages

bearing a 1.1 per cent interest rate, paper money would
be issued from the fund.

In turn, banks would have to

lower their interest rates, enabling the workingman to

^"Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the
United States (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc.,
1947), p. 421.

secure money more reasonably.2

In the 1850's, Kellogg's

plan did not impress the labor movement, for their experi
ences with wildcat

banking had made them skeptical of paper

money schemes.3
During the Civil War, there was growing concern by
labor over bankers' political control:
While the workingmen were enlisting in the services
of their country, the bankers and owners of gold
were working their way into Congress . . . These
men enacted such legislation as was beneficial to
themselves; they diminished the volume of currency
and reduced the price of labor and property . . .
Immediately following the War, financiers and the
working class were locked in a struggle over the redemption
of government bonds.

Businessmen demanded redemption -

in gold and the debtors.wanted redemption in greenbacks
which had been issued during the Civil War.

5

Also, the

high interest rates on government bonds diverted money from

2

Edward Kellogg's original work, Labor and Other
Capital, appeared in 1848. For additional information,
see Edward Kellogg, Labor and Capital: A New Monetary
System, ed. Mary Kellogg Putnam (New York: John W.
Lovell Co., 1884), 374 pp.
a

York:

Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor (New
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 124.

^T. V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor 1859 to 1889
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: T. V. Powderly, 1890), p. 35.

industrial, commercial and manufacturing

enterprises.^

it

was in this type of financial climate that the workers
found themselves.

Unable to cope with these problems,

they turned to organized labor to introduce various plans
of monetary reform.
National Labor Union
The National Labor Union, organized at Baltimore in
1866, was the predecessor of the Knights of Labor and the
American Federation of Labor.

The most prominent demand

by workers at the 1866 convention was an eight-hour day.^
There was some discussion on the money situation, however:
The right of the workingmen to take action on the
subject of the currency of the United States was
at that time seriously questioned. It was an
unpardonable offense to suggest to Congress that
it should take notice of the issue of legal tender
paper money or an issue of government bonds bear
ing a low rate of'interest.
Yet, the consensus among leading trade unionists was
that a new weapon had to be found to end labor's degradation
and. elevate it to its rightful place in society.
g
7

This

Foner, o£. cit.. p. 422.
.

.

.

John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labour in.
The United States. II (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1953),
pp. 86-87.
8
Powderly, ojj. cit., p. 42.

weapon was cooperatives formed by the workers.

But, as long

as the control of credit and money remained in private
hands, laborers could not by any system secure their
position.

It was first necessary that the monetary system

be "restored to the people."

9

There were several labor leaders, among them William
H. Sylvis, Richard F. Trevellick, and Andrew C. Cameron,
who were advocates of Kellogg's theories.

They persuaded the

National Labor Union in 1867 to adopt a monetary reform
platform based on a modification of Kellogg's program.^0
Their plan called for the repeal of the national banking
system, and the substitution of legal-tender treasury
notes as the exclusive currency of the nation.

The govern

ment would set the interest rates and reduce to three per
cent the interest on bonds redeemable for greenbacks.

In

addition, government loans in the form of greenbacks would
be available to the public at about one per cent interest.
Sylvis, in his enthusiasm for the currency reform, said,
"When a just monetary system has been established there

9

Foner, o£. cit.. pp. 417-420.

10
will no longer exist a necessity for trade unions.
The money reformers of the National Labor Union were
quite aware that inflation of prices would follow their
proposal.

Yet, immediately following the Civil War,

prices were declining as a result of retirement of green
backs by the Secretary of the Treasury.

When congressional

legislation of 1868 ceased their retirement to prevent the
decline in prices, it stopped short of the inter-convertible
bond and government loans to private business— the machinery
of the revolutionary scheme.

l?

By 1870 the National Labor Union had split into two
factions:

half trade and half political.

With business

recovery, many of the trade unionists found greenbackism
"highly amusing."

This description annoyed the reformers

and contributed to lack of unity.

Some of the members

supported a labor party, while others, stressing "pure and
simple" unionism, looked upon political activity as a hope
less vision.

In this disjoined state, survival of the

organization was virtually impossible.

H-The platform of the National Labor Union, 1867, is
reproduced by Powderly, op. cit.. pp. 46-52, 203.
•^Commons

and Associates, pp. cit., II, pp. 121-122.

■^Rayback, op. cit., p. 128.

11
Although the National Labor Union was short lived, it
played a significant role in labor history.

While placing

strong emphasis on monetary reform and political action, it
pointed out to the American people that the government of
the United States was becoming dominated by large scale
industrial and financial

i n t e r e s t s . ^

Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood
With the disintegration of the National Labor Union,
the effort to form a national federation had not ended;
shortly before the Panic of 1873, a new attempt was made.
Representatives of the National Trade Union, which had
withdrawn from the National Labor Union, assembled at
Cleveland in July of that y e a r . ^

Under the name of The

Industrial Congress, they drew up a plan of action, although
no constitution was adopted.

16

Because of the trade union

nature of the Congress, the financial plank in the platform
concerning the interconvertible bond and paper money system
was included only after heated debate, while cooperative

■^Foner, op. cit., p. 432.
15
Commons and Associates, op. pit,., II, p. 157.
•^Powderly, pp. cit., p. 60.

12
ventures were given only a brief endorsement.

17

'

The second convention, held in Rochester, New York,
in April of 1874, was of greater importance because of the
fusion of the Industrial Brotherhood with the Industrial
Congress.

18

The convention accepted the ritual, as well

as the name, of the Industrial Brotherhood.

However, some

delegates were opposed to item eighteen of the Brotherhood
platform for it appeared to dictate to the government.
The plank read as follows:
To prevail upon the government to establish a just
standard of distribution between capital and labor
by providing a purely national circulating medium
based upon the faith and resources of the nation,
issued directly to the people, without the inter
vention of any system of banking corporations,
which money shall be of legal tender in the pay?ment of all debts, public or private, and
interchangeable at the option of the holder for
government bonds, bearing a rate of interest not
to exceed three and sixty-five hundredths per cent,
subject to future legislation.
The feelings of the majority were expressed by one
delegate when he said:
. . . Money is only the representative of value.
We make the value. Why, may I ask, should we not

•^Commons and Associates,
l®Ibid., pp. 163, 196.
a secret labor federation.

0 £.

cit.. II, pp. 160, 161.

The Industrial Brotherhood was

19«rhe entire platform of the Industrial Brotherhood
is given by Powderly. ojp. cit.. pp. 63-65.

i

13
see to it that the value is honestly and fairly
represented by an honest American currency based
upon the real tangible possessions of the people
of the United States, instead of a few imaginary
golden dollars . . .
A vote was then taken and the platform was adopted.

This

concept for monetary reform would continue but not the
Industrial Brotherhood for it had been launched during the
Panic of 1873 and ensuing depression..

Few delegates

attended the convention of 1875 which marked the close of
their organization.

21

Greenback Labor Party
As organized labor's interest and strength in political
action dwindled during .1874 and 1875, the main initiative
for political organization was assumed by the farmers.

In

1875, there were several attempts to organize an Independent
Party, and one convention was held in Cleveland.

Delegates

were agrarians, lawyers, and some leaders from the trade
unions that folded.

They adopted a platform stressing

financial reform and were called the Greenback Party.

22

The platform declared "the solution of the money question

20Ibid., p. 63.
^Commons and Associates, op. cit.,' II, pp. 166-167.
22Foner, op. cit.. pp. 475-477

14
more deeply affects the material interest of the people
than any other question in issue before the people."

The

Party demanded the payment of the national debt in greenbacks and the issue of interconvertible legal tender
currency and bonds bearing not more than 3.5 per cent per
annum. 23
That same year, representatives from organized labor
and Grangers attended a Cincinnati Conference headed by
Horace H. Day who had been a participant in the National
Labor Union.

Against Day's wishes, the delegates chose

to unite with the Greenback Party, and accepted its plat
form, which differed slightly from their own.

Prom the

time of the uniting until 1879, every Greenback platform
included the repeal of resumption of the Specie Payment
A c t ^ which had passed in January of 1875.

This inclusion

23 Commons and Associates, op. cit.. II, p. 168.
94

^ T h e Act contained a variety of provisions designed
to appeal to silver advocates (replacement of fractional
currency by silver coins); paper money advocates (removal
of all limits on the aggregate issue of national bank notes
and linking the retirement of greenbacks— the aggregate
outstanding not to fall below $300 million— to the increase
in national bank notes); and gold standard advocates (its
main provisions). Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson
Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960
(Princetons Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 48.

15
was a contribution of the Cincinnati Conference.2®
Generally, organized labor was not interested in
uniting with the Greenback Party because

it

felt the

Party would not be of special benefit to them.
1877 laborers began to join2®

But, in

because of resentment toward

government handling of s t r i k e s . V a r i o u s alliances of
laborers and Greenbackers appeared in Ohio and Pennsylvania,
while a Workingmen's Party was developing in New York.
These mergers suggested to greenback and labor party
leaders the feasibility of uniting their forces, and the
result was a national convention held at Toledo, Ohio, in
1878.

The National Party was thus formed and adopted the

typical greenback and labor demands in

its

platform,2®

but the interconvertible 3.65 bonds were not mentioned.2^

25

Foner, op. cit., p. 477. See also, Commons and
Associates, op. cit.. II, p. 169.
26Foner, op. cit.. pp. 478-479.
27

'The most violent and most significant labor uphevel
in the nineteenth century was the Railway Strike of 1877.
For detailed discussion, see Rayback, pp. cit.. pp. 133-136.
28
29

Commons and Associates, pp. pit., II, pp. 240-241.
Foner, pp. pit., p. 483.

16
The presidential election of 1878 was the apex of the
Greenback Labor Party, with disintegration following
shortly thereafter.
foundation.

The alliance was based on a shallow

The agrarian element stressed monetary reform

and cared little for labor demands.3®

In that same year,

the chief demand of the party (the repeal of the Specie
Payment Act) disappeared as January 1, 1879, was the date
fixed for resumption.3^

By 1880, the party platform

called for a government monopoly of paper currency and for
unlimited coinage of silver.

Thereafter, the Party itself

was of iittle significance, although the financial program
lived on.32

Knights of Labor
The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was formed
by Uriah Stephens at Philadelphia in 1869.. It stemmed from
a Philadelphia Garment Workers Local which had been black
listed into almost total inactivity during the recession
of 1866-68.

Thus Stephens felt the need for concealment of

3®Rayback, op. cit., p. 138.
3^Commons and Associates, pp. cit., II, p. 248.
32

Friedman and Schwartz, loc. cit.

17
labor1s activity and the Knights remained a secret organi
zation from 1869 to 1878.33
In the early years, the Knights participated in a
unifying movement which had been initiated by the Junior
Sons of '76.^

A convention was called at Tyrone,

Pennsylvania in 1875, and included the socialists, Sons
of '76, and Knights, but the unification was not a success.
Agreement could not be reached on the matters of monetary
reform and the use of political action.^
A surge of workmen came into the order as a result
of the Railway Strike of 1877 and indecision over the
attitude to take toward the Greenback Labor Movement.

A

national convention became a necessity and was called in
l

early January of 1878 at Reading, Pennsylvania.

O

The

Reading General Assembly accepted for the most part the
preamble of the Industrial Brotherhood and by doing so,
evidenced their realization that reforms would come mainly

33

Commons and Associates, oja. cit.. II, p. 197.

34

The Sons of '76.were organized at Pittsburgh in
May, 1874, and placed monetary reform as the main objective
of its platform.
Ibid., pp. 201-202.
35
JRayback, oj3. cit., p. 144.
36Ibid.

18
through political agitation and action.

37

Money was by no means overlooked in the Knights' plat
form.

The fifteenth section of the preamble read as

follows:
To prevail upon governments to establish a purely
national circulating medium, based upon the faith
and resources of the nation, and issued directly
to the people, without the intervention of any
system of banking corporations, which money shall
be a legal tender in payment of all debts, public
and private.3®
It is to be noted that the delegates made no mention
of the interconvertible bonds in that section.39

The

Knights' attitude toward the money question remained un
changed until 1884.

Then, the Knights' preamble was

slightly altered by the addition of "that the government
shall not guarantee or recognize any private banks or
create any banking corporations."40
There were many factors which led to the rapid decline
of the Knights.

37

Powderly,

From a membership of 700,000 in 1886, its’

ojd.

38

ext., p. 131.

Powderly, Ibid., pp. 128-130, reproduces verbatim tho
preamble adopted at Reading, January 3, 1878.
39Ibid., p. 203.

19
number dwindled to 100,000 by 1890.^^"

Failure was due to

the interrelated effects of irresponsibility on the part of
the membership, fumbling leadership, poorly organized and
unsuccessful strikes, the dissipation of energy and funds
in cooperative ventures which collapsed, and the attempt
to draw the unskilled, industrial workers into a single,
unified labor organization which caused the withdrawal of
support by the national trade unions.

42

At the Knights' convention in December, 1889, in
St. Louis, an agreement was reached with the National
Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union which united their
demands.

It included the abolition of national banks and

the issue of legal tender treasury notes in lieu of national
bank notes, regulating the amount needed on a per capita
basis as the business of the country increased.

They further

advocated the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

43

Although the Knights were still active in the 1890's,
its membership continued to decline and its industrial

41
42
43

Commons and Associates, oja. cit.., II, p. 482.
Dulles, op. cit.. p. 148.

Powderlv, op. cit.. pp. 342-343, gives the full
agreement.

20
strength was a matter of the past.

The Knights made a final

step away from the wage-earners1 movement when a report was
made by the Grand Master Workman to the General Assembly of
1894:
The Order of the Knights of Labor is not so much
intended to adjust the relationship between the
employer and employee as to adjust natural
resources and productive facilities to the
common interest of the whole people . . . It is
not founded on the question of adjusting wages,
but on the question of abolishing the wagesystem and the establishment of a cooperative
industrial system. When its real mission is
accomplished, poverty will be reduced to a
minimum and the land dotted over with peaceful,
happy homes . . .44

Brief Historical Setting for the Silver Movement
Before a study of labor's attitude toward the silver
question can be made, it is first necessary to review the
history of the silver movement.

The last three decades of

the nineteenth century, particularly the years after 1890,
witnessed political fervor over the money issue.
The focal point for silver agitation was the Coinage
Act of 1873 which failed to mention the minting of the

44Knights of Labor, Proceedings. 1894, p. 1, cited in
Commons and Associates, op. cit.. II, pp. 494-495.
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standard silver dollar.

The Act provided for only subsidiary

silver coins and a trade dollar which was to be used in
dealing with the Orient.^
The silver dollar was actually a coin little known to
Americans.

Since the world market price of silver had been

higher than the mint price, the silver dollar had not been
in circulation since 1836.

The Coinage Act of 1873 gave

legal recognition to the fact, and silver spokesmen in
Congress did not oppose the legislation.^
price of silver began to decline,

An

However, as the

the silver supporters

began to feel that it was a conspiracy on the part of
Eastern bankers and legislators to demonetize silver without
the general knowledge of the public.

45

So determined was

J. Laurence Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in
the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1888),
pp. 93-102.
46
Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.. p. 114.
47
David R. Dewey in Financial History of the United
States (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903), p. 406,
gives the market price of silver from 1840 to 1895.
"The
reasons for the price decline seem clear; on the supply
side, rich new mines were opened in the American West, and
there was a world wide increase in productivity; on the
demand side, a number of European countries shifted from the
bimetallic to a gold standard and sharply reduced their
monetary use of silver." Friedman and Schwartz, loc. cit.
For a detailed discussion, also see Laughlin, pp. cit.,
pp. 161-175.

I
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their effort to discredit the act that the episode was
labeled the "Crime of 1873."^®
The silver producers demanded that the only remedy to
the Crime of '73 was the free and unlimited coinage of
silver.

Debtor farmers in the Middle West and South joined

silver producers because they felt free silver would increase
the money supply and thereby lower the real burden of their
debt.

Greenbackers joined the silver proponents for they

felt that issuing silver dollars was just as effective as
issuing more greenbacks.

49

The forty-fourth Congress (1875-1877) did not enact
any silver legislation although the House passed a freecoinage bill proposed by Representative Richard P. Bland of
Missouri.

Later, the Senate amended the House bill and,

when the Bland-Allison Act passed in February, 1878, it
was for silver purchase instead of free coinage.

The pur

chases under the Bland-Allison Act absorbed over sixty per
cent of American silver production; yet, it was not

4ft
' °Alexander Dana Noyes, Forty Years of American
Finance. 1865-1907 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909),
pp. 35-36. See also Dewey, pp. cit.. p. 404.
^ F r i e d m a n

and Schwartz, op. cit.. p. 115.
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sufficient to counteract the world forces which tended to
lower the price of silver.

50

Free silver forces were dissatisfied with the legis
lation because it did not provide for unlimited coinage.
From that time forward, agitation for free silver was
carried on with religious zeal, and the theme of "The
Crime of 1873" was resounded in the pro-silver speeches.

51

In 1890, the high tariff advocates agreed to support
a silver coinage bill in exchange for silver support on the
tariff,^ and the result was the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.
The measure provided for the purchase of all the American
output of silver, but did not admit unlimited coinage.53
In 1893, the United States was experiencing a business
depression.

Congress attributed the money panic to the

^ T h e Senate Bill provided that the Government should
purchase and coin into dollars not less than $2,000,000 and
not more than $4,000,000 worth of silver each month. The
silver so purchased was to be coined into silver dollars
which were full legal tender. Dickson H. Leavens, Silver
Money (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, Inc., 1939),
pp. 38, 39.
Cl

J Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit., p. 116.
52
Noyes, op. crt., pp. 147-149.
53
The bill authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion each month and
to issue in payment thereof treasury notes of full legal
tender. Dewey, pp. cit., p. 437.
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Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and had the purchase clause
repealed.

Although opinions may differ as to the causes

of the panic, the act was undoubtedly an important factor.^4
Such men as William Jennings Bryan were vigoriously
opposed to the repeal.

Later, Bryan acquired the Democratic

nomination for president on a free-silver plank.

In the

political campaign of 1896, Bryan was opposed by the Repub
lican nominee, William McKinley, who accepted a platform
favoring the gold standard.

Even though the Republicans

were victorious, legislation did not immediately follow to
end the money controversy, for free silver advocates still
had a majority in Congress.

During the next four years,

the increased prosperity followed by new gold discoveries
served as a prelude to gold legislation.

55

The gold standard was triumphant in 1900 with the
passage of the Gold Standard Act.

The gold dollar was

declared the standard of value with the following provision:

54

Leavens, op. cit., p. 43. Also, see W. Jett Lauck,
The Causes of the Panic of 1893 (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1907). 122 pp.
55

For a detailed discussion of the election see, Stanley
L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). 350 pp.
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It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the
Treasury to set apart in the Treasury a reserve
fund of $150,000,000 in gold coin and bullion,
which shall be used for.such redemption purposes
only.56
Even though the legislation passed, it was only a
compromise, for the silver advocates in the Senate con
tinued to push for their cause.

In the presidential

i

election of that year, the money controversy was again
of prime importance, but with Bryan's second defeat, the
silver issue on the national scene was closed. 57

American Federation of Labor and
the Silver Movement
The demand for a federation of trades and labor unions
resulted from the fact that the Knights of Labor did not
meet the needs of those workers who were interested in craft
rather than labor unionism.

The Knights stressed a more

general "uplift program," while the craft groups felt that
concern should be directed strictly to economic problems.
Centralized and autocratic in character, the Knights'
organization could not satisfy the demand for national

56Noyes, op. cit., p. 254.
57

Dewey, pp. pit., p. 469.
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federation along craft lines, which would preserve trade
autonomy and at the same time combine the forces of the
craft groups.

CO

Therefore, in 1881, a convention was called in
Pittsburgh to form a federation of trade unions.

One

hundred and seven delegates attended, of whom forty-eight
represented neighboring Knights of Labor Assemblies in
Pennsylvania, the others representing craft unions from
more distant places.

The name adopted at the convention

was the Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions
of the United States and Canada.®0

This new federation

adopted almost in its entirety the program, including the
political platform, of the Knights of Labor.

Greenbackism

alone was the only major plank of the Knights which was
omitted.®0

When the next convention was held the following

year, the political plank was repealed and a manifesto,
/

cp
Mollie Ray Carroll, Labor and Politics (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923), p. 28.
59
60

Foner, op. cit.. p. 519.
Carroll, pp. cit.. p. 30.
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which discontinued political action, was issued.

61

In 1886, the federation was completely reorganized
and the name, "American Federation of Labor," substituted.
Their stand on political action remained the same.

6p

The

Federation recommended that its members cast their votes,
independent of party, for the candidate who was most likely
to promote their interest.

63

This was not the case, however, in 1893, when the
American Federation of Labor by implication endorsed a
political party.

64.

The panic and resulting depression had .

created unrest among the laboring class.

When the Annual

Federation convention was held at Chicago, Illinois in
December of that year, there was a discussion on the
monetary situation.

It was felt that the repeal of the

"Sherman Bill" had failed to improve the financial or
commercial condition of the country, and had actually
61
Morton A. Aldrich, The American Federation of Labor
(New York: The McMillan Company, 1898), p. 257.
62

Carroll, op. cit.. p. 28, points out that it was not
until several years after 1886 that the American Federation
of Labor decided to trace its origin back to 1881.
63

Aldrich, loc. cit.
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intensified the distress.

One delegate voiced the opinion

that the resolutions adopted at the Bimetallic Convention,^
held in Chicago in August, 1893, expressed the sentiments
of the masses of the people.

A motion was made that the

American Federation of Labor should endorse the silver
convention's resolution and recommend to Congress the
passage of a free coinage silver bill at the ratio of 16
ounces of silver to 1 ounce of gold.

This would be a means

of relieving the monetary stringency and returning the
nation to prosperity.

The resolution was adopted by the

66
convention.
The Federation had been officially represented at the
American Bimetallic League Convention in Chicago during the
sxammer, although there had been no previous endorsement of

65^he Bimetallic Convention was held by the American
Bimetallic League, an independent silver organization
established in St. Louis in November, 1889. Jones, op. cit.,
p. 19.
66 American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1893, p. 60.
The Congressional Record carried petitions advocating free
and unlimited coinage of silver which had been submitted by
the following labor unions: Brotherhood of Painters of
America, No. 72, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Trow Moulders'
Union No. 247, Cleveland, Ohio; Tailors Local Union, Ottumwa,
Iowa, and the Window Glass Workers Assembly No. 300,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. U.S., Congressional Record, 53rd
Cong., 1st sess., 1893, XXV, Parts I and II, pp. 1907, 13681370.
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bimetallism.

67

The convention was called in an effort to

stir public opinion against the repeal of the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act.

68

Samuel Gompers, president of the

American Federation of Labor, agitated on behalf of free
silver in cooperation with the Bimetallic League.

At the

annual Federation convention in 1894, Gompers in his report
stated:
In compliance with the resolution favoring the
remonetization of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1
. . . a large number of circulars were distributed
throughout the country on the subject, and a
better appreciation of the matter is now had by
members of the respective organizations, as well
as our national legislators . .
The convention once more adopted the policy of favoring
the free coinage of silver, 70 although all the national
unions were not in agreement.
dissented.

The typographical union

Also, John McBride, president of the United

Mine Workers, was elected- Federation president over Samuel
Gompers. 71

67
68

Commons and Associates, o£. cit.. II, p. 510.
Jones, op. cit., p. 23.

6Q
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1894, p. 13.
70Ibid., p. 29.
71
Commons and Associates, pp. cit., p. 513.
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Under McBride1s editorship of the American Federationist in 1895, numerous editorials and articles appeared
urging "free silver."

One writer pointed out that the

eastern press, with few exceptions, favored the single
gold standard while the west and south favored bimetallic
currency.

The argument was made that the east was a

creditor to the south and west.

In order to secure money

to develop their resources, the south and west were forced
to turn to eastern financiers.

He further stated that the

solution wanted by the south and west was a return to the
same conditions under which their debts were contracted
prior to 1873.

72

In the writer's logic, the following

a
argument supported his position:
The favorite argument of the gold standard men is
that the silver dollar is only worth 57 cents, but
they cannot deny that an ounce of silver will buy
as much now as it did in 1873, for with silver in
1873 worth $1.32 per ounce, it would buy one
bushel of wheat valued at that time at about $1.30
per bushel, and in 1895, with silver worth 60 cents
an ounce, we can still buy a bushel of wheat, valued
now at about 60 cents. This proves that silver,
measured by all other staples, has not declined,
but that the purchasing power of gold has doubled.73

^2prank L. Hoenes, "The Free Coinage of Silver at a
Ratio of 16 to 1," American Federationist. April, 1895,
p. 22.
73Ibid.
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Another article condemned President Grover Cleveland, a gold
standard man, and closed with "bimetallism is in the air
and is bound to come."

74

In addition to the American Federationist, many other
publications no doubt attempted to influence the workers for
free coinage.

One of the most famous was William H. Harvey's

Coin1s Financial School published in June, 1894.7^
I

In his book, Harvey used the device of placing an
adolescent by the name of Coin upon the platform of the
lecture hall of the Chicago Art Institute.

Eventually,

Chicago's distinguished bankers, businessmen, and scholars
were drawn to the Institute to hear the cogency of his
arguments.

Coin would engage many of them in debate, force

them to admit errors in fact and logic-, and win them over
to the free silver side.

76

These lectures had never occurred,

74American Federation of Labor, Editorial, American
Federationist, May, 1895, p. 31.
7^William H. Harvey, Coin's Financial School (Chicago:
Coin Publishing Company, 1894) 204 pp. See also: William
H. Harvey, Coin1s Financial School, ed. Richard Hofstadter
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1963) 249 pp.
76

.
Corn answered a question supposedly asked by J. R.
Sovereign, Master Workman of the Knights of Labor, on money
based on labor. See Harvey, ed., op. cit., pp. 170-172.
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of course, but many people believed they had.
Harvey's book had become a national best seller
he published a new one, Coin1s School Up to

Since
77

D a t e ,

in 1895,
78 which

contained a new series of imaginary debates.
The Populists circulated among many of the workers
an abstract of organized labor petition^ sent to Congress.
Not only did the petition demand a return to the free and
unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at 16 to 1 and
condemn interest bearing bonds, but also, it expressed
organized labor's attitude toward the demonetization of
silver in 1873:
Again, is'it not obvious to every one that the
striking down of one-half the world's volume of
money makes the remaining half a comparatively
easy matter for capitalists to control and
manipulate, and that toilers, to obtain money

77

.
.
See Jones, op. cit., pp. 32-33 for a detailed
discussion.
7Q

William H. Harvey, Coin's Financial School Up to
Date (Chicago: Coin Publishing Company, 1895).
79Some of the signers of the petition were: J. R.
Sovereign (Knights of Labor), Samuel Gompers (American
Federation of Labor), P. J. McGuire (United Brotherhood o f '
Carpenters and Joiners of America), Frank P. Sargent
(Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen), and John McBride
(United Mine Workers of America). William J. Bryan, The
First Battle, A Story of the Campaign of 1896 (Chicago:
W. B. Conkey Company, 1896), p. 167.
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for the purchase of their food supplies, are
placed entirely at the mercy of the foreign and
American money-sharks, who, by contracting the
currency, can force a panic or famine in money
at their supreme will?
Would they be guilty of such a crime? We only
say in reply, look at our present helpless con
dition. Does it not seem to you, in the light of
the fact here given, that, where in the midst of
plenty there is wide-spread suffering and unhappi
ness, there is considerable meat in the refrain
from Wall Street:
"Dig on, ye toilers, dig; the
legislative button that we press will do the rest."®®
These publications along with numerous other articles and
speeches on the free silver issue aroused even greater
sentiment.

This, coupled with the economic depression of

the nineties, set the stage for William Jennings Bryan's
rise to fame.

William Jennings Bryan and
The American Federation of Labor

(
As the publicity of the financial debates intensified
in 1895, Bryan, with his eloquence and personable manner,
became a leading figure in the Democratic Party.

He wanted

to unite all those who believed in free silver— independents,
Populists, Republicans, and Democrats under one banner and

®®Ibid., pp. 166-167.
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if at all possible, under the Democratic Party.

81

In the presidential campaign of 1896, the money question
became a paramount issue.

The Democratic Convention nomi

nated Bryon upon the silver platform, after hearing his
preliminary oration which ended with the following sentence:
Having behind us the producing masses of this nation
and the world, supported by the commercial interests,
the laboring interest, and the toilers everywhere,
we will answer their demand for a gold standard by
saying to them: You shall not press down upon the
brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not
crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.®^
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of
Labor, stated:
Bryan spoke the language of humanity and he
appeared as the proclaimed savior of the common
people who would break the power of the gold
standard scepter of Wall S t r e e t .
The American Federation of Labor in 1895, reaffirmed
its position on "free silver," with the qualification that
it did "not in any degree endorse any political party that
may have made free coinage a partisan political question.
,
xJones, pp. cit., p. 70.

0*1
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Bryan, op. cit., pp. 199-206.
Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New
E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1925), p. 87.

York:
84
p. 65.
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American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1896,
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This produced a storm from the Bryanites because labor failed
to endorse the Democratic Party and a protest from the
Republicans who interpreted the resolution as favorable to
QC

Bryan.

It is quite evident that some labor groups were

for Bryan as indicated by an editorial in The Electrical
Worker;
The Workingmen's Bryan Club which is a non-partisan
organization, has now a membership of over 2,000
composed of nearly as many Republicans as Democrats
. . . In addition to this central club, ward clubs
have been organized in all the wards in the city,
so that the number of St. Louis Workingmen who have
enrolled their names in the Bryan clubs already
number over 2,500, and hundreds are joining each
meeting night.
The editorial further stated that 35,000 people had appeared
to hear Bryan speak at a mass meeting of the Workingmen
of St. Louis.
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Also, of interest to laborers was an address circulated
by the Central Bryan Club which encouraged the workers to
join their organization.

Their address first attacked Mark

QC

Gompers, loc. cit.
QC

°°The Electrxcal Worker was the official journal of th^
National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, an
affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.
^National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America,
The Electrical Worker. October, 1896, p. 5.
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Hanna,

go

by pointing out

his unfavorable interference with

labor's efforts, but the financial question remained the
most significant topic of the circular.

It appealed to the

workers that "a vote for silver is a vote against foreign
bankers and Wall Street skylocks."

OQ

Despite such efforts as the Bryan Club's, skepticism
prevailed among the workers.

The press secretary of a

local union in San Francisco commented in The Electrical
Worker:
"Sixteen to One and Bryan" is the watchword with a
great many of the boys. They seem to think there
is a scarcity, and I believe they would like to
have some, thinking, perhaps, Mr. Bryan would, by
his election show them an easier road to prosper
ity than by climbing poles. There are also a few
of us who think McKinley and sound money, with
protection, will give us a chance to climb.poles
and earn good hard 100-cent dollars . . .
Employers, in many instances, attempted to influence
and educate their workers in McKinley's behalf by posting
placards in the workshops, distributing pamphlets among

88

Jones, op. cit.. p. 289, points out that
Marcus A. Hanna, campaign manager and influential associate
of- McKinley, was more sympathetic toward labor, organized
and unorganized, than most industrialists.
89

National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America,
The Electrical Worker, loc. cit.
90_,
.^
Ibid.,
p. 8 .

the laborers, hiring shopforemen who were well informed
on the money question, acquiring speakers to talk to the
men during their lunch hour, slipping leaflets into pay
envelopes, developing sound money clubs among the workingmen, and other such actions.
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The presidential election of McKinley proved that
labor in general had not responded to the Democratic appeal
and organized labor was divided among itself.

James R.

Sovereign, head of the Knights of Labor, joined the
Populists who endorsed Bryan while Terence V. Powderly,
ex-president of the Knights, campaigned for the Republicans.
The American Federation of Labor was noncommittal to a
party and Gompers, president of the Federation, stated:
I was for free silver, not the Democratic Party.
If the Democratic Party favored free silver, well
and good, for legislation is altogether too fre
quently enacted by partisan sponsorship.99
At the 1897 Federation convention, W. D. Mahon of the
Street Railway Employers' Association, charged that action
should be taken against President Gompers for collusion
qi

i 5XJones, op. cit.. p. 334.
92Ibid.. pp. 75, 317.
93

Gompers, op. cit., p. 87.
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with the Democratic National Committee.

After an executive

session, the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved,

that we endorse the President's position, dismiss the
charges and exonerate him from blame."

94

Bimetallism was

last mentioned at the American Federation of Labor Con
vention in 1898 when an adopted resolution read as follows:
i

"Bimetallism is so strongly entrenched in the labor move
ment that it is not necessary at this time to debate the
question."

95

National Banking System
Another aspect of the financial question which aroused
labor's interest during the 18901s was the national banking
system, which was established under the National Bank Act
of 1864.

This act was "to provide for a national currency,

secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and provide for
circulation and redemption thereof."

96

A national bank
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^National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America,
"16th Annual Convention of AFL," The Electrical Worker.
January, 1897, pp. 6-7.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1898,
p. 63.
96

For the full act, see: U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on. Banking and Currency, Federal Banking Laws
and Reports. 1780-1912
(Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), pp. 348-374.
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could be established by five or more associates with no
less than $50,000.

In order to issue notes, each national

bank was required to deposit with the Treasury, United
States bonds equal in amount to one third of the capital
stock? the bank was then entitled to receive circulating
notes equal in amount to ninety per cent of the current
market value of the bonds.

The bank association could then

issue the notes which would circulate— in payment of taxes,
lands, salaries, debts, and other demands within the United
States.97
The American Federation of Labor clearly stated their
7

negative attitude toward the System at their convention in
1894 with the adoption of Plank Twelve:
The abolition of the monopoly privilege of issuing
money, and substituting thereof a system of direct
issuance to and by the p e o p l e .
The American Federation of Labor did not point out the method
by.which this should have been accomplished? however, several
writers took it upon themselves to give their recommendations.

97Ibid.. pp. 349, 350, 354, 356,357.
98
p. 50.

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1894,
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One method of fulfilling plank twelve was offered by
J. T. Small, a correspondent for the American Federationist,
who suggested the use of a mutual banking system.

Small

explained that a money free from interest, if at all possible,
was wanted by the people.

Under the National Bank Act,

notes were primarily circulated first through loans to
businessmen at a rate of interest varying from six to twelve
per cent.

Small's plan was based on the formation of mutual

banks by the workers themselves.

Their property would be

pledged as security for their own note issue.

Thus, the

worker could derive the same benefits, minus the excess
interest charge, rather than deal'with a national bank for
a.loan.

. .
99
He urged the workingmen to consider his idea.

But Stephen T. Byington had an entirely different
approach to the "issue of money directly by the people."
He felt that money issuance was a monopoly in the hands of
Congress and their favorites— National Banks.

It was

suggested by Byington that any individual wishing to make a
gold or silver coin or issue paper money of any sort, could

99

J. T. Small, "Mutual Money," American Federationist.
June, 1895, pp. 57-58.
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do so without the approval of the government.

He believed

that people would learn through experience which was of
value and which was not, and eventually uniformity would be
reached to which all would agree.
John McBride, editor of the American Federationist
in 1895, asserted that the strength of the national banks
consisted chiefly of confidence on the part of depositors,
rather than upon their ability to pay dollar for dollar.
He maintained that if all depositors surrendered their
certificates of deposit, and demanded their money, every
national bank in the country would be forced to close its
doors.

This system of confidence and credit, he felt,

was anything but creditable to the government and to the
people.

In conclusion, he stated:

We must take from speculators, bankers and brokers
the power to control our medium of exchange before
interest can be reduced to a minimum, usury be
wiped out, and business done upon a cash rather
than a credit basis.

■^^Stephen T. Byington, "To Abolish Money Monopoly,"
American Federationist, October, 1895, pp. 106-107.
American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "The Kind
of Money Needed," American Federationist. August, 1895,
pp. 84, 85.
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The national banking system and gold standard again
captured the attention of the American Federation of Labor
when the Gage Bill was presented to Congress in December of
1897.

102

Two resolutions pertaining to this bill were

adopted at the Nashville Convention because the Federation
feared adverse effects if the bill passed.

The resolutions

stated that this bill would firmly entrench the gold
standard on the American Economy and would fasten the
national banking system on the people.

The Federation felt

that the bill was simply an undisguised effort to retire
greenback and other government paper money by substituting
national bank notes in their stead.103
In reaction to the American Federation of Labor's
financial resolutions, Secretary of the Treasury Gage wrote
a letter to President Gompers defending his bill.

He

102The bill, H.R. 5181, read as follows:
"To provide
for the refunding of the National debt, for establishing a
redemption fund, and a division of issue and redemption in
the Treasury of the United States and to modify existing
laws respecting National Banks, and for other purposes."
U.S., Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., XXXI,
Part 1, p. 234.
*|no

#

xw-»The bill was sponsored by the Secretary of the
Treasury, Lyman J. Gage. American Federation of Labor,
Proceedings. 1897, p. 113.
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mentioned that if the gold standard was inimical to the
interest of the laboring classes, then it was inimical
to all classes.

He did not believe that the exploitation of

one class by another, either through false weights, partial
laws, or a bad monetary system, could be made to work for the
permanent benefit of the exploiting class.

Gage had also

taken personal offense by the passing of the resolutions
and further stated:
. . . that the permanence of the gold standard (for
which I argue) operates in this evil direction,
then your resolutions of condemnation are well
founded, and I am justly charged, either with an
ignorance which constitutes me a foolish advisor,
or with a perversity of motive which makes me
an evil advisor . . .104
In defense of his position, Gage admonished Gompers and said
that if either Gompers or any of his associates could prove
that the views expressed in the kill were not in the best
interest of the American monetary system, then he would
abandon his efforts.

105

•^^Letter from Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treas
ury, to Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation
of Labor, as cited in American Federationist. January, 189F,
p. 254.
105Ibid., p. 260.
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Gompers immediately wrote a letter of rebuttal to
Gage in which he reaffirmed the Federation's stand on the
Gage Bill.

He pointed out that resolutions were made to

voice the opinion of a group and therefore offered no
arguments.

Hence, the Federation was simply utilizing its

right to express an opinion, as Gage had done by suggesting
the bill.

Gompers discussed at some length the effects a

gold standard would have on the laboring class and concluded
this portion of his defense with the following statement;
You must abandon the advocacy of gold monometalism
unless you can show that the demonitization of
silver and the doubling of the demand for gold
resultant therefrom, has not caused gold to grow
dearer and prices lower to the great injury of
all producers of wealth. You should at least
show that the perpetuation of the gold standard
will not result in making money dearer and human
flesh cheaper. •L06
Gompers questioned Gage quite extensively on the feasibility
of the national bank note substitution, and stressed that
"it will make the banks the masters, the many the slaves,
and would enrich the few and impoverish the multitude."

107

Letter from Samuel Gompers to Lyman J. Gage, cited
in American Federationist. January, 1898, pp. 260-261.
107Ibid.. p. 262.
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Apparently, Gage never replied to Gompers' letter
although he was offered an opportunity.

The bill brought

about a lengthy discussion in the Banking and Currency
Committee of Congress, but was not passed.

Summary
Organized labor during the latter part of the nine
teenth century responded to the needs of
with programs for monetary reform.

its

members

Especially during hard

times, a sufficient supply of money was not available to
the working class and the interest rates on bank loans
further burdened the laborers.

In their dispair, the union

members turned to their leaders to resolve their problems.
Monetary reform was the solution.
The National Labor Union, Industrial Congress and
Industrial Brotherhood, and Knights of Labor advocated the
abolishment of the national banking system and the issue
of paper money by the government directly to the people.
Political action was stressed by various leaders as a
means of achieving labor's goals, and also, a number of
unionists joined the Greenback Labor Party.

Some labor

leaders felt that if money reform transpired, then coopera
tives would be the answer to return labor to its rightful

46
place in society.
Of special significance during this period was the
formation of the American Federation of Labor which was
destined to become a strong representative of the working
class as well as their guide in many important issues.

The

Federation, too, urged the abolition of the national banking
system, but wanted money to be issued by the people, not
/

by the government.

The American Federation of Labor, as

well as the Knights of Labor, recognized that the free and
unlimited coinage of silver was a means by which the worker
could secure additional money, and therefore, participated
in the silver movement.

CHAPTER III

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
THE BANKING SYSTEM 1900-1928

From the time of the passage of the National Banking
Act in 1864, certain inherent weaknesses in the Act were
brought before the public.

Little attention was given to

these defects until the 1890's which marked the beginning
of the banking reform movement.^
Organized labor had been opposed to the System from
its beginning and offered its own solutions to the banking
problems, as was shown in Chapter II.

In 1906, the American

Federation of Labor at the Minneapolis convention slightly
changed its attitude and stated in its Declaration of
Principles:
We favor a system of finance whereby money shall be
issued exclusively by the government, with such
regulations and restrictions as will protect it

•'•Henry Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve (New York:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1915), pp. 25-27.
47

48
from manipulation by the banking interest for their
own private gain.^
This differed from their 1894 statement which specified
"issuance to and by the people,"

not by the government.

There is no doubt that organized labor had justifiable
complaints about the system because one of the basic defects
was the inelasticity of the currency.

This did not mean

that the currency could not be increased, but that it could
not be expanded and contracted in accordance with the
increase and decrease m

the demand for it.

4

In addition to the currency problem, the system lacked
an open market committee for commercial paper, an effective
means of clearing and collection of checks, a provision for
the organization of American banking institutions in foreign
countries to stimulate foreign trade and an overall
cohesiveness and coordination of commercial bank policies.
Also, the actions of the Independent Treasury System, under
which the government acted as a partial custodian of its

2
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1906, p. 239.

3

Supra. Chapter II, p. 39.

^Lawrence E. Clark, Central Banking Under the Federal
Reserve System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935),
p. 12.
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own funds, resulted in irregular withdrawals of money from
bank reserves and from circulation.

This was detrimental

to general business conditions and, in turn, to labor.

5

Further, the reserve arrangement® of the system
worked ineffectively and led to pyramiding of reserves.
For example, country banks would mail their checks to
reserve agents for collection and upon mailing, the checks
would be counted as legal reserve.

The reserve city

banks would do likewise in sending the same checks to the
central reserve banks.

Some checks, therefore, were

counted twice and the legal reserves were inaccurate.

7

Through the pyramiding of reserves, the greatest con
centration of funds was in New York City.

The New York

banks, governed by the profit motive, primarily made call
loans, many of which were used in the securities market.
This entire procedure became quite unsatisfactory during

5

.

A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the
United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915),
pp. 397-399.
g
National banks were required to keep a legal minimum
reserve against their deposits. The amount required depended
upon the bank's classification as: (1) central reserve city
banks, (2) reserve city banks, or (3) country banks. Clark,
o p . cit., p. 4.
,7

Ibid., p. 5.
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periods of credit stringency when the call of these loans
had an unbalancing influence on the money market and stock
exchange transactions.

The effect was felt throughout the

nation and resulted in financial panics.®
The Panic of 1907 definitely emerged from inadequacies
in the banking system.

By the latter part of that summer,

it was apparent that the money market was faltering.
Securities were overvalued by conservative standards, and
building construction was beginning to slacken.

In mid-

October, the panic actually began with runs on some banks
and trust companies. 9

• banks, like depositors, sought
Many

to turn their assets into cash, and thus, loans decreased
and the call-money rate greatly increased.

The banks

tried to lessen the shortage of currency induced by the
private hoarding of cash.

They introduced, on a large

scale, clearinghouse certificates and the Treasury tried to
stem the panic by pouring money into the banks.

With this

®Ibid,., pp. 6-12.
9
On October 22, 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company,
holding $50 million of deposits for 17,000 depositors,
closed its doors. Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss,
Financial History of the United States (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., 1952), p. 253.
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additional amount of currency in circulation, the Panic was
halted.
The financial conditions of 1907 were reflected in
the November convention of the American Federation of Labor.
A delegate from the International Photo-Engravers' Union
of North America, Louis A. Schwarz, blamed the unscrupulous
banking methods of the large financial centers of the country
for the financial panic which seriously affected the
interests of the laboring class.

Business and trade were

demoralized and the demand for labor was reduced.

Schwarz

then offered the following resolution:
. . . that this convention go on record, being the
voice of organized labor, as being unanimously in
favor of any efficient methods that may be employed,
to place the currency of the United States upon a
more elastic and safe basis to prevent the possi
bility of the scarcity of currency, and that this
convention, representing the working people of the
United States, demand of the people's represent
atives in Congress, that immediate steps be taken
toward this e n d . ^
It was further resolved that organized labor was opposed
to the hoarding of currency, and advocated the restoration

•*-Qlbid.. pp. 52-53. See also, Clement Juglar, A Brief
History of Panics, trans. DeCourey W. Thom (New York: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1916), pp. 165-181.
■^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1907,
p. 239.
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of all savings to the different channels that served to
keep the currency of the United States in healthy circu
lation.

The resolution was considered, but it was felt

by the Executive Council that the matter had already been
covered by the Declaration of Principles adopted at the
previous convention.^2
Immediately following the Panic of 1907, Congress took
steps toward correcting the weaknesses in the American
Banking System by passing the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in May
of 1908.

13

The Act was an emergency measure to prevent a

•shortage of currency and to establish a National Monetary
Commission, composed of senators and representatives,

to

make a thorough study of the necessary and desirable
changes in the money and banking system.

The Act was to

expire on June 30, 1914.^
While the Monetary Commission made their study, organ
ized labor continued to urge a system of finance whereby

12Ibid.
13

See J. Laurence Laughlin, The Federal Reserve Act.
Its Origin and Problems (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1933), Appendix C, I, p. 350, for the entire AldrichVreeland Act.
^Studenski and Krooss, pp. pit., p. 254.
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money would be issued by the government.

in 1912, John

H. Collins, a delegate of the Central Labor Union to the
American Federation of Labor Convention, acknowledged that
the President of the United States was going to submit to
the governors of the states a proposition for the creation
of additional banks for the benefit of farmers.

He urged

the convention to support the proposition with certain
conditions; primarily, that if any system for more adequate
money and banking facilities were to be created, then wage
earners, as well as farmers, should be able to obtain
credit at cost.

Collins further resolved:

. . . that we reiterate labor's long continued demand
for a reform in banking and currency that will stop
the abuses that yield monopolistic profits to large
institutions and combinations . . . ®
He stressed that the voice of the representatives of- organ
ized labor had as much right to be heard on the monetary
problem as that of representatives of bankers and business
men.However, the Committee

on Resolutions amended the

proposal to include only the support of the President's

15

American Federation of Labor,Weekly Newsletter.
December 7, 1912, p. 4.
■^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1912,
pp. 90-91.

54

proposition with the primary condition recommended by Collins.
The resolution was then adopted by the Convention.^7

Federal Reserve System as Solution
The passage of the Federal Reserve Act in December, 1913,
brought to a close over twenty-five years of effort for
banking reform.

The Act had been founded on principles and

practices which were calculated to remove the defects of
the National Banking System.

Before the final passage,

conflict had developed between those who favored the Aldrich
Bill (the National Monetary Association plan) and those who
favored the Owen-Glass Bill (Federal Reserve plan).

The

Aldrich plan, supported by many bankers and large business
men, provided for one central bank.

The Federal Reserve

plan authorized a central banking system consisting in part
of regional reserve banks.

The Aldrich plan was rejected

primarily because it was believed that it meant too great a

17Ibid.. p. 378.
ISpor details on legislative history, see Laughlin,
The Federal Reserve Act. Its Origins and Problems, op. cit.,
pp. 161-190.

18
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centralization of power in the hands of the "financial
interests" of Wall Street.

19

Organized labor apparently did not support either the
Aldrich plan or the Federal Reserve Act.

20

Labor leaders

did not take part in the formation of the Federal Reserve
System and labor literature does not reveal any particular
interest toward these two plans.
The American Federation of Labor was pragmatic and
realized that since the Act had passed, they would support
amendments beneficial to the laboring class.

Such as the

case in 1914 when Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington
introduced a bill, S. 6460, to amend the Federal Reserve
System.

The amendment would establish a system through

which loans, not exceeding $5,000, four per cent interest,
and twenty years' duration, would be made to any one person.
The purpose of the loan was for acquiring or improving rural

1Q

3See Clark for a comparison of the Aldrich Plan and
Federal Reserve Act. Op. cit.. pp. 29-31.
Of|

wLysle Winston Cooper, in "Economic Policies and
Theories of the American Federation of Labor," (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Economy, Univers
ity of Chicago, 1925), p. 282, states that he, too, could
find no evidence of American Federation of Labor participa
tion in the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.
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or city property.

Senator Jones, in introducing the bill,

stated:
. . . there are a great many of our people who are
really in a need of assistance who are not in a
position to get their claims presented to Congress.
This bill is intended to furnish relief to deserving
people who cannot avail themselves of the provis
ions of the banking laws where security is required
and a short time given and a high rate of interest
exacted, but who will be able to secure the govern
ment from losses . . .^
It was his intention that the bill would not take the place
of rural credit but would supplement those measures.

In

opposition to the bill, Senator McCumber from North Dakota
stated that it was paternalistic and socialistic, and it
would give that appearance to the average reader.

The bill

was referred to the Banking and Currency Committee but was
not acted u p o n . ^
Organized labor was not discouraged and continued to
push for amendments which they felt would be in their favor.
All the while, they maintained a stand for a system of

^American Federation of Labor, "Uncle Sam to Loan
Money?" Weekly Newsletter. September 12, 1914.
22

U.S. Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
1914, LI, pt. 15, pp. 14763-14764.

57
finance whereby money would be issued exclusively by the
government
Following World War I, organized labor's interest in
financial matters became more acute.

At a trade union

conference held in Washington, D.C., in December, 1919, a
proclamation was issued entitled Labor. Its Grievances.
24
Protests, and Demands.

One grievance section dealt

with credit and its control by private financiers.

Organ

ized labor felt that credit was inherently social and the
"lifeblood of modern business," but the manner in which it
was administered burdened industry rather than served it.
Through credit, unearned incomes of financiers were enhanced
at the expense of earned incomes of the workers.

Therefore,

they urged:
. . . the organization and use of credit to serve
production needs and not to increase the incomes
23

American Federation of Labor Weekly Newsletter. April 4,
1914; September 5, 1914; October 21, 1916. Also, The American
Labor Yearbook. 1917-1918 (New York: Rand School of Social
Science, 1918), p. 59.
24
Labor's Conference, Labor, Its Grievances. Protests.
and Demands (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Labor,
1920), p. 9. See also, Samuel Gompers, Labor's Political
Banner Unfurled (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of
Labor, 1920), p. 8.
"Bankers Should Not Control Credit,"
.American Federation of Labor.Weekly Newsletter, October 16,
1920.
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and holdings of financiers.. Control over credit
should be taken from financiers and should be
vested in a public agency, able to administer
this power as a public trust in the interest of
all

the

_

people.

A statement issued by the Comptroller of the Currency
John Skelton Williams in 1920 was, to organized labor, an
endorsement of their charge that the control of credit by
bankers corrupted the spirit and purpose of industry.
Williams condemned the unjustifiable interest rates by
New York bankers and admitted that industry was hampered by
such charges.

26

Williams further proclaimed that New York

bankers were borrowing money from the Federal Reserve at
four and one-half per cent to six per cent and loaning it
as high as thirty per cent.

27

In support of Williams' condemnation of the exorbitant
interest rates, the American Federation of Labor convention

i

in 1921 demanded prompt enactment by Congress of legislation
to limit the spread between the rate at which member banks
of the Federal Reserve System secured money and the rate

25Ibid.
26

American Federation of Labor, "Labor's Political Pro
gram Includes Finances," Weekly Newsletter, October 23, 1920.
27

American Federation of Labor, "Bankers Lecture Workers
While Trusts Close Mill," Weekly Newsletter, October 30, 1920.

59
they were permitted to charge.

A maximum spread of one and

one-half per cent was recommended and legislation was
demanded to prohibit members of the Federal Reserve from
lending money for speculation.

28

Due to a severe but short-lived downswing of the busi
ness cycle in 1920 and 1921, a number of articles centering
around the money topic appeared in American Federation of
Labor publications,3^ and organized labor became quite
incensed when charges were made by Federal Reserve bankers
and their supporters that high wages were largely respons
ible for this downturn.

The Federal Reserve had recommended

that wages of workers should be reduced to increase business
activity.30

28AFL History, Encyclopedia. Reference Book (Washington,
D.C.: American Federation of Labor, 1924), Vol. II, p. 85.
28

Such titles appeared in the American Federation of
Labor,Weekly Newsletter: "Wall Street Control Seems Grim
Reality," (October 23, 1920), "Tamed Gold Standard is
Wobbly Old Basis," (August 6, 1921), "Bankers Must Let Loose,"
(July 2, 1921), "Bankers Are Blamed," (July 23, 1921), and
"Bankers on Strike," (September 3, 1921). Also, a meeting of
trade union leaders in the Executive Council Chamber of the
American Federation of Labor, February, 1921, pledge^ them
selves to' obtain the public support and recognition of the
administration of credit as a public trust in the interest
of all the people. American Federation of Labor, Weekly
Newsletter. Special Edition, April 9, 1921.
^American Federation of Labor, "Banks Check Home Build
ing by Exacting High Interest," Weekly Newsletter, December
3, 1921.

One journalist for the American Federation of Labor
noted that during 1921, the New York Federal Reserve Bank
had accumulated extremely high profits and had raised
salaries of its officials— an occurrence that had caused
discussion in the United States Senate.

31

Senator Lee S.

Overman of North Carolina stated that the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York had spent seventeen million dollars in the
erection of one of the finest bank buildings in the world
and had hired men from surrounding banks at quandrupled and
quintupled salaries.

He explained that the Federal Reserve

System was intended to be operated >on a non-profit basis,
but the law had been amended so Federal Reserve Banks could
retain one hundred per cent surplus.

Since profits were

so large, the senator said, the Federal Reserve bankers
"are wasting it by increasing salaries over seven million
since 1919. and by erecting these extravagent buildings."32
A defense of salaries paid to Federal Reserve Bank
officials was made by H. Parker Willis, an employee of the

Op

^American Federation of Labor, "Banks Boost Salaries:
Howl Wage Deflation," Weekly Newsletter. December 24, 1921.
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Federal Reserve Board.

He stated that a comparison could

not be made between the Federal Reserve salaries and those
of other government officials whose salaries were based
largely on custom and tradition.

A reporter for the

American Federation of Labor was amused at such a defense
because "trade unionists are called upon to present their
living costs and bare necessities to men who insist that
'there are no classes in this country.'"

33

Alarmed by these attacks on the Federal Reserve System
and banking institutions in general, its defenders intro
duced in Congress in 1922, H. R. 11217:
To make punishable by law the offense of spoken,
statements or

The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor
took a firm stand of oppostion to this bill.

They felt

that such legislation was an attempt to protect the privileged
few from criticism of their acts and to limit free speech
and press.

The Council noted that if the bill passed, it

would be considered a misdemeanor to denounce

the inc reased

■^American Federation of Labor, "Bankers Employee
Defends Big Salary," Weekly Newsletter. April 22, 1922.
■^U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1922, LXII, Part 5, p. 5207.
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salaries paid by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Also if any Congressman advocated a measure for the pro
tection of the people from illegal banking acts, he could
be fined $5,000, imprisoned for five years, or b o t h . ^

To

organized labor's satisfaction, the bill did not pass.
While the bankers insisted on wage reductions to offset
cyclical downturns, trade union delegates at the 1921
convention of the American Federation of Labor had their
own solutions.

E. H. Fitzgerald and A. C. Hay of the

Brotherhood of Railway Clerks demanded that a movement be
instituted to-enforce labor's legal rights to legal tender
money, and to refuse the acceptance of Federal Reserve
notes, National Bank notes and bank checks.

No doubt

Fitzgerald and Hay wanted to accept "hard money"— gold and
silver coins.

Other portions of the resolution offered

alternatives to Congress.

One requested the repeal of all

banking acts and the withdrawal of legal protection to
bankers.

Another urged the governmental establishment of

banks and the liquidation of government bonds into legal

35

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922,
pp. 107, 339.

/
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tender money.

Because of the complicated nature of the

Hay-Fitzgerald resolution and the near adjournment of the
convention, the Resolution Committee referred it to the
Executive Council for further study.

36

At the next convention, in 1922, the Executive
Council reported that it had made a thorough investigation
!
into the subject of currency, credit, and banking, as had
been suggested by previous convention resolutions.

The use

of savings and funds of the workers deposited in banks,
the methods and use of credit, and the practicability of
stabilizing the purchasing power of money were the main
issues under consideration.

The investigation was made on

the assumption that the workers' savings were being used
by the banking institutions to discredit, crush, and destroy
37
trade unions and to favor the employer.
The Executive Council inquired into the extent to which
bankers controlled industrial enterprises and commercial
activities.

It was found that although the banking system

36

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1921,
pp. 302-303, 470-471.
•^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922,
p. 88.

in the United States dominated industry and commerce in
the sense that industrialists and merchants needed loans
by banks, the exact form of domination could not be
ascertained.

It was,agreed that bankers were in a position

to exert great influence over the business policies of
concerns which required large amounts of capital and were not
financially strong.

Also, there were instances in which

bankers were on boards of industrial enterprises and
industrialists were on boards of banks.

These were con

sidered unfair practices because of the effect on banking
opportunities.

Therefore, the Council concluded that an

effort should be made to secure a complete division between
the financial and the industrial and commercial enterprises.
Since the problem was too complex, the Council requested an
authorization to give the subject additional consideration
before offering a definite plan of action.

38

Special attention was given'to the control and influence
of banks over the industrial relations policies that might
be enforced upon employers in their dealings with wage
earners.

It was disclosed that bankers, generally speaking,

38Ibid.
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I

were opposed to the trade union movement and they often
tried to compel employers to assume an attitude toward
trade unions which would weaken, if not destroy, the
organization.

Nevertheless, the Executive Council did
\

admit that bankers could also be influenced by manufacturers, merchants, and trade associations. 39
Several proposals had been offered to the Council as
means of improving the financial situation.

It was

suggested that the government undertake the establishment
of banks to compete with the private ones, but the Council
had not proceeded far enough in their investigation to
make an official statement along these lines.

Other

proposals considered were to liberalize the postal savings
bank system
union b a n k s . ^

and to encourage the establishment of trade
The Council felt that organized labor's

strongest weapon in dealing with the control by bankers
was the savings deposits of union members and their friends.
The boycott method could be used against those bankers whose

^ I b i d .. 'p. 89.
40

41

Supra. Chapter III, p. 68.
Supra, Chapter III, p. 74.
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AO

aims and policies were detrimental to the labor cause. ^

Also, the Executive Council had made an inquiry into
the practicability of stabilizing the purchasing power of
the monetary unit.

They had given consideration to the

plans of Professors Fisher of Yale, Sprague of Harvard,
and Cassel of Sweden.^

No official recommendation was

made and the Council concluded:
Every influence and interest in our national life
should rise above selfishness to a spirit of pro
moting the future welfare of all and to that end
should cooperate with the national government in
finding a proper solution to this most urgent need
of our time— a more stable medium of exchange.44
The American Federation of Labor showed its cooper
ation in achieving this goal when it participated in the
hearings on Stabilization held by the Committee on Banking
and Currency.

Congressman James Strong of Kansas defended

the following bill, H. R. 11806:

42

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, op. cit.,
pp. 90-91.
^ S e e Irving Fisher, Stabilizing the Dollar (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1920), 296 pp. For a summary of the
plans by Gustav Cassel and 0. M. W. Sprague, see Joseph S.
Lawrence, Stabilization of Prices (New York: The Macmillar;
Co., 1928), pp. 122, 125, 293-300.
44

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, loc. cit.
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A bill to amend the act approved December 23, 1913,
known as the Federal Reserve Act; to define certain
policies toward which the power of the Federal
Reserve System shall be directed; to further promote
the maintenance of a stable gold standard; to pro
mote the stability of commerce, industry, agriculture
and employment; to assist in realizing a more stable
purchasing power of the dollar, and for other pur
poses. ^
Mr. W. C. Hushing, Legislative Representative of the
American Federation of Labor, testified that his organt
ization was interested in that portion of the bill which
dealt with stabilizing the purchasing power of the dollar.
But there was some doubt in his mind whether the bill
would accomplish that purpose.

He hastily added, however,

that the bill was a start in the right direction.

Mr. Strong

explained that it was improbable, if not impossible, to have
absolute stabilization.

However, the purpose of the bill was
*
to use the Federal Reserve's money and credit policies in
such a way as to reduce the fluctuations to a minimum.
Mr. Hushing admitted that he was not an economist, but to
him, the bill seemed to be a practical way to begin and he

45

.
.
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings. Stabilization, 70th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
1929, p. 1.
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agreed that the American Federation of Labor would endorse
the bill.

AC.

But the Strong Bill was not reported out of

the Banking and Currency Committee.
Organized labor was demonstrating a more mature effort
by having a representative at the hearing,and by so doing,
was expanding into the area of banking and currency.

It

was quite evident from Mr. Hushing's testimony that the
Federation was in need of trained economic advisors who
could more ably understand and present organized labor's
viewpoint.

Postal Savings Banks
As early as 1891, postal savings banks had received
attention at the American Federation of Labor Convention
when a delegate offered a resolution for the establishment
of these banks by the government.

The resolutions committee,

however, felt that it was an inopportune time for such
legislation because of other pressing trade union matters.^7

46
47
p. 39.

Ibid., pp. 409-410.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1891,
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In September of 1895, an editorial in the American
Federationist proclaimed that the postal savings banks
"would be the safest and best form of banking for the
people."

It was explained that such a system was quite

successful in Great Britain and was in practical operation
in Canada.

The editor encouraged postal savings because

he believed the fairly high rate of interest paid by, and
the absolute safety of, the system would make it an ideal
depository for wage earners' savings.

Furthermore, it would

encourage thrift among wage earners, as well as lessen the
power of the capitalists.

48

This editorial apparently

reflected the feeling of the majority of the Federation
for the Convention in December of that year by resolution
officially urged the establishment of a Postal Savings
System.

49

At the 1897 convention, Millard Lloyd, a delegate from •
the Illinois State Federation of Labor submitted a more
detailed resolution on the establishment of postal savings
banks.

He wanted these banks to be independent of all

AQ

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Postal
Savings Banks," American Federationist, September, 1895,p. 125.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1895, p. 68.
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banking systems then in operation in the United

S t a t e s . ^0

The resolution was adopted, but it was clarified by another
delegate who recommended that it be understood that the
American Federation of Labor was not in favor of national
banks as depositories of postal savings.
The following year, the Executive Council reported
that no progress had been made in the establishment of this
system, but the promoters had agreed to the Federation's
amendment to exclude national banks as depositories.

CO

It

was not until the Panic of 1907 that consideration was
again given by the Federation Conventions to the matter of
a postal savings system.

The delegates of the American

Federation of Musicians felt that such a financial state
would not occur in nations where postal savings banks were
established.

Whether or not this was a correct assumption,

they felt the savings of the people would be assured and a
simple demand for their deposits would be honored.

There

fore, it was again resolved that the American Federation
of Labor pursue a course of pushing for the establishment

^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1897, p. 3*.
51Ibid., p. 74.
52

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1898, p. 24.

of postal savings banks, and this demand continued through
1909.53
This objective of organized labor became a reality
when in June, 1910, the Federal Government established the
Postal Savings System.

The Act provided that from the

postal savings fund, five per cent was to be deposited
with the Treasury of the United States and thirty per cent
could be invested in United States bonds.

54

Organized

labor, however, was not in favor of that portion of the
legislation^ which provided that the remainder of the
funds could be deposited with national or state banks if
secured by public obligations.

The Act did not provide

for loaning of funds, and in 1912, the American Federation
of Labor adopted a resolution encouraging loans to the
EC
laboring people for residential improvement purposes. °
Along these' same lines, the Federation Convention of 1913
adopted a resolution favoring an amendment which would

Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1907,
pp. 169, 335; Proceedings, 1909, p. 209.
^American

54 Studenski and Krooss, op. cit., p. 248.
^ Supra. Chapter II, p. 39.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1912,
p. 379.
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enable school district trustees to take their school
district bonds to the Federal trustees of the postal savings
fund and borrow money without the intervention of a third
party.^

This effort represented a combination of interests

which linked their concern for the educational welfare of
their children-with their own monetary aims.
In 1912, an editorial in the Weekly Newsletter pro
claimed the instant popularity of the postal savings
system.

58

But, in reality, it was not the immediate success

its sponsors had visioned.

CQ

#

At the 1913 Federation Con

vention, Thomas Wright of the Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators and Paperhangers of America, recommended that
Congress alter the postal banks by removing all maximum
limitations of deposits, eliminating the provision of
redepositing savings in private banks, and establishing
checking account facilities.

Thus, the postal savings banks

c n

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1913,
p. 276. The Convention Proceedings of 1916 mentioned that
organized labor was unable to secure passage of this legis
lation. Proceedings, 1916, p. 98.
CQ

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Postal
Savings Banks Win," Weekly Newsletter, November 23, 1912.
^^Studenski and Krooss, op. pit., p. 249.
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would be in competition with the private banks.

After much

discussion, it was recommended that this proposal be referred
to the Executive Council and not adopted at that time
because of the pending legislation in Congress, the Federal
Reserve Bill.

The Resolution Committee felt that Wright's

idea might be misconstrued or limit the Council. 60 ' Yet,
there is no evidence of American Federation of Labor
participation in the hearings on the Federal Reserve Bill.
But organized labor continued to maintain a position
advocating increases in the amount of deposits in the
postal savings banks.

When deposit limitations were

increased from $500 to $1,000 in 1916,
definite progress had been made.

it

felt that

61

Proposals for change were not mentioned again until
the downturn of the business cycle in 1920-21.

The following

year, the Executive Council reported that a recommendation
had been made to enlarge the facilities and to increase the
amount of and the interest on deposits.

The recommendation

60

. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1913,
pp. 276-277.
61
p. 98.

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1916,
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was issued in opposition to private bankers, who they felt
were partially responsible for the unstable financial conditions.

Prom that time, their interest in Congressional

legislation to amend the postal savings system declined.
Organized labor began to look for other solutions to their
money and banking problems.
Labor Banks
Although several writers

63

have given consideration to

the area of labor banking, it would be negligent to omit
it from this study.

At the time some union delegates pushed

for postal savings and government ownership of banks, others
wanted to place the wage earners' savings in labor's own
financial institutions.

This was another reform measure

proposed to bypass the private bankers and the high interest
rates to workers.®^

62

The American Federation of Labor

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922,

p. 90.
®^See for example, Richard Boeckel, Labor's Money
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923), 181 pp.? J.
B. S. Hardman and Associates, American Labor Dynamics
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), 432 pp.? H. J.
Hamblen, "The Labour Bank in America," The Economic Review,
September 15, 1927, V.15, pp. 375-376.
®^For complete detail, see: Industrial Relation
Section, Princeton University, The Labor Banking Movement
in the United States (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1929), 376 pp.
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Conventions from 1904 to 1919 spasmodically considered
resolutions urging labor banking, but all proposals were
rejected by the conservative leaders of the Federation.
In analyzing the attitude of the American Federation
of Labor toward labor banking, it must be understood that
the two national unions which were most active in this
area, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, were outside the
Federation.

gc

It has been generally accepted that the

first labor bank opened in this country was the Mount Vernon
Savings Bank in May, 1920.

This bank was sponsored by the

National officers of the International Association of

65Ibid., p. 131.
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Machinists, an affiliate of the American Federation of
T ,
66
Labor.
In 1920, the Machinists delegates submitted a resolu
tion at the Federation convention for approval of labor
banks, credit unions, and cooperative banking.

Action was

taken by the Federation to approve the cooperative move
ment through the authorization of a Bureau on Cooperative
Societies under Federation control.

67

Neither at this

convention nor the following one did labor banking receive

66

In 1918, the Central Labor Council of Seattle,
Washington, was making plans for a banking institution which
would be known as the Trades Union Savings and Loan Associ
ation. Its board of directors was to be composed of each of
the unions holding stock. The institution was started in
March, 1919, and had deposits of $61,147.
It was noted that
a large part of the banks1 assets were in Liberty bonds and
that the state auditor credited it as 17th in reference to
savings and assets. By June of that year, the bank appeared
to a reporter to be making favorable progress among the
local trade unionists, and the deposits passed $80,000.
However, it is doubtful that this institution accepted
demand deposits and for this reason was probably excluded
from labor bank listings. American Federation of Labor,
Weekly Newsletter. December 28, 1918, '-Union Savings Bank,"
May 17, 1919; "Savings Bank Grows," June 7, 1919.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1920,
pp. 176-180, 281-282, 396-397.

approval, and all resolutions were defeated without debate. 68
The Executive Council did not feel

it was

in a position

to take a stand on this matter and no doubt the conservative
attitude of Gompers had an important influence on this
decision.

The Executive Council in 1922, when considering

labor banks, stated that few trade unions were so organized
as to permit them to enter into the banking business.
Because of the need of funds to be used in defense of
strikes or lockouts and for the payment of other benefits,
the Council believed it unwise for the unions to convert
their funds into working capital of a bank, which, if
incorporated, could be sued and the funds seized.

The

Executive Council concluded with this statement:
While we believe trade union banks are possible,
we believe that such ventures should be considered
with caution and should be approached with extreme
care.69
The death of Gompers in 1924, and the election of
William Green to succeed him as president of the American
Federation of Labor did not cause any marked changes in

68

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922,
pp. 205, 222-223, 253, 373-374, 389-390.
69

Ibid.. pp. 90-91.
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the attitude of the Federation.

The Executive Council

reports continued to maintain an air of conservatism and
in 1929 stated:
A bank is one of the most sensitive of economic
agencies. Unions engaging in banking enterprises
should assure themselves by every precaution
possible for the competency and dependability of
their technical advisors. They should avail them
selves of all the supervision and counsel obtain
able through state banking authorities and the
federal reserve system. Such precautions meet
with corresponding reward in public confidence
and the safety of the bank itself. A number of
labor banks are developing sound and wise policies
and are a credit to our labor movement. Labor
banking, however, is as yet in the experimental
stage and should be accordingly safeguarded, and
we urge greatest caution upon all those connected
with them. Our action is based upon our realization
of the close connection between these banks and
the labor movement.^0
That same year, on the fifth anniversary of the
Federation Bank and Trust Company of New York, President
Green wrote to Peter J. Bradley, President of the Bank:
I am proud of your achievement. The work which you
have done shows that labor and labor's representa
tives are competent to manage and control their own
financial institutions.^

70

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1928,

p. 74.
71

.

American Federation of Labor, "Union Bank Prospers:
Labor Ability Proven," Weekly Newsletter. May 26, 1928.
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Yet, in general, labor banking was only a short lived
venture which proved to be unsuccessful.

''

The most rapid

expansion came between 1922 and 1924 when there was an
increase in the number of banks from 7 to 25, and reached
a peak in 1926 with 36.

Thereafter, a decline set in with

only seven in operation m

1932.

72

Labor banking was encouraged by professional promoters
who gathered interest among local labor leaders.

Under a

disguise of offering assistance, some of these promoters sold
to labor groups banks of questionable financial soundness.
These unsound purchases eventually contributed to some bank
failures.

Other causes of failure varied from lack of
7^

support to incompetent management .'

•

Many of the union

groups were moving into an area where they lacked practical
experience.

Some of the union officials were exerting more

efforts in the financial arena than around the bargaining
table.

Too, there is no doubt that the depression starting

in 1929 contributed to the liquidation of many of the banks.

72

American Labor Yearbook (New York:
Social Science, 1932), p. 187.
7^

Rand School of

'^Commons and Associates, op. cit.. IV, p. 576.
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The notable feature of the movement is that organized
labor did recognize that they were in an unfavorable position
in dealing with the private bankers.

Thus, it tried to solve

this problem by establishing its own financial institutions.
Summary
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the
most significant change in the banking system of the United
States occurred with the passage of the Federal Reserve Act
in 1913.

Organized labor did not participate directly in the

hearings pertaining to the establishment of the Federal
Reserve, but it recognized the complexity of the monetary
issues.

It lacked a comprehensive understanding of the

monetary legislation and realized the need for expert advice.
The influence of Samuel Gompers' conservatism was
examplified by the American Federation of Labor's rejection
of radical monetary proposals.

It did, however, encourage

the establishment of a postal savings system and strongly
urged that labor banks be undertaken with caution.
The interest exhibited by organized labor during this
period was a prelude to increased participation in govern
ment hearings and to a greater movement into lobbying for
those monetary proposals which it supported.

CHAPTER IV

REOGRANIZATION AND REFORM DURING
THE GREAT DEPRESSION

For over thirty years, numerous economists and
historians1 have delved into complicated and lengthy studies
of the causes and effects of the Great Depression— a
depression that was not just a unique feature to the United
States economy but was worldwide in scope.. Concentration
in this chapter will be on organized labor, which as a
portion of the masses affected by this financial crisis,
expressed its reactions toward banking and monetary reform
measures and offered its own solutions.

See: Marcus Nadler and Jules I. Bogden, The Banking
Crisis (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933); Chester
A. Phillips, T. F. McManus, and R. W. Nelson, Banking and
the Business Cycle, A Study of the Great Depression in the
United States (New York: The McMillan Co., 1937); James F.
T. O'Conner, The Banking Crisis and Recovery Under the
Roosevelt Administration
(Chicago: Callagan and Co., 1938);
C. C. Colt and N. S. Keith, 28 Days, A History of the
Banking Crisis (New York: Greenberg, Publisher, 1933);
Charles R. Whittlesey, Banking and the New Deal (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1935); Leonard P. Ayers, The
Economics of Recovery (New York: McMillan Co., 1933).
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In the early part of 1929, organized labor became quite
alarmed over the phenomenal rise in stock prices.

An

American Federation of Labor correspondent reported that
the Federal Reserve System, which was intended to guard the
nation's credit and stop money stringencies, had been
attacked by Dr. H. Parker Willis, a professor of Banking
at Columbia University.

"For long years past," the professor

stated, "the Federal Reserve has been wasting its resources
and following unsound banking principles in several
distinct directions."

He requested that the Federal Reserve

cease aiding Wall Street and stop "bootlegging its accom/
The correspondent noted,

modations to the stock market."

with a tone of sarcasm, that this was a diplomatic manner
of suggesting that the bankers cease using the people1s
money to gamble on Wall Street.

2

The Federal Reserve did take action in February, 1929,
when it warned member banks to cease using funds for
speculative purposes.

The American Federation of Labor

felt that this notice showed how government officials could
change front, for in 1928, Governor Young of the Federal

2

American Federation of Labor, "Credit Strangled by
Bootleg Banking," Weekly News Service. February 2, 1929.

Reserve Board had stated that loans to brokers were "a
legitimate credit function."'
Also, the Federation was inclined to agree with a
statement by Paul M. Warburg, "a noted financier, and
substantial c i t i z e n , t h a t the Federal Reserve by March
of 1929 had lost control of the money market to the
speculators of Wall Street.

When the crash came in

October, there is no doubt that organized labor held the
Federal Reserve partrally responsible. 4
Even with the collapse of the stock market, the
Federation, as the general public, could not foresee that
an unusually severe depression was developing.

In the

early months of 1930, there was a slight recovery associated
with an increase in automobile production arid improvements
in nonresidential construction.

Yet, the decline in

production and prices by the mid-1930's, along with the
stock market fiasco, had created a downward revision in both
short-term and long-term expectations.

In the early months

of 1931, the American economy again seemed to be staging

3
.
American Federation of Labor, "Stock Market Panic
Aided by Uncle Sam," Weekly News Service, February 16, 1929.
4

American Federation of Labor, "Speculators Control
U.S. Money Market," Weekly News Service. March 16, 1929.
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a recovery but the international financial structure
collapsed completely, deepening the depression in the United
States.
During this period, the Federation was informed that,
because of a decline in prices, some banks would not extend
credit to businessmen until workers' wages were reduced.
The argument given by bankers was that a decline in the
costs of living meant that a wage cut would not lower
standards of living.

The Federation contended that the

maintenance of wage rates was a dynamic factor in sus
taining economic growth and in supporting confidence.

It

was up to the American bankers "to get money out of the
banks and into circulation" through!loans to business.
To organized labor, the bankers could perform their
functions more wisely if they had regular and intimate
contacts with production technicians and representatives
of wage earners.

The bankers had to take into account the

welfare of the worker as well as all other economic groups
and organized labor was looking to them to help stabilize
the income of the wage earners.^

5American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1931,
pp. 87-88.

}
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But the workers were presented a pessimistic view by
the Federation's Monthly Survey of Business:
i

Business here has been passing through a mild panic.
The situation abroad, railroad difficulties, wage
cuts and unemployment all have contributed to destroy
confidence. Fear creates dangerous situations,
threatening crisis. Many people, frightened for the
safety of their funds, have withdrawn their money
from banks; bank runs have forced the banks to get
ready cash by selling securities for any price they
would bring. Not only has this caused heavy losses
because security prices are very low; the dumping
of securities on the market has driven prices even
lower, and the bankers' difficulties have prevented
the granting of credit to business undertakings.®

Banking Legislation
Despite the general feeling of despair, the American
Federation of Labor assured its members that there were
signs of increasing confidence in the economy among bankers
and businessmen.

President Hoover, in September, 1931,

had proposed a plan to the Federal Reserve Advisory Council
that the banks form a pool which would create a fund to
supply ready cash to weaker banks through loans on bank
assets.

£

.

.

.

American Federation of Labor, "Restoring Confidence
At Home," Monthly Survey of Business. October 19, 1931.
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National Credit Corporation
The National Credit .Corporation was chartered on
October 13, 1931, and capital was raised by having the
banks subscribe two per cent of their net deposits.

Weak

banks could secure ready cash from the Corporation for
assets which were sound but could not be given as security
for loans from the Federal Reserve Banks.

The Federation

noted that this plan was designed to stop runs on the banks,
halt the stock market decline, and make it easier for banks
to grant credit for business endeavors.7
In April, 1932, the National Credit Corporation came
under critical review of a Federation writer.

In his

estimation, it first prevented a number of unnecessary bank
failures, but in the final analysis was not competent to
handle the situation and failed to re-establish confidence.
As a private organization, it was not ready to take the
necessary risks, and only $155,000,000 was loaned to 575
banks.

8

William Green, president of the American Federation. .

of Labor,stated:

7Ibid.
Q

American Federation of Labor, "What the Banks Owe for
Government Help," American Federationist. April, 1932,
p. 445.
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In the failure of the National Credit Corporation
we have seen the failure of even collective action
of private banks to meet the urgent need so that a
government agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corpor
ation, was established to conserve the intrinsic
values in investments.9

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
An air of optimism was prevalent among organized labor
leaders when President Hoover's annual budget message of
December, 1931, recommended the establishment of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

In Hoover's opinion,

this corporation "would not overlap those
of the National Credit Corporation."'1'0

([functional

Its purpose was to

meet the emergency credit strains by granting loans to banks,
insurance companies, railroads, and farmers, thereby
releasing frozen credit for its normal use in trade.

On

January 22, 1931, the bill was signed and the United States
Treasury subscribed to $500 million in capital stock.

The

Corporation had the power to make loans up to two billion
dollars.

The American Federation of Labor gave full approval

of this emergency measure and stated:

g

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Will Private
Banks Measure Up?" American Federationist. March, 1932,
p. 261.
^°Studenski and Kross, op. cit.. p. 372.
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We may reasonably expect that it will reduce bank
failures, help to restore confidence and return
money and credit to productive channels of trade.
If it accomplishes these ends, it will do more to
restore business than any other move possible at
this time.
In February, 1932, organized labor congratulated
Congress on their good teamwork in carrying forward the
President's reconstruction program, especially the estab
lishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

The

Federation's Monthly Survey of Business mentioned that
besides checking bank failures, the various financial bills
proposed and those already passed by Congress were intended
to help solve three other pressing financial problems:
hoarding, inadequate loans to business, and the declining
yield in the bond market.12
Yet, the Research Department of the American Feder
ation of Labor felt that while Congress's measures prepared
the way for business recovery, it would only come about
when buying power was restored to the people.13

In the

^American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit,"
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.
12American Federation of Labor, "Credit and Business,"
Monthly Survey of Business. February 19, 1932.
13Ibid.
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following month, they reported that business confidence
was gaining.

This was largely due to the Reconstruction

Finance Corporation, which had prevented a large number
of bank failures.
money to the banks.

Also, hoarders began to return their
Other gains in the fields of finance

included an increase in bond prices and loans to railroads.14
However, by January of 1933, it was quite, evident to
the Federation that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
had not fulfilled the needs of the laborers.

Even though

it had helped to forestall bank failures, credit had not
been extended by the banks to business.

Instead, loans

were called, plants were forced to close, men were laid
off and unemployment increased.

In addition, the suggestion

by organized labor for increased buying power was not heeded
and wages were still being cut.15
To further complicate the depression was the banking
crisis in the early part of 1933.

The American Federation

of Labor realized that the banks were caught "in a closing
vice" and that the banking difficulties were too widespread

14
American Federation of Labor, "Business Confidence
Gains," Monthly Survey of Business. March 19, 1932.
15American Federation of Labor, "Only Production
Creates Wealth," Monthly Survey of Business. January, 1933.
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to be met by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

16

The Hoover administration, in organized labor's opinion,
had based its policy on the theory that deflation could be
cushioned by loans from this Corporation and once confidence
was restored, business would of itself be strong enough to
move the economy forward.

Congress had not made the

fundamental adjustment to make this program effective.

Only

stronger Federal action could check the forces of deflation
and turn business upward.17
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation1s lending
powers were to expire in January, 1933, but they were
extended from time to time by Presidential order and by
subsequent amendments.

In 1934, Representative McLeod of

Michigan introduced a bill, H.R. 8479, authorizing this
Corporation to purchase all remaining assets of closed
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System.

18

At the hearings, representatives of the American Feder
ation of Labor urged that closed non-member state banks

17Ibid.
1 ft

xoU. S., Congressional Record. 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1934, LXXVIII, part 7, p. 7156.
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also be included.

19

The McLeod Bill was amended by the

Committee on Banking and Currency to include all banks,
and the bill, S. 1175, passed in the summer of 1935.^®
No doubt organized labor wanted to insure' that its
members who had deposits in closed state banks would have
their losses restored.

This was another indication of the

increased interest and participation of the American
Federation of Labor in the area of banking legislation.

Home Loan Bank System
During the Hoover administration, attempts were made
in other ways to protect capital institutions and prevent
further deflation.

The Home Loan Discount Bank Bill was

supported by organized labor in January, 1932, as a con
structive measure to improve the confidence of the
people.

21

The Bill was passed in July, 1932, and the

^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1934,
pp. 80, 550. See also, American Federation of Labor.
History. Encyclopedia. Reference Book, (Washington, D.C.:
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 1960), Vol. Ill, p. 286.
20
U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1935, LXXIX, part 14, pp. 39, 643, 644.
^•^•American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit, "
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.

system was started with a capital of $125 million provided
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Twelve banks

were established with authority to rediscount first mortgages
for lending institutions, such as savings banks, building
and loan associations, and insurance companies.

Yet, the

American Federation of Labor was somewhat apprehensive
about the Home Loan Banks' permanence and wondered if
these Banks, like other programs, would not just perpetuate
wrong principles and mistakes.
Despite the Federation's doubts, it agreed that the
system would offer the working man an opportunity to borrow
money to prevent foreclosures and would later promote home
.

building.

00

But the fears of the Federation proved to be

well based for it soon became apparent that the Home Loan
Banks could not offer much relief to the distressed home
owner, and by March, 1933, only $9 million of rediscounts
were outstanding.

23

00

American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business, August 24, 1932.
OO

#

■ “’Studenski and Kross, op. cit., p. 373.

93
Glass-Steagall Act
In the early thirties, the banking authorities were
faced with a problem when attempts were made to expand
the currency.

Under the Federal Reserve Act, Federal

Reserve notes had to be backed by at least 40 per cent in
gold with the remainder secured by commercial paper.

Due

to the decline in business activity which resulted in a
decrease in the supply of commercial paper, notes had to
be backed increasingly by gold.

Thus, there was a serious

threat to the expansion of the currency.

To meet this

danger, and also to make possible emergency loans from
Federal Reserve banks, the Glass-Steagall bill was proposed.
The American Federation of Labor assured its members
that Congress was trying every means to restore confidence
andi "return money to business" when they stated:
On February 15, another measure, the Glass
Steagall bill, to open new reservoirs of credit,
was passed by the House. It liberalizes Federal
Reserve restrictions so that the Reserve banks
may lend funds to their member banks on any
sound security, such as good bonds or mortgages
so that money may be more readily available.
The passage of this bill will free some $2,500,000
more credit. These measures are carefully safe
guarded against dangers of unsound inflation.?4

^American Federation of Labor, "Credit.and Business,"
Monthly Survey of Business. February 19, 1932.
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When the Glass-Steagall bill passed in February, 1932, the
provisions included an expiration date of March, 1933, which
was extended from tune to txme thereafter.

25

t

An article in the American Federationist helped to
explain to the worker the basic provisions of this Act.
Besides mentioning that member banks could borrow from any
Federal Reserve Bank even if they did not have the security
which had been previously required, the article also mention
ed that gold reserves would be freed.

The Glass-Steagall

Act permitted the Reserve Banks to use, instead of commercial
paper, United States bonds, for the sixty per cent reserve
against the paper money in circulation.

Thus, the worker

was reassured that when foreign countries required large
payments in gold from the United States, the Federal Reserve
Banks would not be under a severe strain.

Therefore, there

was no immediate cause to fear normal gold withdrawals.26
With these various emergency measures being passed for
banking relief, it was the opinion of a Federation writer
that:

25
26

Clark, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

American Federation of Labor, "What the Banks Owe
for Government Help," American Federationist. April, 1932,
pp. 446-447.
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If the banks now fail to carry out the government's
■* purpose by adopting a courageous credit policy and
considering the needs of the community when loans
are asked, they are repudiating their obligations
to the country. Millions who are suffering from
will hold them respon-

Goldsborough Bill
Various members of the seventy-second Congress began
to introduce inflationary bills when they realized that the
Federal Reserve was not succeeding in bringing prosperity
to the country.

In the spring of 1932, one group proposed

the Goldsborough Bill, which contended that the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve banks were charged
with the duty of taking all available steps of reflating
wholesale commodity prices "to the level existing before
the existing deflation," and stabilizing prices at that
level.

Also, this bill would have broadened the Federal

Reserve's open-market operations and authorized the Board
to raise or lower the official price of gold. 28

^ Ibid.. p. 448
28

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings; H.R. 10517. 72nd Cong. 1st Sess.,
1932.
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W. C. Hushing, the legislative representative of the
American Federation of Labor, participated in this hearing—
as he had on the Strong Bill (1928)— and said that his
organization was in favor of the provisions for stabilization
of the price level.2®

In his testimony, Mr. Hushing stated:

You understand, of course, we are not financiers,
and it would be foolish for us to come to the
Committee on Banking and Currency and endeavor to
tell you how this thing should be brought about,
but we are in favor of the principles involved
here, and we come here and indorse it, stand
behind it heartily, and leave it to you gentle
men to figure out the details as to how it shall
be made effective.3®
The American Federation of Labor passed over such
"old standbys" as free silver and greenbacks to support
the Goldsborough Bill.

This decision could have been based

on Irving Fisher's support of this Bill3^ for the Feder
ation had previously considered his plan on stabilization.

19

Even though the farmers, organized labor, Congress and
a good deal of public sentiment were for-the measure, it

2®Ibid., pp. 323-329.
30Ibid.. p. 325. It is doubtful that organized labor
would have favored changes in the official price of gold.
31Ibid., p. 333.
32Supra.. Chapter IV, p. 95.
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did not pass.

Some New York banks, most of the Federal

Reserve authorities, and the Secretary of the Treasury
were able to prevent its enactment.^3

Banking Collapse of 1933
When the collapse of the banking system came in the
early months of 1933, it became clear that certain basic
weaknesses of it had to be corrected by national legis
lation.

To the Federation, one fault of the system was

the lact of unification.

William Green had stressed the

point in an editorial when he said:
Federal banking has steadily raised standards, but
banks that did not wish to conform gave up Federal
for state charters. Obviously, the first step
toward raising the general banking practices is to
establish the authority of the Federal government—
then unified authority will close the escapes that
have enabled banks to evade higher standards.34
Organized labor relied to a great extent on the
banking experts and concurred with their proposal that
all the banks should become members of the Federal Reserve

33

Irving Fisher, Stable Money. (New York:
1934), pp. 203-207.
34

Adelphi Co.,

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "A Unified
Banking System," American Federationist. May, 1932, p. 563.
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System in order to achieve effective unification."^

It

was apparent that the economic situation had brought about
a moderation in the attitude of the American Federation of
Labor toward the Federal Reserve and a better understanding
of its purpose.
Of particular importance to the Federation was the
safety of the deposits of its members.

In addition to a

Federal guarantee of bank deposits, they were concerned with
the problem of banks' risking the depositors' money through
investment companies.

Many of these companies had bought

speculative securities which had become worthless.^
Organized labor felt that a separation of security affil
iates from the commercial banks was a necessity.

At a

banquet held by the Central Labor Union of Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, the President of the Federation had stressed
the growing demand for increasing government control over
banking.

He mentioned that the people wanted their funds

to be placed in banks for safe keeping and convenient use

35

Amerxcan Federatxon of Labor, "Back of the Bank
Crisis," American Federationist. April, 1933, p. 357.
36Ibid., p. 358.
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and not to be used for speculation.3^
Also under consideration by the Federation was the
idea of branch banking, and William Green stated in May,
1932:
Before and during this depression the small unit
state chartered bank had been a special banking
risk. To meet the problems of the small banks,
a system of branch banks is proposed. Branch
banks are advocated by the Federal Reserve System
to meet the needs of the rural communities
adequately and at the same time give them the
stability and services available in the business
center.^
Federation publications in 1933 continued to stress
the importance of branch banking and the basic contention
that small banks would not fail if they were branches of
strong city banks and had access to reserves in time of
need.

However, the Federation believed that the final

outcome rested with Congress and its resourcefulness in
passing legislation which would make the necessary reforms
in the banking system.38

■^American

Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service.

March 18, 1933.
38American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "A Unified
Banking System," American Federationist. loc. cit.
^American Federation of Labor, "Banks - Crisis and
Reform," Monthly Survey of Business, March, 1933, and
American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Labor Wants Sound
Finance," American Federationist. April, 1933, pp. 348-349.
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Banking Act of 1933
It was not until the Roosevelt administration that
legislation for basic reforms in the banking system were
enacted.

William Green had pledged the complete cooperation

and support of the American Federation of Labor to President
Roosevelt and stated:
The responsibilities growing out of this terrible
experience caused by the failure of the banks to
function rest heavily upon the President of the
United States. All classes of people are looking
to him for leadership and constructive advice.^
With Roosevelt's approval, Senator Glass was able to
procure the enactment of the Banking Act in June, 1933.^
It was designed to strengthen the commercial banks,
weaken the connection between speculation and banking, and
give added powers to the Federal Reserve.

Even though

organized labor did not participate in the hearings, they
were in general agreement with the basic provisions of
the Act.

40

American Federation of Labor, "Labor Backs Roosevelt
In Bank Collapse Emergency, Green Says," Weekly News Service.
March 1, 1933.
41

Clark, op. cit., p. 276.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The provision of the Banking Act which attracted the
greatest attention from the American Federation of Labor
was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor
ation.^

This corporation could lend upon or acquire

assets of closed member banks and would insure deposits of
all member banks and approved non-member banks. 43
Organized labor had worked long and hard for the
enactment of this protective legislation.

As early as

1932, the idea had been implanted for Federation support
when the Weekly News Service had brought to the members1
attention a bill proposed by Henry Steagall for bank

42

.
.•
The provision for insuring bank deposits was not
supported by President Roosevelt. See: Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston:
Houghton Miffen, 1959), p. 433.
^ T h e insurance which became effective January 1,
1934, was limited to $2,500 in the case of any depositor,
and each member of the fund was to contribute to it an
amount equal to one half of one per cent of the total
amount of deposits certified by the bank. Rudolph L.
Weissman, The New Federal Reserve System. (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936), p. '68.
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deposit guarantees for members of the Federal Reserve
System.

44

At the November Convention of the American Federation
of Labor, a delegate of the Ohio State Federation of Labor
offered a resolution which requested the Executive Council
to give its immediate attention to the subject of improving
the banking laws of the United States so as to give to
depositors in banks a greater security from losses.

A

similar resolution for deposit protection was introduced
by delegate James O'Connell of the Metal Trades Department
of the American Federation of Labor.

Both resolutions

were referred to the Executive Council for its careful
attention and action.

The Resolutions Committee reported

that the prime purpose of banks was to provide a place for
safe keeping of deposits.

44

1

"Every protection to prevent

American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service,
March 12, 1932. The bill by Representative Henry B.
Steagall was passed by the House but was killed in the
Senate because of intense oppostion by Senator Carter Glass,
a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.
Senator Glass favored merely a liquidating corporation to
advance to depositors in failed banks the estimated amount
of their recovery.
In 1933, Steagall and Glass agreed to
combine the two proposals and incorporate them in the
Banking Act of 1933. Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.,
p. 434.
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depositors from loss should be provided," the Committee
asserted, "and the bank system and practices should be
remodeled to provide such protection.
The Federation President took a positive stand on this
issue in March, 1933 when he said:
The demand of Labor . . . i s that the law-making
bodies of our Nation and those in control of our
Government take such steps as may be necessary to
control the banking institutions of the Nation,
to accord protection to the savings of the masses
of the people and to prevent the dissipation of their
deposits after they have placed them in the banks
of the country in all good faith and confidence.
The guarantee of bank deposits was the object of a
resolution at the October convention of the American Feder
ation of Labor.

John M. O'Hanion of the New York State

Federation of Labor requested that the Executive Council
draft and present to Congress appropriate legislation to
provide for the security of depositors in banks or support
any Federal legislation which had that object for its
purpose.

The Committee on Legislation endorsed the reso

lution and called attention to the Report of the Executive

45

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1932,
pp. 168, 377, 378.
4-fi

American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service,
March 11, 1933. See also, American Federation of Labor,
Weekly News Service. March. 18, 1933.
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Council which referred to the law creating the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.^
In January of 1934, the American Federation of Labor
maintained that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
would do much to restore faith in the banking institutions
and that they had supported the insurance law in all its
legislative stages.

Yet, it was still being vigorously

opposed by the organized workers who were trying to weaken
the law.

The workingman was assured that the Federation's

efforts would be mobilized to retain the measure as a
necessary law to protect depositors from both dishonest
.

4ft

and inefficient bankers. °

Portions of a report by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
of Michigan on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
were reproduced by the Weekly News Service in June as
evidence of the effectiveness of deposit insurance.

The

Senator had vigorously criticized the reactionaries who
had assailed this corporation and had stated:

47

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933,
pp. 106, 156, 526, 527.
48

American Federation of Labor, "Deposit Insurance
Wins," Weekly News Service. January 6, 1934.
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In the entire history of the Republic there has
been no other six-months period when only two banks
closed. It is an amazing proof of the restoration
of public confidence in our banks protected by the
F.D.I.C. This Corporation is the main steel beam
supporting the recovery structure. The public is
convinced it has come to stay and must nqt be ripped

out.^
The Executive Council reported in October that Congress
had amended Section 12B of the Federal Reserve Act so as to
extend for one year the temporary plan for deposit insur
ance.

It had also increased the maximum amount guaranteed

by the Corporation from $2,500 to $5,000 per depositor.
The Executive Council felt that this law proved a contention
always held by the American Federation of Labor that the
guaranteeing of deposits would give people more confidence
in financial institutions.

It was also pleasing to them

to add that the efforts to repeal the law were not effective
because public•sentiment had been too.strong.

The Resolu

tions Committee gave full approval to this section of the
Executive Council1s report.

^American Federation of Labor, "Deposit Insurance
Helps Banks, Vandenberg Says," Weekly News Service, June 16,
1934.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1934,
pp. 82, 550.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by mid-1936
had paid off 93 per cent of the insured deposits of the
fifty-eight member banks that had failed since 1933, and
an American Federation of Labor editor felt it instructive
to bring these facts to the attention of his fellow members.
Under the old system, the small depositors in many instances
would have received but a very small portion of their
savings, and then only after a long delay accompanying
receiverships.

The editor reiterated that under the insur

ance system, the Federal Government guaranteed that the
depositor would get his deposit back promptly.

Despite the

constructive social results of safeguarding the savings
of small depositors, it was regrettable to organized labor
that the bankers in the United States were still objecting
and using their influence against the-insured deposit
system. 51

The bankers' continued objections were of little

significance, for the system became a permanent one in
roughly its present form under the provisions of Title One
of the Banking Act of 1935.

^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "And
Bankers Oppose It," Weekly News Service. August 1, 1936.
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Banking Act of 1935
The Banking Act of 1933 was an improvement in banking,
but it fell short of reform measures suggested by many of
the financial experts.

For example, the Act had failed to

require all banks to become members of the Federal Reserve
and did nothing positive to encourage branch banking.
These were reform measures which had been supported to a
large extent by organized labor. 52
The real effort to extend centralized control over
banking came in early 1935 with the introduction of the
Eccles Bill.

53

The main objective of this bill was to

facilitate monetary management.

The inflationists objected

to the bill because price stabilization was not the primary
goal and they, along with organized labor, supported the
unsuccessful Goldsborough amendment.^4

^ Supra. Chapter IV, p. 100.
53
Studenski and Kroos, op. cit., pp. 396-397. The
American Federation of Labor had favored a program in 1933
advocated by Marriner S. Eccles, then a banker of Ogden,
Utah, befoie the Senate Finance Committee.
In organized
labor's interpretation, Mr. Eccles had urged a policy
calling for "a more equitable distribution of wealth pro
duction through a unification of banking system under the
supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank." American Feder
ation of Labor, Weekly News Service. March 4, 1933.
54Supra. Chapter IV, p. 95.
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With the help of Senator Glass, the Eccles Bill was
modified substantially before it was passed as the Banking
Act of 1935.^

No official position by organized labor

toward the Act is revealed
proceedings.

in their publications or

From their previous attitudes, one would have

to agree that they were in accord with the greater
centralized control over banking which was provided by the
Act.

However, as far as each and every provision was

concerned, no valid assessment can be made as to organized
labor's position.

Labor's Proposals For Reform
Beginning in the early part of the depression, union
members felt it imperative that they respond to the need
for financial reform and offered their own proposals at
the American Federation of Labor Conventions.

It was the

expressed hope of each delegate who enthusiastically
offered a proposal that his would be the one which would
be accepted and submitted to a Congressman foir legislative
action.

55

See: U.S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1935, LXXIX, part 14, p. 856.
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The Federation realized that education and proper
information imparted to the workingman were the keys to a
better understanding of the banking institutions and the
Federal Reserve System.

William Green expressed such hopes

in an editorial in April, 1932:
Wage earners need to understand our financial
institutions in order to formulate effective
policies. The cooperation of a number of
authorities in the financial field has been
solicited for the preparation of a series of
articles for the use of our trade-union readers.
We met uniformly helpful cooperation except from
the bankers invited to contribute to better
understanding of this f i e l d . ^ 6
The Federation affiliates throughout the country, in
response to the financial situation and no doubt influenced
by the various articles in Federation publications, brought
several money and banking propositions before the 1932
convention.

Four resolutions in different forms and with

^ A m e r i c a n Federation of Labor, Editorial, American
Federationist. April, 1932, p. 381. The American Federation
ist that year included writings of economists, statisticians,
and the Secretary of the Treasury: "Weakness in American Bank
Regulation," Charles S. Tippetts (Professor of Economics,
University of Buffalo), April, 1932, pp. 412-418y "Lack of
Uniformity A Weakness," E. E. Agzer (Rutgers University),
April, 1932, pp. 419-424; "The Relation of the Treasury
Operations to Credit and Financial Conditions," J. Ogden
Mills (Secretary of the Treasury), April, 1932, pp. 386-390;
"Branch Banks for America," Shirley Donald Southworth (Pro
fessor of Economics, College of William and Mary), May, 1932,
pp. 514-525; "The Federal Reserve System," E. A. Goldenweiser (Director, Div. of Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System, July, 1932, pp. 744-751.
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varying ideas for solutions to the problem were considered.
The first was presented by the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers who urged the assembly to go
on record as favoring the government ownership of all
banking institutions.^

The second was offered by the

American Federation of Teachers, who in a more lengthly
resolution, urged not only the enlargement of the postal
savings system, but also recommended that the Federation
inaugurate a nationwide campaign to expose the bankers1
undermining American education and constructive local
government activity.

It also felt it was only through

government control of banking and credit that private
CQ

profiteering could be terminated.

The Ohio State Feder

ation of Labor through delegate Thomas J. Donnelly voiced
its desire that the Executive Council give immediate
attention to legislation for regulation of savings banks
and building and loan associations.^9

The fourth resolution

was offered by the Metal Trades Department,
spokesman).

57

(James O'Connell,

It believed the Executive Council should be

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1932,

p. 125.
58Ibid., pp. 141-142.
59Ibid., p. 168.
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instructed to give its careful consideration to any Federal
and State legislation affecting and regulating banking.®®
The four resolutions were referred to the Resolutions
Committee who in turn suggested that the Convention submit
them to the Executive Council with instructions to give
careful attention to banks and banking and take whatever
action necessary to correct the abuses of the financial
system.

This

report was unanimously adopted. 61

Education before action was the intention of Jqhn P.
Frey, Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation's Metal Trades
Department, when he published a lengthy article entitled
"Bankers' Domination."®^

He explained that one reason

collective bargaining had not made greater progress in
industry was the opposition of the bankers to an industrial
condition which would enable organized labor to have a

®®Ibid., p. 377. See also, American Federation of Labor,
Weekly News Service. December 10, 1932.
61

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1932,

p. 378.
62

American Federation of Labor, John P. Frey, "Bankers'
Domination," American Federationist. February, 1933, pp. 134144. See also, American Federation of Labor, Weekly News
Sefrvice, February 4, 1933.
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voice in the industrial program.

But the dominant position

which the bankers occupied over the control of credit
placed them in a position whereby they could prevail upon
the captains of industry to meet with the representatives
of labor around the conference table instead of in the
legislative chambers.

This situation was an ideal, not a

reality, and Frey charged:
Upon the bankers, more than any other group, rests
the responsibility for many of the intolerable
industrial and economic conditions which are shaking
our national structure to the very center. Some of
these industrial conditions as they affect wageearners, are so unjustified and so intolerable that
they create social and political situations much
more dangerous to our American civilization than
all of the propaganda carried on by communists and
others whose aim is to overthrow American insti
tutions and supplant human liberty and freedom of
action by dictatorship, and all that this involves.^
Frey concluded that a remedy could only come about
after a thorough understanding by the workers of the
dominant position held by bankers.

This would be brought

about by the presentation of facts which in turn would
invoke further study, and only then could corrective action
,7

be taken.
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American Federation of Labor, John P. Frey, op. jcit.,

p. 144.
64Ibid.
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Some bankers in late 1933 realized that if banking
did not reform itself, then the Government would nationalize
the banks.

Henry Bruere, president of a New York savings

bank, was apprehensive about the nonchalant manner in which
most bankers were facing the financial situation and
commented:

!

I believe it is true that we must now, as practical
men, recognize that we are going in the next months,
in the next few years, to be compelled to test what
we do in banking, what we do in business by its
effect on the total economic situation, upon the
common good.65
Such testimony gave the American Federation of. Labor
assurance that some bankers were learning that if their
financial institutions were not put in order to serve the
nation honestly and well, a nationalized banking system
would evolve.66
Even when the Annalist.a journal of finance, commerce
and economics, admitted that "banks were permitted and even
encouraged to publish bank statements which did not reflect

65

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Some Bankers
Are Learning," Weekly News Service. September 23, 1933.
Henry Bruere had previously written an article for the
American Federation of Labor, "The Mutual Savings Banks,"
American Federationist. April, 1932, pp. 396-400.
66Ibid.
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true conditions," a Federation editor was not so much
lamented by this as anxious that the bankers take immediate
action to correct past mistakes and begin anew.

67

In October of that year, the American Federation of
Teachers again urged the nationalization of the banks and a
withdrawal of the controls on postal savings banks, so that
these banks could perform the duties of a commercial bank.
The Resolutions Committee, after studying the teachers'
proposal, was in accord with the thought of further liberaliz
ing the postal savings banks, but as for the proposal to
nationalize the banks, they were of the opinion that grave
constitutional and fiscal questions were involved.

No

commitment could be made until after a most careful study
of the complexities involved, and this would have to be
undertaken by the Executive Council.
Three similar resolutions were proposed at the 1934
convention to provide for nationalization of banks, a
greater measure of security for the depositor, as well as
lower rates of interest.

Although the Resolutions Committee

^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Untrue Bank
Statements," Weekly News Service. October 28, 1933.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933,
pp. 171-172, 431-432.
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felt the purpose commendable, they believed that the
guarantee of deposits and the Home Owners Loan Corporation
would achieve such ends.

The Committee regarded the question

i
of Government ownership of less importance than a more
rigid control of the banking system, and therefore recom
mended that the resolutions nob be acted upon by the
convention.

69

At the following convention, the Amalgamated

Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers was the only
group who requested convention approval of government
ownership of banks.

However, the American Federation of

Labor nonconcurred with this resolution.

70

In summary, the American Federation of Labor, like the
general public during the early Thirties, developed a
greater understanding and awareness of the need for a
strong, sound banking system.

The Federation turned to

financial experts for articles to appear in its publications

®^The three resolutions for nationalization of the banks
were proposed by the Amalgamated Association o.f Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers, the American Federation of Teachers, and
the Washington State Federation of Labor. American Feder
ation of Labor, Proceedings. 1934, pp. 181, 207, 208, 273,
254-255.
70

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1935,
ppf 175, 509. See also, American Federation of Labor,
Weekly News Service. November 16, 1935.
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and felt that such proper information would enlighten the
workers.

Generally, organized labor leaders rejected the

socialistic approach to banking and reaffirmed Gompers1
basic philosophy of working within the capitalistic frame
work.

They were in general agreement with those measures

which sought to strengthen, centralize, and regulate the
banks and bring all such institutions under the control of
the Federal Reserve System.

Monetary Reform
In 1931-32, organized labor began to show growing
concern over the gold crisis and decline in international
prices.

71

The American Federation of Labor Monthly Survey

of Business reported in mid-1932:
The gold standard is supposed to maintain a balance
in national currency and international trade. It
gives the world an international money system,
founded on stable values. Each country defines by
law the weight of gold which constitutes its
financial unit . . . But, when unduly large amounts
of gold are accumulated in some countries and
others have not an adequate supply to clear trade
balances and meet obligations, the system breaks
down.^2
71

American Federation of Labor, "World Financial Situ
ation is Acute," Monthly Survey of Business. October 19,
1931.
72

American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. June 23, 1932.
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This imbalance had caused the abandonment of the gold
standard by Great Britain in Septfember, 1931, and some
twenty-five countries had followed her lead within a year.
To organized labor, the gold crisis had two serious
*

effects.

First, those countries which had abandoned the

gold standard experienced a depreciation in their currencies
on the world market which resulted in falling prices of
goods and services.

Since the United States sold on the

world market, the Federation believed United States ptices
would follow world price trends, and her economy would be
driven into further depression.
Secondly, those nations still on the gold exchange
standard which held their reserves in investments in thie
United States had withdrawn them when the panic followed
Britain's gold suspension.

The American Federation of

Labor Research Department maintained that the consequent
disorganization of world currencies and prices was one of
the most serious depression problems the United States had
to meet.

It was throwing men out of work and costing the

country millions of dollars in weekly income losses.

How

could the United States adjust payments so that its best
interest would be served?

This question was the one that

the Research Department felt must be answered and the
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answer could come through cooperation at the conference
table between nations.

73

While plans were being made in the spring of 1933 for
an International Monetary Conference to be held that summer
in London, Congress was being pressured to inflate the
currency.

In the opinion of a writer for the Federation,

deflation had gone far enough and rising prices would
unquestionably stimulate business and move the economy
out of the depression.

Yet, he felt that issuing more

money in proportion to the United States gold stock was
objectionable.

The major obstacle was public psychology

for people feared any monetary change and distrusted money
not firmly tied to gold.

If enough money was issued without

gold backing, inflation would soon get out of control and
new money would become worthless.

The wirter pointed out

that even if the currency was carefully managed, there was
no proof either that currency inflation could be

i-n

control once started or that it would raise prices in the
first place.

In reality there were more dollars outstanding

in 1933 then in 1929, but they were being hoarded.
73

What

American Federation of Labor, "European Problems
Assume Prominence," Monthly Survey of Business. November,
1932, and American Federation of Labor, "International
Currency Problems Are Urgent," Monthly Survey of Business.
December, 1932.
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was needed, he concluded, was not more dollars but more
buying power in the hands of those who needed food, clothing
and shelter.

This could be achieved by putting the unemployed

to work producing and exchanging goods.^
But the first step in the President's currency reform
program was the separation of the dollar from gold.

On

April 20, 1933, by Executive order, the United States was
taken off the gold standard which prohibited the export of
gold coin, bullion, or certificates except under license
issued by

the Secretary of the

75
Treasury.

With

this suspension, the

American Federation of

Labor brought before the workers several measures which had
been suggested by financial experts.

First, the United

States could, reduce the gold value of the dollar and raise
prices.
with that

This would put the United States currency on a par
of other nations and

stop the pricedecline.

^American Federation of Labor, "Why the Crisis,"
American Federationist. March, 1933, pp. 279-290.
75

This action freed the Roosevelt administration's
hands for the purpose of (1) raising domestic prices;
(2) facilitating domestic credit expansion; (3) dealing
with foreign countries at the forthcoming London Economic
Conference; (4) preventing any congressional action that
might take the initiative as to reflation out of the
President's hands. Fisher, op. pit., p. 347.

Yet,
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this would not provide for a stable price level in the
future, which the American Federation of Labor advocated.
The second proposal was to link the United States
currency to a combination of gold and silver, "symmetalism.
This would do away with the scarcity of the metal base gold
but again would not stabilize prices in the future as the
Federation desired.
To fix a gold value for our currency and then to let
the dollar be managed to prevent too great a rise or decline
was the third measure proposed.

The American Federation of

Labor felt that this measure did have 'the advantage of
keeping prices adjusted in international markets as well
as at home.

It

noted at the end of April, 1933, that no

attempt was being made to "manage" the currency.
The final proposal was to reduce the gold value of the
dollar and adjust to the price level which would be
stabilized permanently.

The American Federation of Labor

favored price stability but remained skeptical of devaluation of the dollar.

But regardless of which measure was

^"Symmetalism" is the term applied to a currency pay~
able in a combination of gold plus silver; "bimetalism" is
a currency payable in either gold or silver. The Federation
felt that bimetalism could not be safely administered except
under an international agreement covering all important
nations.
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chosen, the Federation felt that cooperation on the part of
the Federal Reserve was a necessity.

77

World Economic Conference
On June 12, 1933, the World Economic Conference was
opened in London with discussion centering on the estab
lishment of a satisfactory international monetary system.
The American Federation of Labor pointed out to its members
that America's wage earners should be concerned with the
matter.

It was

explained

that the United States currency

was related to that of every other nation.

If there were

no orderly established relationship, business was crippled
and the workers lost their jobs and incomes.

It was

realized by the Federation that no international conference
could hope to achieve an international gold standard as
had been the case in the past.

Therefore, several measures

of interest to organized labor were being considered..

Sir

Basil Blackett, director of the Bank of England, had
proposed a system of planned money.

77

Each nation would

American Federation of Labor, "Is A Dollar Always A
Dollar," American Federationist, May, 1933, pp. 498-500.
See also, American Federation of Labor, "Depression a World
Problem," Monthly Survey of Business. April, 1933.
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keep the purchasing power of its currency stable according
to its home prices and maintain a constant price level.
The nations of the world would agree to cooperate in doing
this, each in its own domain.

Since home prices of the

great commercial nations were determined by world prices,
this would automatically keep an approximate stability
between the different national currencies.

If changes in

living costs could be eliminated, then this proposal would
be of immense benefit to wage earners.
Another plan, by John Maynard Keynes, to overcome the
shortage of gold reserves was noted by the American Feder
ation of Labor.

Keynes' proposal was that instead of

transferring gold between nations, an international
authority should issue gold notes.

These gold notes could

be used for international payments and would be obtained in
exchange for the gold bonds of any government.

70

The Federation President, William Green summarized for
the workers in an editorial the basic objectives of the
London Economic Conference and stressed the overall

^American Federation of Labor, "World Economic
Conference," Monthly Survey of Business, May, 1933.
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importance of the outcome to organized labor. 79

However,

the Conference was unsuccessful because a broad agreement
among the nations on economic policy could not be reached.
The United States was experimenting with economic nation
alism and its delegates were unprepared to discuss currency
stabilization.

In the six weeks of existence, the only

accomplishment of the conference was an agreement among
the principle silver-producing nations not to dump the
80

metal on the market.

Gold Reserve Act of 1934
i

The Roosevelt administration decided to raise the
general price level in the latter part of 1933 by devaluing
the gold dollar.

The theoretical basis for the Gold
1

Purchase Program was the quantity theory of money.

If the

price of gold was increased, the gold supply and the amount
of money in circulation would be expanded.

It would be

more profitable to mine gold and more currency could be

7Q

' '^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "London
Economic Conference,11 American Federationist. June, 1933,
pp. 575-578.
80

See, James P. Warburg, The Money Muddle (New York:
Alfred A. Knoph, 1934), 272 pp.
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issued against a given quantity of gold.®-*The American Federation of Labor Convention in October,
1933, had considered the question of currency inflation.
The Resolutions Committee expressed the conviction that
currency inflation could least of all benefit the wage
earners, but would reflect upon them the greatest possible
harm.

It was declared:
. . .we must, under no circumstances, permit our
government to saddld this additional and unbear
able burden upon our wage earners and salaried
employees under any fiscal policy or any arrange
ment or procedure that will lessen the exchange
value of the monetary standard used to fix wages.

The Executive Council was directed to resort to every
possible and practicable means at its command to prevent

81
82

Studenski and Kross, op. cit., p. 389.

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933,
p. 433. Matthew Woll, a member of the Executive Council of
the American Federation of Labor, stated:
" . . . labor
is at a loss to understand the difference between inflation
and reflation. To labor, the.immediate, if not as well
the ultimate, effects are the same and the appeal that
reflation is not inflation because it is a process of
enhancing immediate values by monetary legerdemain up to
a given point and not beyond is merely an apology, with
more confusion, and without adequate explanation," Matthew
Woll, Labor. Industry and Government (New York: D.
Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935), p. 237.
^
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currency inflation.
Despite the objections of organized labor, starting
on October 25 at a price of $31.35 an ounce (slightly higher
than the London free-gold market), the price of gold was
gradually raised to $35.00 an ounce by December.®^

At

that time, the Monthly Survey of Business reported:
Tampering with the currency is a very serious matter,
for the buying power of a dollar is of the greatest
concern to every American citizen. Since we left
the gold standard in April, declines in the dollar's
value and demands for inflation have caused alarm
in the business world and acted as a brake on
recovery. Banks, business concerns, men and women
with savings— all have hesitated to place their
money in investments because as long as the dollar
declines, dollars they lend now are worth more than
the dollars they will get back in the future.
Credit for business undertakings has been hard to .
get; investments fled to government bonds for
security.
QO
° American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1933,
loc. cit. The Federation was also afraid that the Roosevelt
administration might issue paper money without gold backing.
The effect of fiat money inflation would be to take from the
workers any income gains they had acquired and put increased
wealth and power in the hands of rich property owners.
American Federation of Labor, "Inflation," Monthly Survey of
Business. June, 1934. See also, U.S., Congressional Record.
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, pp. 426-427 where Senator
Vandenbterg entered, for the record, an article expressing
the attitude of the American Federation of Labor in respect
to inflation and fiat money.
QA
,
° Studenski and Kroos, loc. cit.
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American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. December, 1933.

By January, 1934, it was apparent that the devaluation
of gold had not increased the general price level.

There

fore, that same month, Congress stabilized the dollar by
passing the Gold Reserve Act.
The Act placed the United States on a gold-bullion
standard internationally and on an irredeemable paper
standard domestically.

The Federal Reserve banks were

required to deliver their gold to the Treasury in exchange
for gold certificates.

All monetary gold was to be con

verted into gold bullion, and .minting of gold coins was
prohibited except for accounts of foreign countries.

To

supplement the measure, President Roosevelt fixed the
price of gold at $35.00 per ounce.86
While there was no definite statement by the American
Federation of Labor as to its attitude toward the Gold
Reserve Act, Matthew Woll, a member of the Federation
Executive Council, gives insight into organized labor's
opinion:

’

While American Labor is opposed to currency inflation,
it must be understood that we are equally opposed
to a return of the old system of control of our
deposit currency for purposes either of inflation

86

.

Fisher, op. cit.. pp. 369-372.
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or deflation by our banks and bankers, national
or international . . . Our course must be to stabilize
our currency as soon as possible, and without restricting the control over the volume of currency already
exercised by our government through the Federal Reserve
Board and the buying and selling of government secur
ities. The nation should guarantee, and our people
must be guaranteed, against the issuance of any
unsecured paper money and be assured the continuance
of the present of currency controlled by a Federal
Reserve Board upon which private business is fully
represented but which is ultimately under control of
the government.87

Tripartite Accord
From the time of the passage of the Gold Reserve Act
until the latter part of 1936, organized labor's interest
in monetary legislation declined.

Shortly after France

abandoned the gold standard and devalued the franc in
September, 1936, the Tripartite Accord was negotiated
between Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Each

country undertook to keep its currency as stable as
possible in terms of the other two currencies.

This was

to be accomplished through a stabilization fund in each
country, and exchange of currency for gold between them
would be made only through the stabilization funds.

87Woll,

op. cit.. pp. 248-249.
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The American Federation of Labor was gratified that the
exchange of currencies had been placed under government
control because it would be impossible for speculators to
manipulate exchange rates by moving large funds from one
country to another.

Also, the Tripartite Agreement would

mean greater growth in international trade which in turn
would provide more work for wage earners in all countries. 88
The agreement lasted until 1939 at which time the United
States almost had a corner on the world's gold supply.

The

agreement did represent a step in the direction of inter
national monetary cooperation which organized labor favored.

Summary
The Great Depression had a lasting impact on the
attitude of organized labor toward monetary legislation.
Not since the days of William Jennings Bryan and free silver
had the American Federation of Labor given such attention
to the question of monetary reform.
For the first time, organized labor demonstrated an
interest in international monetary matters and supported

88

American Federation of Labor, "Workers Benefit by
Three Power Gold Agreement," Monthly Survey of Business,
October, 1936.
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the World Economic Conference and the Tripartite Accord.
It was apprehensive about leaving the gold standard and
the devaluing of the dollar and supported those legis
lative measures which urged price stabilization.

This

was a notable change in organized labor1s attitude from
its support of the free coinage of silver in the 1890's.
It realized more than ever before the need for a
sound monetary system.

Even though organized labor lacked

a sophisticated analysis of the monetary situation and
understood little of money expansion and the level of
unemployment, it was gradually maturing in its thinking
and its approach to the basic issues.

The money and

banking crisis during the Great Depression brought to
organized labor an aWareness of the need for an even greater
participation in the area of money and banking legislation.

CHAPTER V
ORGANIZED LABOR'S VIEWS TOWARD
MONETARY POLICY, 1914-1965
Since the establishment of the Federal Reserve System
in 1913, the actions undertaken by its Board to regulate
the supply of money and credit have been termed monetary
policy.

The fundamental importance of the effects which

control over money and credit would have on industry, the
worker, and the union was recognized by organized labor as
early as the Civil War.

But before any appraisal by organ

ized labor could be made with a critical eye and a mature
outlook, it first had to develop a basic understanding of the
Federal Reserve's actions.

It is the purpose of this chapter

to give a historical account of the development of organ
ized labor's attitude toward monetary policy.^

•^The data on monetary policy presented in this chapter
were gathered from the following publications and for fur
ther details, see: Harold L. Reed, Federal Reserve Policy.
1921-1930 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1930?
S. E. Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), I and II? E. A.
Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., 1951)? David P. Eastburn, The
Federal Reserve on Record (Philadelphia: Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, 1965).
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1914 - 1945
During the early formative years of the Federal Reserve
System, from 1914 until the United States entered World War
I, easy money conditions prevailed.

These conditions were

a product of a great release of reserves to the banks under
the Federal Reserve Act and of European gold imports.
Organized labor had little reason to voice any criticism of
these Federal Reserve actions, but their publications give
no insight into the matter.
When the United States entered World War I, the objec
tives of the Federal Reserve System were enlarged to include
aid in financing the government.

When the War ended, the

Reserve, banks continued to subordinate themselves to the
Treasury and maintained low discount rates (four per cent in
New York) in order not to interfere with the sale of Victory
notes.

Since an inflation was developing, the Federal

Reserve authorities were anxious to tighten credit condi
tions, but it was not until late in 1919 that discount
rates were raised.
At a trade union conference held in Washington, D.C.
in December, 1919, organized labor urged that the control
over credit be taken from the financiers and placed under
the authority of a public agency, which would use this power
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in the public's interest.

2

This type of affirmation- on the

part of organized labor was indicative of its lack of
thorough knowledge of the responsibilities and actions of
the Federal Reserve authorities.
During the period of business contraction in 1920-21,
the American Federation of Labor held the bankers more
responsible than the Federal Reserve authorities for the
tight monetary conditions.

3

However, after the recession, an investigation of the
Federal Reserve System's action was undertaken.

The

American Federation of Labor, Weekly Newsletter reported
in March, 1923:
On motion of Senator Gooding, the Senate has asked
the President to investigate the charge that a
secret meeting of the Secretary of the Treasury and
55 federal reserve bank officials in this city
fWashington], on May 18, 1920, it was agreed to
curtail credit, increase interest . . . These
decisions brought on the deflation movement that
stopped business, closed factories, wrecked farmers
and turned 5,000,000 workers on the streets.4

2

Supra. Chapter III, p. 58.

3

Supra. Chapter III, p. 59.

4

American Federation of Labor, "Bankers, In Secret
Meeting, Stopped Industry's Wheels," Weekly Newsletter.
March 10, 1923.

133
This investigation was again the topic of an article
which appeared in the Weekly Newsletter in August, and the
Federation reaffirmed its opposition to the private control
of credit.^

Despite the general feeling by the public

and organized labor against the Federal Reserve authorities'
actions, it was the conclusion of the Congressional invest
igating committee that the Federal Reserve System was not
responsible for the deflation.

g

Since the American Federation of Labor was not an
authority on Federal Reserve policy, it relied on indi
viduals in the financial field for appraisal.

In December,

1924, M. J. Mutphy, vice president of the Federation Bank
of New York and former member of the Federal Reserve. Board,
declared:
The time has arrived when the nation's gold reserve
and currency issuing power should be administered
in the interest of the nation, and to unify and
stabilize our banking system.
If we applied
scientific credit control in the early parts of 1919,
we might have saved much of the disasters culmin
ated in 1920 and 1 9 2 1 .^
5
American Federation of Labor, "Federal Bank System
Prepares for Attack," Weekly Newsletter, August 4, 1923.
6Goldenweiser, op. cit.. p. 136.
7
American Federation of Labor, "Union Bank Officers
Predict High Prices," Weekly Newsletter. December 6, 1924.
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The Federal Reserve authorities maintained an easy
money policy in the years 1925 and 1926.

There were signs

of growing speculative activity in the stock market, rising
prices of stock, and increased use of credit to finance
stock market activity.

This speculation in the stock

market again received critical attention from the Feder
ation in 1926 when it was reported:
When the federal reserve bank system was installed
several years ago, the public assumed that this
marked the end of higher interest on money and
stock manipulation. Now it is acknowledged that
speculators have no trouble securing funds and the
biggest stock market ever known has been going on
for a year. Under the law member banks cannot
pass up to the reserve banks loans secured by stocks
and bonds, but they can turn in paper having its
origin in commercial transactions and lend the
proceedings in the stock markets.8
Because stock market speculation had reached pre
carious new heights in 1929, the Federal Reserve Board
tried a policy of "moral suasion" to meet the situation.
On February 7, 1929, a public statement was issued by the
Board that member banks should not use discount facilities
at its Federal Reserve Bank for the purpose of making
speculative loans.

Chart I shows the changes taking place

8
American Federation of Labor, "Federal Bank System
Has Many Loopholes," Vfeekly Newsletter, January 2, 1926.
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in stock prices and discount rates from 1924 through 1929.
The American Federation of Ijabor informed the workers
that the Federal Reserve Board had warned against the
speculative wave that was sweeping the nation.

Yet, if

interest rates were tightened to check further speculation,
the Federation felt that legitimate business activities would
be hampered and concluded:

"This situation illustrates how

the welfare of the workers is inseparably linked with every
g

social activity."

In May, 1929, William Green, Federation president,
proclaimed:
During the past six years, there has been unpre
cedented sustained business progress, and commer
cial credit is essential to its continuance. The
Federal Reserve Board raised the rate of discount,
which effectually checked stock speculation for the
time. This Board is charged with responsibility of
seeing to it the reserve banks manage credit so as
to accommodate business and commerce.
The policy of "moral suasion" was abandoned in the
summer of 1929 because the increase in broker's loans was
not from the account of banks and was thus beyond direct

g

American Federation of Labor, "Money Rates Affect
Labor," Weekly News Service. April 6, 1929.
•^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Excessive
Stock Speculation a Menace," American Federationist, May,
1929, pp. 534-535.
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Charts on Bank Credit. Money Rates and Business (Washington, D. C.,
January 25, 1939), pp. 18 and 26.
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control by the Federal Reserve System.

The Board tried a

new technique which it hoped would exert pressure on the
speculative situation and would not harm business.

In

August, the discount rate of the New York Bank was raised
from 5 to 6 per cent.

At the same time, the Bank's buying

rate for bankers' acceptances was reduced from 5-1/4 to
5-1/8 per cent.
Basically, the American Federation of Labor approved
the new technique of the Board.

It was explained in the

Monthly Survey of Business that one factor which led to
business uncertainty was the high interest rates on money
for short-term loans.

Businessmen would need money for fall

production and the Federal Reserve Board was relieving the
situation somewhat by reducing the rates on loans for
business purposes.^
Yet, there were some labor leaders who did not under
stand the new technique of the Federal Reserve Board.
such leader was William J. McForley

12

One

who, in the early part

■^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. September 1, 1929.
12

x Mr. McForley was president of the International Union
of Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers, and past president of the
Building Trades Department of the American Federation of
Labor.
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of October, 1929, attacked the tight money policy of the
Board:
If the Federal Reserve Board would only forget Wall
Street and see to it that legitimate business gets
what it is entitled to— money at reasonable rates—
we would all be better off, for if history means
anything, excesses in Wall Street will bring their
own penalties and correctives.^
With the collapse of the stock market in the last week
of October, the Federal Reserve Board reversed its policy.
Discount rates were reduced and purchases were made in the
open market to provide reserves for New York banks.
The Federation tried to alleviate the fears of its
members by asserting that since business was on a sound
basis, the stock market crash would not have a serious
depressing effect upon it.

The wage earners' buying power

was higher than usual and goods had been moving from
producer to consumer’ at a satisfactory rate.-^
However, by December, the Federation had some doubts
about business activity because stocks had continued to
decline.

It pointed out that the lowest point had been

•^American Federation of Labor, "Blames High Money for
Building Slump," Weekly News Service, October 12, 1929.
-^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. November 1, 1929.

139
reached on November 13 when stock prices averaged 48 per
cent below the peak of September 3, 1929.

Losses in the

stock market had affected every group in society, even the
wage earners, and had caused cancellation of orders for
automobiles, radios, and other consumer items.

The Feder

ation feared that production would be curtailed which would
cause additional layoffs and unemployment.

Yet, the

Federation did see one beneficial effect of the liquidation
of stocks— -the decline of money rates— which would be a
most important factor in favor of business improvement.^
The price level and business activity started on a
downward course in the fall of 1929 and continued into 1930.
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve Board maintained its policy
of easy money by gradually reducing the discount rate at
all Reserve banks and by purchasing securities on the open
market.
The Federation's support of the policy of the Board
was expressed in the Monthly Survey of Business:
On February 6, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York
and four other cities reduced rediscount rates and a

•^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business, December 1, 1929.
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movement for easier money also took place abroad.
Rates for commercial and business loans came down
immediately, following the lead of the Reserve
Banks. This will stimulate business improvement,
help the price situation, and hasten progress in
building. °
In July, 1930, the Federation noted that the lowest
discount rate in history had been reached when the Reserve
Bank of New York reduced its discount rate to 2-1/2 per
cent.

The Federation added:

"This move to make money

easier than ever is a most constructive force, though it
will be several months before its influence is fully felt." 17
However, the easy money policy was not succeeding in
expanding the use of credit.

In January, 1932, a lengthy

article in a Federation publication painted a rather grim
picture of the financial problems facing the American workers
Bond prices are now below the long term value of
many securities; if banks are forced to sell before
prices recover, there will be many unnecessary
losses and failures. Businessmen cannot get the
credit they need because of the frozen condition of
bank funds. Railroads need credit to meet their
obligations; insurance companies also are suffer
ing from the drop in bond prices; farmers need

16

American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. March 1, 1930. See also, American Federation of
Labor, Monthly Survey of Business. June 1, 1930.
17

American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. July 1, 1930.
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credit for spring plantings. Business is check
mated by the credit deadlock.
In mid-1932, the Federation emphasized the fact that
the depression would be ended when people had jobs and
their demand for goods put new life into industry.

Organ

ized labor offered two main methods of increasing employ
ment.

First, it was recommended that federal credit be used

for construction of public works, and secondly that "credit
be issued to private business" in order that production could
be started.
The Federation felt that the Federal Government had to
find some way "to get credit reserves passed on through
commercial banks to business" or "to loan it direct.
Organized labor's concern stemmed from the fact that bank
loans had decreased sharply during the first six months
of 1932 as is shown in Chart 2.
By July, 1932, the Federation was of the opinion that
tension over the financial situation was easing.

The drain

18

American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit,"
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.
IQ

^American Federation of Labor, "Jobs— The Key to
Recovery" and "Give Business Credit," Monthly Survey of
Business. May 16, 1932.
20

Ibid. See also, American Federation of Labor, Editor
ial, "Federal Credit," American Federationist. June, 1932.
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Bank Loans, 1932

14

13

12

11

10
Jan.
Source:

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Federal Reserve Board, as cited in American
Federation of Labor, "Banks Withhold Credit,"
Monthly Survey of Business, August 24, 1932.

143
of gold to Europe had ceased, hoarding had declined, and
banks had reduced their debts to the Federal Reserve.

The

worker was informed by the Federation that the Federal
Reserve was continuing to pour credit into the banks with
the hope that the banks would gradually begin "passing it
on to business,"

21

Yet, in the fall of 1932, the Monthly Survey of Busi
ness reported that even though there was a business revival,
it was in the form of replacement of depleted inventories.
However, reserves of buying power were not adequate to
maintain economic activity.

Therefore, the Federation

concluded that in order to stimulate buying power, wages
had to be increased as hours were reduced; then, business
would seek more credit from banks.^2
But the banking situation by 1933 had become more
acute and bank failures mounted steadily.

Federal Reserve

actions, were restricted by the limitations on the eligibility
of the paper that could be discounted and by the rigid

21

American Federation of Labor, "The Government Program
Against Depression," Monthly Survey of Business. July 25,
1932.
22

American Federation of Labor, "Wage Shortage Checks
Revival," Monthly Survey of Business, October, 1932.
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collateral requirements for Federal Reserve notes.

Although

legal provisions in both cases had been relaxed in 1932, the
relaxation was not liberal enough to arrest the course of
the deflation.

The Federation

Reserve was working within

acknowledged that theFederal

its boundaries in an attempt to

give assistance during the banking crisis.23
During this same period of financial chaos, an editor
ial in the American Federationist explained to the worker
the operations of the Federal Reserve in regard to monetary
policy.

In the article, the Federation President, William

Green, defined the basic operations of the System and
concluded:
We should frankly face the fact that our monetary
policies are controlled and take steps to have this
managed for the best interest of all instead of for
the priviledged few.
The Federal Reserve Board
should be safeguarded
not only against partisan
politics but against private banking i n t e r e s t s . 24
The Federal Reserve policy from 1933 to 1936 was one
of continuous easing of credit.

Interest rates on all

classes of money went down with a much sharper decline in

23

American Federation of Labor, "The Crisis," Monthly
Survey of Business. February, 1933.
24

American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Our Central
Planning Agency," American Federationist. May, 1933.
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short-term than in long-term rates.

Mortgage rates changed

very little so that the gap between short- and long-term
rates widened sharply.
During this period, organized labor generally favored
the easy monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board, but
the question of rates on mortgages was brought before the
1935 American Federation of Labor Convention.

A delegate

of the California State Federation of Labor contended that
homeowners and small industries were paying interest rates
100 per cent greater than farm mortgages.

He offered a

resolution which condemned the practice of charging
excessive rates of interest and he wanted the Legislative
Committee of the American Federation of Labor to memorialize
Congress to introduce the necessary legislation to control
the profit in money.
■

Executive Council.

His resolution was referred to the

95

In the fall of 1935, business was more active and
prices were rising.

There was an increasing volume of

trading on the margin account and stock prices were vigor
ously advancing which alarmed organized labor.
25

The

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1935,
pp. 241-242, 594-595. See American Federation of Labor,
"Labor and Interest," American Federationist. July, 1935,
pp. 739-740 for a similar discussion on mortgage rates.
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Federation was fearful that this situation might lead to
another stock market boom and collapse.

It maintained

that since the Federal Reserve banks had stocks of gold
that were twice as great as in 1929, a large expansion of
credit could take place.

Even though new legislative

measures had been established to control credit and
finance, the Federation was worried that these measures
would not be adequate.

26

In February and April, 1936, the Federal Reserve
Board, responding to the increase in stock prices, made
slight increases in the margin requirements on stockexchange loans.

Because of continued gold imports during

1936 and 1937 which added to the excess reserves of the
member banks, the Federal Reserve Board believed that a
readjustment of reserve requirements was desirable.

The

Board did not want to modify its policy of easy money but
felt that it would be better prepared to take preventive
action if an indesirable credit expansion occurred.

From

organized labor's previous attitude of fear that an
uncontrolled credit expansion would cause another stock

^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business, November, 1935.

t
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market crisis, it can be concluded that it was in favor
of the Board's actions.

Chart 3 shows the increase in

stock prices from 1933 through 1936.
During the mid-thirties, the American Federation of
Labor was faced not only with economic problems caused
by the depression, but also with problems of an internal
nature.

From the 1933 convention through the 1935 con

vention, an increasing number of resolutions on industrial
unionism was introduced.

At each of these three conventions,

the Resolutions Committee rejected all of the industrial
union resolutions and reaffirmed craft unionism.

Shortly

after the 1935 convention, eight national union leaders,
led by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, organized
the Committee for Industrial Organization.

The purpose of

this Committee was to organize the unorganized workers in
the mass production industries into industrial unions and
to bring them into the American Federation of Labor.

The

Federation Executive Council attempted to persuade the
Committee to disband and when it refused, the Committee
was expelled from the American Federation of Labor by the
1937 Convention.

The Committee for Industrial Organization

then became the Congress of Industrial Organizations and

Chart 3.
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began to organize the mass production workers in steel,
automobile, and other industries.^
J. Raymond Walsh, a professor at Harvard University,
when writing about the Congress of Industrial Organizations
in 1937, proclaimed;
. . . It is a shock to discover that the labor move
ment still retains so few economists, statisticians,
and lawyers. What the C.I.O. needs is a research
organization, with regional offices and staffs to
assemble and analyze regularly the relevant facts
about the companies and industries with which it
deals, to explore the industrial make-up of the
country, the conditions of the working class, the
nature of the secular influences that are molding
their lives.
Because of the Congress of Industrial Organizations'
preoccupation with organizing the mass production industries
and the need for research expansion during its early
formative years, it indicated little interest in monetary
policy.

Therefore, it is difficult to make an assessment

of the views of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
While the conflict between the American Federation of
Labor and the Committee of Industrial Organizations was

27

Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History
(New York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 463-483.
28

J. Raymond Walsh, C.I.O. Industrial Unionism in
Action (New York; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937),
p. 278.
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occuring in 1937, a downturn in business was in progress.
The Federal Reserve in the fall of 1937 lowered the
discount rate and bought securities in anticipation of the
seasonal demand for currency while the Secretary of the
Treasury released sterilized gold.

To further help arrest

the decline in business, reserve requirements wemp slightly
lowered in the spring of 1938.

The Federation approved of

these monetary actions and the Monthly Survey of Business
reported:
Measures to increase bank credit, which include the
reduction of reserve requirements for banks, and
the deposit in Federal Reserve Banks of $1,400,000,000
of the treasury's inactive gold reserves; these
together will increase the bank credit base available
for loans by over $1,500,000,000; and in addition,
the relaxation of bank examiners' regulation will
make it easier for small businesses to get credit.
These moves cannot but have far reaching effects in
2Q
^
stimulating business.
The Federation was discouraged when the easy money
policy of the Federal Reserve was not highly successful
in stimulating business activity.

During 1939 and 1940,

excess reserves of member banks increased steadily while
their indebtedness to the Reserve banks decreased.

29

American Federation of Labor, "The Outlook,"
Monthly Survey of Business. First Half, 1938.
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With the entry of the United States into World War
II, the debt program of the Treasury became the principal
source of policy for the Federal Reserve System.

During

the active war, inflationary pressures were left to the
agencies of direct economic controls, such as the War Labor
Board, the Office of Price Administration,, the War Production
Board, and to the selective instruments of control at the

>

disposal of the monetary authorities.
In this period, there was no serious criticism of
Federal Reserve policy, but instead, the leaders of the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations continuously attacked the War Labor Board's
views on wage stabilization.3®

Phillip Murray, head of the

Congress of Industrial Organizations, told the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee .in 1941 that wage control
was not necessary to control inflation.

He expressed the

"firm and unqualified opposition of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations to the inclusion of wage control
*
in the p r i c e contfol
bill." ?1
•

3®Taft, pp. cit., p. 558.
31

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings, H.R. 5990. 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941,
p. 30.
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The Congress of Industrial Organizations in the latter
part of 1943 maintained that every effort had to be made to
stabilize prices, control living costs, and thus enable the
government to keep faith with its citizens.

Yet, it was the

contention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations that
"money could be inflationary only if spent, but not if
saved."

Therefore, the arguments against wage increases

on the grounds contributing to inflation were "irrelevent,
incompetent and immaterial.

1946 - 1965
When World War II ended, the United States economy was
faced with a great volume of money and liquid assets along
with an accumulated demand for goods.

This situation

presented a perfect background for inflation, but even in
1947 the Federal Reserve was still acting with great moderation.

By the middle of the year, the Federal Reserve

Board and the Treasury agreed upon a policy of permitting
short-term yields to rise, yet long-term rates continued
to be "pegged."

Congress of Industrial Organizations, The Economic
Outlook, November, 1943.
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By January, 1949, the American Federation of Labor was
becoming alarmed over the inflationary tendency of the
economy.

It was looking to the Federal Reserve System for
i

a solution when it stated:
The powers of the Federal Reserve System should be
used to prevent inflation and to provide no more
than a reasonable and normal growth in the nation's
money supply. If there is a conflict between this
policy of preventing inflation and the Federal
Reserve System's present policy of supporting the
market for U. S. Government obligations at par, it
should now use its powers to prevent inflation.
This should be done with wisdom and discretion?
adjustments should be adequate, but should not be
made so abruptly as to cause violent changes in
prices of government obligations. The added cost
to taxpayers of increased carrying charges on the
federal debt would be infinitesimal compared to the
losses they bear from continued price r i s e s . ^ 3
In February, the Federation noted that Secretary of
the Treasury, John W. Snyder, had announced that a new
security loan campaign "to promote savings and fight
inflation" would be initiated.

33

Under the new plan, the

American Federation of Labor, "Attack the Root
Cause of Inflation," Labor's Monthly Survey, January, 1948,
pp. 1-5. The Federation did note that on December 24, 1947,
the Federal Reserve "repegged" the price at which it bought
long-term government bonds at 100.25 per cent of par instead
of 100 per cent and on January 9, 1948, it had raised the
discount rate from 1 per cent to 1-1/4 per cent. These
actions were steps toward higher interest rates and would
tend to make commercial banks more cautious in expanding
credit.
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sale of series E savings bonds would be emphasized.

The

American Federation of Labor had consistently supported the
government in all of its programs to promote thrift among
the workers.

The 66th annual convention of the American

Federation of Labor adopted a report endorsing the continuation on a voluntary basis of the Treasury Department's
payroll savings plan for the purchase of United States
savings bonds.

William Green, head of the American Feder

ation of Labor, urged the workers to support the new security
loan campaign.
While the Federation encouraged its members to purchase
savings bonds, it challenged charges that high wages were
the prime cause of inflation.

Boris Shiskin, American

Federation of Labor economist, in June, 1948, said that the
excessive volume of money in circulation was to blame
soaring prices.^5

for

He called for Congressional action to

curb inflation and "to balance out our economy at a high
level of production."

However, in Shiskin's opinions

34

.
American Federation of Labor, "Treasury Department
Will Launch New Security Loan Drive to Fight Inflation,"
Weekly News Service, February 13, 1948.
35

American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service,
June 1, 1948.
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To cut back the money supply alone would mean an
economic balance at a lower rate in production of
goods which would be consumed only by those
fortunate enough to have adequate purchasing power.^
The Federation further asserted that the Treasury had
encouraged easy money and easy credit by refusing to increase
the interest rate on its short-term certificates.

To the

Federation, this action was contrary to the advice of
Federal Reserve officials and would increase the workers'
cost of living through higher prices.

37

The Federation's Weekly News Service in August reported
that the 80th Congress had adjourned with very little
accomplished.

Much to the Federation's disappointment, no

36 American Federation of Labor, "Inflation Curbs Urged
for Balanced Economy," Weekly News Service, June 15, 1948.
See also: American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service.
June 18, 1948, in which Federation President Green enumer
ated proposals submitted to the Republican Convention to
curb inflation. The Federation recommended a four-point
program:
(1) That committees of businessmen, labor, agri
cultural and other groups be called by the Council of
Economic Advisers to develop a joint program to check
inflation.
(2) That the voluntary allocation program for
scarce materials operating under the U.S. Department of
Commerce be strengthened.
(3) That monetary and fiscal
policies to check abnormal increase in money supply and bank
credit be followed.
(4) That a vigorous program to sell
U.S. savings bonds to American consumers be conducted.
37

American Federation of Labor, Labor's Monthly Survey.
June-July, 1948, p. 6 .
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action was taken on President Truman's sweeping antiinflation program and a limited substitute was passed.

The

substitute was a credit control bill which restored wartime
consumer buying regulations on a temporary basis and granted
the Federal Reserve Board authority to increase the reserve
requirements on member banks.
Even after reserve requirements were raised that fall,
a downward trend in economic activity was becoming increas
ingly apparent, and by 1949, it became more pronounced.
Prices declined, business loans were being liquidated,
production activity decreased, and unemployment increased.
Federal Reserve policy was adjusted to counteract the
recession.

Margin requirements on security loans were

reduced, consumer credit regulation was relaxed even before
it expired on June 30, 1949, and reserve requirements were
continuously reduced.
In the fall of 1949, the American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations participated in
the hearings held by the Joint Committee on the Economic

Federation of Labor, "Congress Votes Limited
Credit Curbs, Housing Aid as Special Session Ends," Weekly
News Service, August 10, 1948.
^ A m e r i c a n
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Report on Monetary, Credit and Fiscal Policies.^

Everett

M. Kassalow and Stanley H. Ruttenberg40 were representatives
for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and presented a
statement on behalf of Emil Rieve, their vice president.
The statement expressed the appreciation of the organization
for the opportunity to testify, "if even only to present
general views on fiscal and monetary policy" and explained:
Our own consideration of the Employment Act and the
policies which can bring about its successful oper
ation have convinced us that there is no more impor
tant single area for bold Government action than in
the fields of Credit, fiscal and monetary policy.4^
In the area of monetary policy, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations felt that the failure of Congress
to renew the Federal Reserve Board's power over consumer
credit in June, 1949, was an appalling mistake.

This was

the Federal Reserve Board's power that had "justified its
existence" and that power should be available for use when

39

The Joint Committee on the Economic Report was
created under the Employment Act of 1946.
40

Mr. Kassalow was Executive Secretary, CIO Full
Employment Committee and Mr. Ruttenberg was Director of
Education and Research.
4% . S . Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monetary,
Credit, and Fiscal Policies of the Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, Hearings: Monetary. Credit and Fiscal
Policies, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 299.
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necessary.

Senator Paul H. Douglas, chairman of the subS

committee, commented that the continuance of the regulations
on consumer credit was attacked by some on the grounds that
it would be unfair to unduly restrict the ability of low
income groups to command durable consumer goods.

Stanley

Ruttenberg said that those individuals who had opposed the
extension of consumer credit were the ones who allowed the
low income people "to become so indebted that they can't
get out of it."

42

Similar to the Congress of Industrial Organizations1
views, the American Federation of Labor felt that the power
/

to control the volume of consumer credit should be restored
to the System as a permanent feature.

In addition, it

believed that the authority of the Federal Reserve System
to modify the required reserve ratios should be increased
so that the System could impose additional reserve require
ments when desired.

The Federation also suggested that the

Government's lending operations be coordinated with general
monetary, credit and fiscal policy, insofar as this was not
incompatible with the major purpose for which the loan
powers were set up.

42

Ibid.. p. 302.

For example, it was apparent to the
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Federation that good public policy required the; expansion
of loans for housing even during the period of post-war
inflation. 43
Although the testimony by the two organized labor
groups was similar at this hearing, their appraisals of the
post-war inflation were somewhat different.

While the

Federation had supported tighter monetary controls, an
article, in the Congress of Industrial Organizations' Economic
Outlook told the workers:
After both World War I and World War II the bankers
sought to do away with the addition to the money
and credit supply created by the bonds.
In both
cases they used the excuse of needing to fight
inflation. Inflation, however, was primarily a
wartime problem— and it had been handled fairly
effectively in World War II . . . What the bankers
were after . . . [wasj a deflation that would put
the country through the wringer and at the same
time restore a condition of scarcity in the money
market which increases the ,economic power of the
bankers.^
By 1950, the economy was showing signs of a recovery
from the 1949 inventory adjustment.

Employment and

industrial production were advancing, prices were rising,

43Ibid.. pp. 548-552.
44

Congress of Industrial Organizations, "Higher
Interest Rates Help Banks— Hit You," Economic Outlook,
May, 1953, p. 36.
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banks were resuming the expansion of loans, and total spend?ing was increasing.

When the Korean War started in June,

a wave of precautionary buying helped to accelerate prices
and to stimulate a growth of bank credit.
In the latter part of thfet year, the Federation
claimed that the United States government was responsible
for keeping the nation's money sound and preventing
depreciation of its value.

Inflation had to be prevented

but the Federation did not want it merely postponed by
wage-price controls as it had been in World

War

II.

The Federation suggested that the United States
government borrow from individuals by selling savings bonds
instead of borrowing from the banks for the latter method
was inflationary.

Also, it supported the Federal Reserve

Board's task of curbing consumer credit and bank credit
and stated that the credit controls on housing, automobiles,
furniture, and appliances had already proven effective in
taking pressure off prices of these items. 45

^American Federation of Labor, "Money Must be Kept
Sound As Uncle Sam Pays for Defense," Labor1s Monthly Survey.
November-December, 1950, p. 6. On September 18, 1950, the
Federal Reserve Board issued Regulation W imposing controls
on installment credit. On October 12, the Board issued
Regulation X imposing selective controls on credit for the
construction, purchasing, and financing of new houses.
These regulations were issued in accordance with authority
contained in the Defense Production Act of 1950.

161
During the inflationary period in 1950, the Federal
Reserve Board was handicapped because of its support of the
long-term government bond market.

The Reserve authorities,

wanting to raise the long-term United States government
bond yield, ran into direct opposition from the Treasury.
This dispute between the two agencies ended with a joint
agreement known as the ".Accord" on March 4, 1951.

The

effect of the "Accord" was the restoration of independence
to the Federal Reserve for the pursuit of flexible monetary
policies.
The Federation approved of the Federal Reserve-Treasury
"Accord" because it felt that the rapid rise in loans to
business had been a root cause of inflation and it was
pleased to see that the credit inflation was being checked
in two ways.

First, the Treasury no longer insisted that

the Federal Reserve buy all government bonds at par value,
and thus the banks would hesitate to sell government bonds
for loan purposes.

Secondly, the banks were cooperating in

the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program

46

to cut down on

^ T h e Voluntary Credit Restraint Program of March, 1951,
was established under the Defense Production Act.
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loans to buy stocks of goods beyond reasonable amounts and
loans for non-defense plant expansxon.

47

The Congress of Industrial Organizations' views of the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy during 1951-52 were
basically different from those of the American Federation
of Labor.

In the report, "Federal Reserve Policy and the

Control of Inflation In a War or Defense Emergency," the
Congress of Industrial Organizations stated:
Our own studies of the recent emergency inflation
lead us to believe that the Federal Reserve policies
for which so much is claimed have been founded on
false premises. Moreover, they proved to be in
effective and inequitable when put into actual
operation during the past two years.**®
In analyzing the monetary policies of the Federal
Reserve System since the "Accord" in early 1951, the
Congress of Industrial Organizations first considered the
use of the discount rate.

It stated that an increase in

47

American Federation of Labor, "Credit Inflation
Checked," Labor's Monthly Survey, April-May, 1951, p. 7.
See also: American Federation of Labor, "Inflation Has
Reduced Dollar's Purchasing Power to 54C in Twelve Years,"
Labor's Monthly Survey, June-July, 1951, p. 6.
4®U.S.,Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings. Standby Economic Controls. 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., 1953, p. 793.
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discount rates ordinarily led to a rise in the interest
rates which member banks charged on business loans, and
this was supposed to cut down the number of borrowers.
Thus the inflationary pressure in the economy would be
eased.

Yet, to the Congress of Industrial Organizations,

slight, even moderate, increases in the interest rate would
not Curtail business speculation.49

At the Hearing on

Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt,
Nathaniel Goldfinger had stated:
I do not believe that a relatively small change in
interest rates will materially affect inflationary
pressures one way or another . . . A large change
in interest rates, it appears to me, would be un
desirable. in view of its effect on the public debt.
Furthermore, I question whether eveh a large rise
in interest rates, 3 to 5 per cent, for example,
would have any material effect on personal savings
and business investment under the economic conditions
of the past 6 years . . . Devices other than interest
rate changes will have to be developed if Government
policy is to affect personal savings and business
investment as means of influencing the course of
our national economy.50

49Ibid.. p. 794.
50 U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on General
Credit Control and Debt Management of the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report, Hearings. Monetary Policy and the
Management of the Public Debt. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952,
pp. 830, 1020-1021. See full statement by Donald E.
Montgomery, Director of Washington Office, International
Union, United Auto Workers, and Nathaniel Goldfinger, member
of Congress of Industrial Organizations' Committee on
Economic Policy. Ibid., pp. 817-822, 1020-1022, 1069-1070.
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Also, the Congress of Industrial Organizations stated
that its statistical estimations disclosed no visible
effectiveness of the Board's actions as far as the-money
supply was concerned, but the interest rates on commercial
and individual loans, as well as government securities,
had risen significantly since the "Accord,"

The result was

a substantial increase in the profits of many banks.

The

Congress of Industrial Organizations pointed out that as
the interest rates on the Government debt climbed, the
cost of servicing the Federal debt rose, thereby increasing
the burden on the average taxpayer of the United States.
In addition, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program
was attacked by the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
When the government was telling management and labor what
wages they could or could not pay and the manufacturers
what prices they could charge, the Federal Reserve Board
asked the bankers to devise their own rules of anti
inflation conduct.
asked:

The Congress of Industrial Organizations

"Can anyone conceive of the Federal Government's

anti-inflation program including the delegation to unions
of the control over wages, or to business the control over
prices?"
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The Congress of Industrial Organizations challenged the
anti-inflationary views of those advocates who wanted the
Federal Reserve Board to withdraw its support from new
government issues and "actively unload important parts of
its holdings of government securities."

The Congress of

Industrial Organizations believed a real "dumping operation"
by the Board would lead to panic and extreme deflation,
unemployment, and economic collapse.

It cited the periods

1920-21 and 1929 as cases where the Board's deflationary
policies had helped precipitate severe business panics.
However, the milder actions during 1951-1952 had no effect
in limiting the expansion of bank credit.
Yet, the Congress of Industrial Organizations stressed
that the inadequacies of the Federal Reserve Board policies
should not be overlooked in formulating future emergency
anti-inflation programs.

It suggested that if there were

to be adequate and equitable curtailment of business loans
by the banks, this should be'done by direct methods.

The

President of the United States possessed the power to limit
the volume of credit which could be issued by the banks.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations did admit that
sound monetary and credit policies, directed at curtailing
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nonessential business activity or speculation could also
serve the same objective.

51

The American Federation of Labor's attitude toward
monetary policy during the period 1953-54 was summarized
at the 1954 convention:
Consider the big downslide of 1953-1954. In the
first part of 1953, price inflation of the Korean
mobilization period had fully run its course. It
was no longer a problem. Yet, the incoming Admin
istration acted as if inflation were a major
menace. It set in motion strong deflationary
policies. These were in hand with the newly pro
claimed overriding objectives of the government
"economy drive" and to balancing the budget.
The Treasury raised interest rates, setting off a
general rise in interest charges on all forms of
borrowing. The era of "hard money" and "dear
dollar" was proclaimed. Most important of all,
the country, in thrpes of a full-scale, long-term
defense mobilization, was suddenly confronted with
a curtailment of defense spending. With the
Communist menace nowhere diminished, despite the
Korean truce, the announced "transition from war to
peace" not only came as a shock, but also changed
business and public expectations to a sudden
reduction in the defggse effort, defense production
and defense outlays.

51

U. S., Congress, Hearings, Standby Economic Controls.
op. cit., pp. 795-796.
52

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1954, p.
260. The Congress of Industrial Organizations was in
general agreement with the American Federation of Labor on
the "hard money" policy of the Eisenhower administration.
See, Congress of Industrial Organizations, "Higher Interest
Rates Help Banks— Hit You," Economic Outlook. May, 1953.
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The report further explained that the "hard money" policies
had served to slow down the economy.

By the second half of

1953, Federal Reserve policies experienced a far reaching
shift to ease bank credit, to stimulate borrowing, and to
arrest the deflationary trend.
The Executive Council contended that although the
monetary "stabilizers" had contributed to the checking of
the recession, they had failed to reverse it.

At best,

they proved effective only as props to stabilize the
economy at the lower level it had reached.

Thus the

Council concluded:
. . . it is the widening disparity between the buying
power of consumers and the rapidly increasing pro
ductive power of industry that presents the central
problem of the American economy. Return, to full
prosperity depends on the solution of this problem.^
Much to the relief of organized labor, recovery from
the recession began in the third quarter of 1954.

Through

out 1955, there was a sharp increase in consumers' purchases
of durable commodities and inventory accumulation on the
part of business.

Also, business investment in new plants

and equipment was increasing at a rapid pace which created
\
53
p. 261.

American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1954,
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pressure upon resources and on the available supply of
loanable funds.

The Federal Reserve Board, fearing infla

tionary developments, attempted to tighten the supply of
money and made it increasingly expensive to borrow funds.
At the annual convention of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations in December, 1955, Walter P. Reuther,
President, reported:
It was relatively easy credit terms for the purchase
of goods and services— and the easing of mortgage
terms in 1954 for the purchase of homes— that helped
to spark the upward surge of consumer spending and
home construction in .the past y e a r . ^
Yet, Reuther felt that the Eisenhower Administration
apparently saw the rise in consumer debt as dangerous and
believed that it should be halted.

He contended that the

effect of the Administration's general "hard money" policy
would be to increase profits for banks and other lenders andtend to depress economic activity.

It was therefore the

contention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations that,
for continued economic growth, the Administration's general
"hard money" policy had to be reversed.^

54Congress of Industrial Organizations, Proceedings,
1955, p. 119.
55Ibid., pp. 121, 125.

The annual convention of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations in December, 1955, was to be its last, for
during that year an agreement was signed to merge the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations.

56

They joined names as well and the organ

ization became popularly known as the AFL-CIO.

These

differences which h^d existed in their attitudes toward
monetary policy 57 were linked in the merger and in the
formation of one research department which was composed of
economists from both organizations.
Throughout 1956, the underlying policy of the Federal
Reserve System continued to be "restraining inflationary
developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth.
Discount rates were increased to enforce open market
operations by making borrowing unattractive to member banks
except in emergencies.
The newly formed AFL-CIO, like the previous separate
organizations, attacked the hard money policy of the

EC

/

3°The merger agreement and the "Implementation Agree
ment" were signed on November 30, 1955, under which the
transfer of property was arranged and the rights of the
unions and members in the merger were formally recognized.
Taft, op., cit., p. 660.
57Supra.Chapter V, pp. 161-162.
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Eisenhower administration.

The AFL-CIO Industrial Union

Department in the fall of 1956 told the workers that the
cost of money was to go higher because the bankers had
"teamed up with" the Administration in raising interest
rates.

The "prime" interest rate which was charged to the

big corporations had been raised by the First National
Bank of Boston followed by the New York Banks.

To the

AFL-CIO, this action by the First National Bank of Boston
appeared to be a signal to the Federal Reserve Board to
also increase the discount rates.
The AFL-CIO also argued that the hard money policies
had destroyed the New Deal mortgage protection.

For the

first time since the twenties, conventional mortgages were
accounting for a large share of home financing instead of
the Veterans' Administration and Federal Housing Adminis
tration loans.

The AFL-CIO was disturbed because the

conventional mortgages did not carry government guarantees.
Therefore, because of the risk and the high interest rates,
the workers were being driven out of the housing markets.^

AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin. September, 1956, p. 8. Dis
count rates were raised late in August, 1956, to 3 per cent
at the ten Reserve Banks with rates of 2-3/4 per cent.
59
AFL-CIO, "Hard Money Policy Causes Decline in Gov't
Mortgages," IUP Bulletin. November, 1956, p. 8.
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Nat Goldfinger, AFL-CIO economist, believed:
The Eisenhower Administration . . . has failed to
give leadership in the most important aspect of
economic policy— that of increasing the living
standards of the low income groups and of increas
ing cultural, educational, welfare and social
opportunities.60
He attributed the general prosperity under President
Eisenhower to the policies instituted by the Roosevelt and
Truman Administration.

61

The Economic Policy Committee of the AFL-CIO, in its
review of 1956 reported that the tight jnoney policy had
failed to stem the investment boom of the large corpor
ations.

Instead, the high interest rates had retarded the

growth in certain sectors of the economy, such as home
building, and had increased the profits of such institutions
as banks and insurance companies.^
This Committee in January, 1957, stated:
Current monetary policy needs to be re-examined.
The causes and effects of a tight money market
are different when seen through the eyes of

60

AFL-CIO, "Economists In Disagreement on Adminis
tration Policies," IUP Bulletin. December, 1956, p. 9.
6:1 Ibid.

62AFL-CIO, Economic Review. January, 1957, p. 4.
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someone otlier than a specialist in monetary
policy .6 3
The AFL-CIO Executive Council declared that "important
types of borrowers have suffered" from the tight monetary
policy.

Farmers, city and state governments, and small

businesses found it increasingly difficult to borrow funds
for necessary improvements and repairs or continuation of
successful activity.6^

The Council recommended a three

point program to combat the inflation failures:
1.
2.
3.

Pursue policies designed to accomplish a steady,
balanced rate of growth in the national economy.
Relax the present "tight money" policy.
Take specific steps to alleviate the hardships
caused by tight money .6 6

6 3 AFL-CIO,

"A New Look at Monetary Policy," Economic
Trends and Outlook,January, 1957. Other criticisms of
monetary policy by the Committee were: "The pattern of
discount rates chasing U.S. Treasury bill rates created
f inflation and confusion in the short-term securities market.
Instead of a Federal Reserve effort to keep the interest
rate on Treasury short-term bills low, so that the discount
rate would be low, it followed the backward pattern of
letting Treasury rates go where they would by not inter
fering too much and then raising discount rates to meet the
new heights of Treasury rates. Through a 'hands off' policy,
the Federal Open Market Committee did not support the price
of Treasury long-term bonds . . . The result: Treasury
attempts to move the Federal debt into long-term issues and
out of the bank structure were not successful." AFL-CIO,
Economic Trends and Outlook, March, 1959, p. 3.
6 ^AFL-CIO,

News. February 9, 1957, cited by Neil W.
Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1958), p. 959.
6 6 AFL-CIO, "Relax Tight Money Policy," Economic Trends
and Outlook. February, 1957, p. 2.
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The Council further suggested that the government provided
for federal aid to education, an expanded public housing
program as well as one for middle-income housing, and the
establishment of a governmental corporation for low interest
rate loans for specific necessary social programs .^ 6
The Industrial Union Department1s Executive Board in
March requested that the Eisenhower Administration and the
Federal Reserve Board reverse "present unjustified hard
money policies" and.warned that there were "signs of slowing
down" in the rate of.economic expansion.

The IUP Bulletin,

during most months in 1957, featured articles attacking the
tight monetary program.^
Wages and Prices and the American Economy was the topic
of a statement issued by the AFL-CIO Executive Council in
August.

The Council argued that a dangerous and paradoxical

^AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin publications as follows :
"Economic Activity Showing Signs of Slackening, IDU Board
Warns," March, 1957, p. 5y "Hard Money Probe Balked by
Administration Pressure," April, 1957, p. 13; "Little Change
Noted in Economy," May, 1957, p. 15; "Tight Money Aids
Banker; Taxpayers Carry Burden," June, 1957, p. 9. "Housing
Slupip Aggravated as Money Costs Go Higher," August, 1957,
p. 12; "Recession is Not the Answer," September, 1957; and
"Bankers Look to Consumer for Continuing prosperity,"
October, 1957.
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situation confronted the American economy.

Since the end of

1956, industrial production had been going down.

At the

same time, prices had continued to move up despite a decline
in aggregate demand and the rapid rise in the production
facilities of the nation.

The Council did not feel that

this paradox could be explained as a "cost-push" inflation
and stated:
. . . it is hard to see how "cost-push" can be the
cause when, according to official Government
reports, labor costs remained practically unchanged
in the past five years in spite of rising wages and
improving fringe b e n e f i t s . 6 ®
Organized labor felt that their criticism of the
Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy was well founded
for by the late fall of 1957, there was evidence of an
economic recession.

With recognition of declines in economic

activity, the Federal Reserve officials moved to lessen
the degree of restraint in November and December, 1957,
by reducing discount rates.
The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO used
the expression "too little and too late" in February, 1958,

AFL-CIO, Wages and Prices and the American Economy.
A Statement Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council
(Chicago: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organization, August 14, 1957) (in the files of
the AFL-CIO).
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to sum up the reaction to easier credit by the Federal
Reserve Board.

It explained that the Board "grudgingly"

acknowledged the recessionary trend in the economy, and cut
margin requirements on stock purchases from 70 to 50 per
cent, followed by a cut in the discount rate. .Even with
easier money, the Department believed all indications
pointed to a further slide in the

economy.

Several months later, the Department used the following
adage as an explanation of the situation in which the nation
found itself regarding monetary policy:
You can step on the brakes and stop a fast moving
car but you can't get it started again merely by
lifting yourToot from the brake p e d a l . ^ 0
It pointed out that the Federal Reserve had again reduced
the discount rate by one-half of one per cent, and also had
lowered the reserve requirements.

The Department believed

that, theoretically, these actions would make credit more
readily available, but until purchasing power balanced with
productive capacity, it was doubtful that easier money
would serve as an economic stimulant.

Only then would

®^AFL-CI0, "Tardy Credit Easing Moves Will Do Little
to End Slump," IUP Bulletin. February, 1958.
^®AFL-CI0,’"Money Moves Seen Having Little Effect on
the Economy," IUP Bulletin. May, 1958.
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monetary policy be of help in encouraging economic growth.
By the end of the third quarter of 1958, economic
activity was again advancing with gains recorded in personal
consumption expenditures, residential construction, and
government purchases.
i

The AFL-CIO noted in October and

November that the Federal Reserve Board had raised discount

i

rates and was taking certain other credit restricting steps.
Organized labor believed that the Treasury and Federal
Reserve officials apparently had not "learned their lesson"
and their actions would bring on a further recession. 72
During this period, Everett M. Kassalow, Director of
Research for the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department
stated:
We are presently operating under several handicaps
in the monetary and credit field, so far as our
objectives of sustained, stable economic growth is
concerned. For example, the basic legislation in
the monetary and credit area was laid down before
the passage of our modern system of social— and
economic— reform legislation which culminated in
the Employment Act of 1946.7^

7 1 Ibid.
7 ^AFL-CIO, "Bankers Gain as Monetary Policy Threatens
Recovery," IUP Bulletin, October, 1958, p. 9. AFL-CIO,
"Credit Screws Tightened in New Blow at Recovery," IUP
Bulletin. November, 1958, p. 4.
7 ^U.S.,

Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Rela
tionship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth (Commen
taries submitted by economists from labor and industry), 85th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp.,53-54, 821.
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In his opinion regarding the broad realm of credit
policy, the strain on the Federal Reserve Board could be
reduced by the judicious use of other Federal credit
instruments.

He felt that there was a tendency on the part

of the public and probably of some Board officials to
arrogate too much power and responsibility to the Board.^
In 1959 as the economy recovered from the 1957-1958
recession, organized labor continued to attack the tight
money policy of the Federal Reserve System.^
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Chart 4

The following articles appeared xn the AFL-CIO, IUP
Bulletin in 1959:
"Tighter Money in Prospect, Could Brake
Recovery Rate," February, p. 15; "Federal Reserve," March,
p. 2; "Recovery Rate Too Slow," April, p. 15; "Reserve
Board's Policies Cloud Nation's Recovery," May, p. 13;
"Money Supply Tightened Despite Needs of Jobless," June,
p. 2; "Tight Money Impact Grows, Higher Interest Rates Seen,"
July, p. 12; "Danger, of Recession Seen as Money Becomes
Tighter," August, p. 3; "Interest Charges Increase in New
Tight Money Moves," September, p. 12; "Wage Inflation
Theories Blasted by Top Economists," October, p. 13; "Money
Costs to Treasury Highest Since Big Crash," October, p. 14;
"Housing Boom Slows Down as Tight Money Takes Hold," Decem
ber, p. 11. See also: AFL-CIO, "Tight Money Manis," IUP
Digest. Summer, 1959, pp. 89-100, and AFL-CIO, "Back to Tight
Money?" IUP Digest, Winter, 1959, pp. 122-128; AFL-CIO,
Policy Resolutions of The Third Constitutional Convention
(Washington: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, 1959), pp. 37-38.
(In the files of
the AFL-CIO); U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Hearings. Employment. Growth, and Price Levels. 8 6 th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1959, pp. 3109-3110.
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shows the changes in discount rates from 1954 through 1959
and the increase in long-term United States government bond
yields.

f

In December, 1959, the AFL-CIO Economic Policy Committee
stressed that the nation had to have enough money and
credit to carry on the business of a growing population.
Even though the Federal Reserve spokesmen constantly
reassured the nation that the Board was trying to provide
enough money, the controversial question to the Committee
was "How much was enough?"

It felt that "financial

intermediaries," "velocity," and other economic factors had
not made enough difference to keep the majority of
Americans from the effects of tight money.

It concluded

that for a nation emerging from the 1958 recession, a rapid
increase in money and credit would not be "undue.
The AFL-CIO predicted in January, 1960, that still
higher interest rates and scarce money lay immediately
ahead as the result of Administration and Federal Reserve
policies of deliberate credit restraint.

It was apparent

to organized labor that "the Federal Reserve feared

■^AFL-CIO, "Money and Credit— Tighter and Tighter,"
Economic Trends and Outlook, December, 1959, pp. 1-4.

Chart 4.
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prosperity even more than recession, and that monetary
policy was being tailored accordingly."

It was the hope

of the AFL-CIO that tight money would be injected into the
election campaign of that year.

However, it felt this was

doubtful because the subject was so complex and it was
difficult to draw public attention to the issue; despite
tight money, the current boom would probably continue through
that year.^
By the late spring of 1960, the economy was showing
signs of a recession.

The AFL-CIO could not understand why

the Federal Reserve continued to keep the discount rate at
a high level. .It contended that tight money was hurting
the small businessman, home buyers, consumers and workers
and was a factor in the continued high rate of unemploy
ment. 7®
The AFL-CIO was pleased to see that by July the
Federal Reserve had finally eased the credit restraint by
lowering the discount rates.

However, it noted that interest

^AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin. January, 1960, p. 12. See
also, AFL-CIO, "Ike Economic Viewpoint Hit by Labor and in
Congress," IUP Bulletin, February, 1960, p. 14; AFL-CIO,
"Higher Interest Costs Extra Billion," Economic Trends
and Outlook. February, 1960, pp. 104.
7®AFL-CI0, "Monetary Policy," IUP Bulletin, May, 1960,
p. 2 .
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rates had not started down and there was little indication
of any significant change in the near future.

79

That fall, organized labor proclaimed that there was
little doubt that the nation was being plagued by a third
Republican recession.
tight

moneys

Although the AFL-CIO knew that

was not the only reason for the decline in

economic activity, it held the Federal Reserve— with the
encouragement of the Administration— primarily responsible.
Therefore, organized labor demanded:
There is a need to reverse present policies now and
to take counter-action. This would be too much to
expect of the Eisenhower Administration or of Mr.
Nixon, neither of whom has expressed concern over
entry into a new recession with nearly six per cent
of Americans already jobless.
From its standpoint, the best action to take against
recession was the presidential election of Senator John
F. Kennedy.®'*'
At that time, the monetary authorities were becoming
increasingly concerned over the balance-of-payments deficit.

^AFL-CIO,
p. 15.

"Cost of Money," IUP Bulletin, July, 1960,

AFL-CIO, "A Third GOP Recession," IUP Bulletin.
October, 1960, p. 1.
81Ibid.

The AFL-CIO in November, 1960, noted that the discount
rate had been cut to three per cent by the Federal Reserve
but felt that it was unlikely to go lower unless there was
a deepening of the recession.

It told the workers that the

major reason given by the Federal Reserve for not lowering
82

interest rates was the gold outflow from the United States.0*
The AFL-CIO felt that the incoming Kennedy Administration
had inherited a related set of economic problems— a
recession and a"flight from the dollar.'

QO

In 1961, the balance-of-payments problem received
greater attention from the AFL-CIO.®^

It was pleased to

see that the Kennedy program was trying to lower long-term
interest rates by having the Federal Reserve maintain the

82

AFL-CIO, "Consumers Gaining Little From Money Easing
Moves," IUP Bulletin. November, 1960, p. 9.
8 3 AFL-CIO,

"Prosperity Will End Gold Crisis," IUP
Bulletin. Pecember, 1960,p. 13. See also; AFL-CIO, "The
Balance of Payments Issue," Economic Trends and Outlook,
Pecember, 1960, pp. 1-4.
84

AFL-CIO, "Labor's Goals for a Better America,"
American Federationist, February, 1961, p. 20; AFL-CIO,
"The'Balance of Payments Issue," Economic Tends and Outlook.
February, 1961, p. 3; AFL-CIO, Balance of Payments Policy,
A Statement Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council
(Miami Beach; American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, February 26, 1961) (in the files
of the AFL-CIO).
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Federal securities market on more than a "bills only"
QC

basis.

However, by late spring, it was disappointing to

organized labor that the Administration's efforts to
reduce the long-term interest rates were "generally unsuc
cessful."

Yet, it optimistically.noted that the United

States.'balance of payments position had
gold outflow had almost diminished.

improved, and the

It strongly believed

that since the c/old outflow was almost halted, the excuse
for both high short-term and long-term rates was no longer
valid and it recommended:
A vigorous approach to monetary policy would
utilize all the tools of the Federal Reserve
Board. This would include a further cut in t h e ^
discount rate which still stands at three per
cent and which holds up the price of money. It
would also require far more than token purchases
on long-term bonds.®®
This basic attitude by organized labor continued throughout
the remainder of 1961.
By January, 1962, the AFL-CIO was pleased to see that
an economic upturn was being forecast by most economists.

85

AFL-CIO, "Reserve Shifts Money Position," IUP
Bulletin. March, 1961, p. 14 and AFL-CIO, "Economic Program
Outlined, IUP Bulletin. February, 1961, p. 5.
86

AFL-CIO, "Interest Rates Stay High? Put Brake on
Recovery," IUP Bulletin. May, 1961, p. 13.
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Yet, it feared that higher interest rates authorized by the
Federal Reserve officials for savings deposits in commercial
banks would be detrimental to the economy.

87

The AFL-CIO

considered that this action would more than likely push up
savings and loan associations' interest on deposits, and in
turn would result in higher rates on mortgages.

The AFL-CIO

predicted that a slackening of housing construction would
follow, adding to any general fall in economic activity
which might occur after mid-year.

It was critical of a

speech by Federal Reserve Board Chairman, William McChesney
Martin, in which he stated that the Board would not interfere
with any higher interest rates "resulting from the interaction of supply and demand."

88

In its spring meeting in Washington, D.C., organized
labor's view was summarized by the AFL-CIO Executive /Council
which stated that the upturn from the recession "had been
less than expected last January."

The Council added that

these economic developments had "unfortunately" borne out

®^0n January 1, 1962, Federal Reserve banks were
allowed to raise interest rates on any savings deposit from
3 to 3-1/2 per cent and to 4 per cent on thbse left in the
bank for one year or more.
88
AFL-CIO, "Vigorous Economic Upturn New Seen by Fore
casters," IUP Bulletin. January, 1962, p. 14.
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warnings of the AFL-CIO and it called for a Federal Reserve
policy designed to maintain low interest rates on long
term loans and to insure continued ease in the money
market .8 9
During this period, Stanley Ruttenberg, economist for
the AFL-CIO, requested, among other things, that an anti
recessionary tax cut be effected.

In his testimony before

the Joint Economic Committee, he stated:
I must express concern over rumors, and I guess it
is more than rumor, that the Federal Reserve Board
will seek to offset a tax cut, if one comes, by a
tighter money policy. Action of this kind would
simply destroy the beneficial efforts of the tax
reductions. While it is important to take monetary
measures to help ease the balance-of-payments
problem, they must be selective and constructive in
nature. A general effort to tighten the availa
bility of funds and thus raise interest rates across
the board now to meet the payments problem just
cannot be tolerated at a time when the American
economy needs credit ease and lower borrowing costs
in order to overcome stagnation. Policies to meet
the international monetary problem can and must be

89

U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings.
State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment. 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 347. For similar recovery
views by organized labor, see: AFL-CIO, "Tighter Money in
Prospect Despite Slack in Economy," and "Labor Offers
Prosperity Plan," IUP Bulletin. July, 1962, pp. 5 and 87
AFL-CIO, "Let's Stop Recession Now," IUP Bulletin. August,
1962, p. 1.

186
shaped that do not undermine the achievement of
what must be our number one
objective— the
qn
restoration of recovery. u
The economy had changed little by November, 1962.
The AFL-CIO reported to the workers that the Federal Reserve
had responded to the demands for easier money by adjusting
only to meet the seasonal needs of the member banks.

qi

In the early part of 1963, organized labor maintained
that more than ever before the economy needed expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies which would reduce unemployment below the five per cent level.

Chart 5 shows the

rising trend of unemployment and interest rates which
concerned organized labor.

The AFL-CIO Executive Council

warned that "job-creating efforts can be nullified by a
tightening of the money supply and an increase in interest
rates," and again urged Congress to reject proposals that
would increase long-term interest rates.

93

But the Council

90

AFL-CIO, "Council Expresses Concern with Lag in U.S.
Economy," IUP Bulletin. May, 1962; See also, AFL-CIO,
"Interest Rate Policies and the Economy," Economic Trends
and Outlook, July, 1962.
9-*-AFL-CIO, "Relaxing of Cuban Crisis Finds Economy
Unchanged," IUD Bulletin, November, 1962, p. 13.
92

AFL-CIO, "Same Problems," IUD Bulletin, January, 1963.

93

AFL-CIO, "Council Opposes Tighter Money," IUD
Bulletin. March, 1963.
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Chart 5.

Unemployment Rate and Yield on Long-Term
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regretfully stated in Augusts
In mid-1963 . . . signs of an increased payments
deficit and pressures from Western European cen
tral bankers lead the Administration to impose
monetary restraints on the domestic economy. The
money supply was tightened, interest rates, were
raised and the discount rate, which the Federal
Reserve System charges on loans to commercial
banks, was increased from 3% to 3-1/2%. This
restrictive policy will have little, if any,
impact on the payments deficit, but it places a
damper on the faltering advance of the economy,
at a time of high unemployment and large amounts
of idle plants and machines.
The Federal Reserve Board's action of raising the
discount rate was called "outrageous" by AFL-CIO president,
George Meany, and he urged an immediate "meaningful" tax
cut to offset the "ill-considered" action.

The AFL-CIO was

quite aware that the Federal Reserve had been trying to keep
domestic capital at home and to attract foreign capital by
"operation nudge."

This had involved driving up the short

term interest rates and holding down' the long-term rates.
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AFL-CIO, Balance of Payments. A Statement Prepared by
the AFL-CIO Executive Council, (Unity House, Pennsylvania?
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, August ,13, 1963) (in the files of the AFL-CIO).
See also: AFL-CIO, The National Economy. A Statement Pre
pared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Unity House, Penn
sylvania: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, August 15, 1963) (in the files of
the AFL-CIO).
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Yet, organized labor was of the opinion that the constant
upward movement of short-term rates would mean higher
interest rates in general.^

The Industrial Union Depart

ment in December, 1963, denied the need to curb the United
States economy because of the balance of payments and urged
that direct controls be instigated over the flow of invest
ments to foreign countries until effective international
monetary reform was achieved.

Q6

Nathaniel Goldfinger, economist for the AFL-CIO, in
,March, 1964, commented:
In 1964, America once again faces a potential threat
from the Federal Reserve— monetary policy may be
used to negate the demand-generating and job-creating
impact of the tax cut. Once again, the Nation's
monetary policy may be tilting with the windmills
of overall demand inflation or ineffectively respond
ing to a. balance-of-payments deficit, leaving
persistent, high levels of unemployment in its w a k e . ^

^AFL-CIO, "Labor Blasts Higher Interest," IUD Bulletin,
August, 1963, p. 3.
^AFL-CIO, "Economic Planning Urged by Convention
Resolution," IUD Bulletin. December, 1963, p. 13.
^U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Domestic
Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings.
The Federal Reserve System After 50 Years, 8 8 th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964, p. 1472.
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When the Federal Reserve Board in November, 1964, raised
the discount rate from 3-1/2 to 4 per cent, the AFL-CIO
continued to view this with alarm.

The Executive Council

stated that it would have a curbing effect on parts of the
economy,

and would do very little to curtail any sudden

short-term outflows of private capital.

To the Council,

the strength of the American dollar depended mainly on the
strength and the prosperity of the American economy at home
.
.
Qft
and it
requested a reversal of the Board's actions.

Organized labor's attitude toward monetary policy in
1965 was primarily a carry-over from the previous years'
concern with the Federal Reserve Board's actions on the
balance of payments issue.

99

The AFL-CIO stressed the need

for vigorous resistance against the campaign in favor of

98AFL-CIO, Federal Reserve Board Action. A Statement
Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Washington, D.C.:
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, November 24, 1964) (in the files of the AFLCIO) .
99

AFL-CIO, Balance-of-Payments, A Statement Prepared by
the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Bal Harbour, Florida: Amer
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ
izations, February 28, 1965) (in the files of the AFL-CIO).
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tighter money and higher interest r a t e s . O r g a n i z e d
labor's awareness of the significance of monetary policy
was quite clearly expressed by Nathaniel Goldfinger when he

i
said:
The AFL-CIO has consistently viewed monetary policy
as a subject of concern to every American. What the
Federal Reserve System decides can affect job oppor
tunities of men and women all over America. What the
Federal Reserve decides affects the cost of money,
of cars, of houses, of doing business, and the upward
and downward trends of business cycles.

Summary
The publications of organized labor from 1914 to 1945
reveal an attitude toward monetary policy which was limited
both in depth and scope.

Economists and statisticians

within the administrative structures were few in number,
and the organizations found it necessary to turn to trained
persons in the financial field for information and explana
tions.

100a FL-CIO, Statement on the President1s Economic
Report. Presented on behalf of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Walter P.
Reuther, Vice President, AFL-CIOy Chairman of the AFL-CIO
Economic Policy Committee, and President, UAW, March 1,
1965.
(In the files of the AFL-CIO).
•1-Olu.s., Congress, House, Hearings. The Federal Reserve
System After 50 Years, op. cit., p. 1474.
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Organized labor's general approach to monetary policy
from 1914 through the 1920's was characterized by a lack
of knowledge and spasmodic interest.

It, however, dis

approved of high interest rates, feared excessive stock
speculation, eyed bankers with suspicion, and supported
price stabilization as a monetary policy objective.
During the depression years of the 1930's, organized
labor became increasingly aware of the influence which
monetary policy had on the worker and on industry, and of
the need for an expansion within its own research depart
ments.

Although at times advocating stronger governmental

control, it favored the Federal Reserve's actions attempting
to alleviate the critical economic situation.
The Second World War brought no basic changes in the
attitude of organized labor to Federal. Reserve policy.
Its major criticisms were directed toward the War Labor
Board.
Since World War II, organized labor has experienced a
marked growth in its understanding of monetary policy.

This

maturing has been reflected in its publications and in its
increased participation in government hearings.

The junction

of staffs and attitudes by the merger of the American Feder
ation. of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
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in 1955 aided research development.

The Employment Act of

1946 served as a stimulant to its interest in monetary policy
and it advocated those policy measures which would fulfill
the objectives of the Act.
Prom the end of World War II through the late 1940's,
contradicting views toward Federal Reserve actions were
expressed by the American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The American Feder- .

ation of Labor believed that the money supply had increased
abnormally causing inflation and it wanted the Federal
Reserve to follow a course of tighter money.

The Congress

of Industrial Organizations felt that the Federal Reserve
was pursuing the correct policy by continuing to support the
long-term government bond market.

However, both organ

izations agreed that consumer credit controls should have
been retained.
During the Korean War period, the American Federation
of Labor felt the need for inflationary control and supported
the Federal Reserve-Treasury "Accord."

The Congress of

Industrial Organizations maintained that the Federal Reserve
policy in 1951-1952 was ineffective and urged direct
monetary control in this type of emergency.
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Organized labor vigorously attacked the Federal
Reserve's hard money policies of the Eisenhower adminis
tration.

It believed that the Federal Reserve was fighting

a "phantom" inflation and was contributing to recessions in
the economy.
During the 1960's, the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations became increasingly
concerned over the balance-of-payments problem.

It con

cluded that the Federal Reserve's policy of "operation nudge"
was not highly successful and suggested direct controls
over foreign investments until effective international
monetary reform could be achieved.

CHAPTER VI

ORGANIZED LABOR'S VIEWS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY REFORM AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
1943-1965

From 1943 through 1965, organized labor expressed
definite attitudes toward the Bretton Woods Agreements
and the Federal Reserve System.

The purpose of this

chapter is to present organized labor's views toward
international monetary legislation and proposals for reform
within the Federal Reserve System.

Bretton Woods International Monetary Agreements
International monetary affairs again captured the
interest of organized labor in the early 1940's.^

It was

concerned that decisions of far-reaching importance in
world affairs were being made without the participation of
the organized labor movement.

1 Supra,

Chapter IV, p. 127.
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One such decision centered around international
monetary stabilization which was being subjected to intense
study by various nations.

The Congress of Industrial Organ

izations felt that it was a question of great intricacy,
difficult to understand and explain.

However, it was a

matter of profound importance to workers because the outcome
could influence employment, incomes and the standard of
living.

To the Congress of Industrial Organizations, this

field was unfortunately left to the expert who may or may
not act in a way to serve the masses of the people.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations considered
/

the gold standard no longer feasible because the United
States held a large portion of the world's supply of gold,
and there would be no practical means of redistribution to
foreign countries.

It noted the United States and Great

Britain had suggested alternative proposals which were
known respectively as the White and Keynes Plans after their
authors.

The organization explained in The Economic

Outlook that each plan defined the value of the national
currencies and provided that no country could take indepen
dent action to change the value of its currency without
permission from the international monetary authority.

If

a country were to have temporary difficulty in its balance

of payments, the monetary authorities under each plan would
provide credit support until the country's emergency situa
tion was rectified.

Thus, exchange rates could be saved

from instability and the world kept from financial distress.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations contended that it
was of utmost importance that the United States, in dis
cussions on monetary stabilization, insist on either of the
followings
(1 ) its freedom independently to fight depression
and maintain and extend employment and social secur
ity, whenever the rest of the world refuses to come
along, or (2 ) a definite understanding that the
international monetary authority shall be committed,
not simply to exchange stability, but preeminently
to world conditions of full employment, rising
standards of life, and enlarged social security.^
It stressed that this subject demanded understanding and
study by the labor movement.

3

/

In.1944, a plan, uniting the recommendations of Keynes
and White, emerged at the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
and attended by delegates from forty-four nations.

At

this meeting, provisions were made for an International

^Congress of Industrial Organizations, "The Gold
Standard is Gone for Good," The Economic Outlook. October,
1943.
3Ibid.

198
Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank).

The International Monetary

Fund had a basic two-fold purpose:

first, to stabilize

values of the currencies of member nations, and second, to
provide credit for trade by making foreign exchange avail'
s<' /
able.to central banks or ‘other government agencies.

The

United States'quota was $2.75 billion of the total $8 . 8
billion.

The International Bank, with a proposed sub

scription of $9.1 billion had two primary functions:
1.

2.

To provide long-term credit for the reconstruction
of war-stricken nations and the development of
resources in those countries whose industrial
ization has been slow.
To provide, through credit, the foundation for a
permanent expansion of world trade among nations
by increasing productive capacity.^

Of the total, the United States'quota was $3,175 billion,
more than twice the amount of the next largest contributor.^
During the hearings on the Bretton Woods Agreements
Act, both the American Federation of Labor^ and Congress of
Industrial Organizations were represented.

4

William Green,

Studenski and Kroos, op. cit., p. 462.

^Ibid.
g
See statement on Bretton Woods in the American Feder
ation of Labor, Proceedings. 1946, pp. 182-183, 610.
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president of the Federation, recommended that Congress
accept this agreement with clarification and safeguards.
With the understanding that the Bretton Woods Agreements
would not alone serve as a complete solution to post-war
chaos in international trade, Green explained the Feder
ation's reasons for supporting the agreements.
He stated that the policy followed between the wars of
national self-interest in competitive currency depreciation
fostered depressions, discriminatory control of foreign
exchange, and other forms of economic warfare.

This policy

in some cases temporarily aided in solving domestic
problems for individual countries but in the long run con
tracted international trade, lowered the standard of living
in all countries, and strengthened trends toward isolation
ism.

To Green, the Bretton Woods Agreements would provide

a plan for the elimination of such practices and a gradual
restoration of the orderly and stable exchange relationships
essential to expanding international trade.

He believed

that it was advantageous to the workers that the currency of
their country be stabilized, that inflation or deflation be
avoided, and that their savings and their earnings not be
destroyed by extreme fluctuations.

He stressed that the

American Federation of Labor's interest was not limited just
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to the American workers, but he believed that it was both a
matter of human decency and a matter of enlightened selfinterest for the United States to share through the World
Bank in restoring the pre-war economic status of allies.

7

The American Federation of Labor recommended that
several changes be made in the Bretton Woods Agreements.
Among these changes was that consultation with the International Labor Organizations

Q

be made a basic administrative

procedure before deciding upon policies and use of funds.
The Federation further suggested that contracts initiated
under the reconstruction and development loans should
include standard labor provisions recommended by the
International Labor Organization.

Q

At these hearings, the Congress of Industrial Organ
izations was represented by James B. Carey, Secretary-

7U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking
.
and Cur
rency, Hearings. Bretton Woods Agreements Acts. 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1945, pp. 679-681.
Q

The International Labor Organization was founded in
1919 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. Even though
Samuel Gompers headed the charter commission, American
organized labor was not represented at the International
Labor Office until the United States government accepted
membership in 1934. Taft, pp. pit., p. 596.
^U.S., Congress, Hearings, Bretton Woods Agreements
Act.. op. cit., pp. 681-682.
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Treasurer, who said that his organization stood firmly
behind the Bretton Woods Agreements.

He offered the endorse

ment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations to the
Agreements and urged that it be adopted without amendments
or changes.

In supporting the International Monetary Fund,

Mr. Carey stated:
For . . . reasons of economic and political security,
of stabilized currencies, and a continued flow of
foreign trade, and of a rising standard of living
through the world, we in the C.I.O. endorse whole
heartedly the proposed International Monetary Fund
as an integral part of any program for economic
cooperation with the rest of the world.^9
He explained that the Bank for Reconstruction and Develop
ment would not encroach upon private banking.

Instead, it

would stimulate greater activity on the part of private
banking interests by guaranteeing loans and by supplying
loans in instances where they could not be made through
normal channels at reasonable rates.

Mr. Carey concluded

that "the fund and the bank are indispensable to the orderly
development of an expanding United States economy in an
expanding w o r l d . I n

July, 1945, the bill to provide for

1 0 Ibid.,

p. 1185.

1 1 Ibid.,

pp.1186-1187.

202
the United States' participation in the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development became Public Law 171, but it did not include
the provisions desired by the American Federation of Labor.

1 9

In 1959, the AFL-CIO made a statement before the sub
committee on the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Stanley H. Ruttenberg, then Director of Research for the
AFL-CIO, offered the support of his organization to House
Report 4452.

This bill provided for an increase of $1,375

billion in the United States' quota in the International
Monetary Fund and of $3,175 billion in the World Bank.
He stated that the increased amount in the International
Monetary Fund would be commensurate with the expanded
volume of international trade, generally high prices of
commodities, and the increased convertibility of currencies.
The AFL-CIO believed that the World Bank had satisfactorily
performed in aiding economic growth to foreign countries,
and its funds should be expanded.
Although the AFL-CIO supported these agencies, it
emphasized that they had relatively limited functions.

The

l^u.S., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1945, XCI, part 14, pp. 888-889.
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International Monetary Fund was not directly engaged in
financing development projects and the World Bank's loans
did not include "social capital" projects such as schools
and hospitals.

Yet, in the opinion of the AFL-CIO, projects

of this type were vital not only to improve the living
conditions of the underdeveloped countries, but also for
economic growth.

Therefore, it urged that other programs

be instigated to assist economic development in the underdeveloped countries.

13

In 1965, the AFL-CIO supported a proposal to again
increase the United States' quota in the International
Monetary Fund along with increases for other members.

The

quota from other member nations would rise from a total of
$16 billion to $21 billion, and the United States' quota
would be increased from approximately $4.1 billion to $5.2
billion. Nathaniel Goldfinger, before the House Banking
/
and Currency Committee, stated that the AFL-CIO was concerned

•^AFL-CIO, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Statement by Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director of Research,
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House
Banking and Currency Committee on H. R. 4452. and H. R. 4453,
March 5, 1959 (in the files of the AFL-CIO). See also,
AFL-CIO, "Helping Economic Growth,"Economic Review,
December, 1958, pp. 73-80.
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with this problem because the "economic health of the
United States and foreign countries affects every American
citizen."

He contended that in the 1960's, the United

States' balance of payments deficit had been used as an
attempt to avoid necessary improvements in social legislation and, at times, to tighten money.

Mr. Goldfinger

concluded with the AFL-CIO Executive Council's statement
made in February, 1965:
In the long run, a more effective international
monetary mechanism is the basic solution to the
payments problems of the United States and the
world. The United States should continue to seek
a mechanism that would provide an effective bank
for the world's credit needs.^
In conclusion, the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of
1945 was supported by organized labor because it felt the
outcome would have an important effect on income, employment
and the standard of living.

14

Although the Congress of

AFL-CIO, Act to Authorize an Increase in the Inter
national Monetary Fund Quota of the United States, State
ment of Nathaniel Goldfinger, Director of the Department of
Research, American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, to the House Banking and Currency
Committee on H. R. 6467, Bill to Amend Bretton Woods Agree
ments Act. April 6 , 1965.
(in the files of the AFL-CIO).
See also, AFL-CIO, Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive
Council, Balance of Payments (Bal Harbour, Florida: American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations,
February 28, 1965) (in the files of the AFL-CIO).

Industrial Organizations stood firmly behind the Agreements
without amendments, the American Federation of Labor felt
that a provision should be made for consultation with the
International Labor Organization.
The AFL-CIO continues to defend the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank.

This interest by organized

labor reflects an increased growth into the area of inter
national monetary affairs and a basic feeling that it, too,
should have a voice in these matters.

The Federal Reserve, A Public System
Since World War II, the AFL-CIO has offered various
proposals for reform in the structure and composition of
the Federal Reserve System.

Also, it has been critical of

the way the principal instruments of control have been used
by the Federal Reserve authorities to implement its policy
decisions and has suggested proposals for strengthening
these instruments.

Convention proceedings of organized

labor, government hearings and reports, organized labor
publications, and general statements have reflected its
attitude toward desired reform within the System.
It is the basic belief of the AFL-CIO that the
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provisions of the Employment Act of 1 9 4 6 should be applied
to the Federal Reserve as well as to the rest of the govern
ment.

In order to accomplish this objective, organized

labor has suggested that the Federal Reserve has to be
changed "to make it a truly public system and a regular
part of the United States government."

16

The AFL-CIO has

given consideration to changes in the Board of Governors,
the Federal Open Market Committee, the Advisory Council,
and the Reserve Banks.
Board of Governors
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
is composed of seven men, each of whom is appointed by the
President of the United States, and these appointments are
confirmed by the Senate.

Each member serves a fourteen-year

term and is ineligible for reappointment after serving a
full term.

One term expires on January 31 every two years.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman are designated from the Board
members by the President..

These offices are for four-year

•^•^The Act provided that the Federal Government should
use all practical means to promote maximum employment,
production and purchasing power.
•^AFL-CIO, "Gearing Money Policy to Economic Growth,"
American Federationist, May, 1964, p. 13.
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renewable periods, and do not necessarily coincide with the
President's term of office.

The members of the Board

represent the Federal Reserve Districts, but only one
member from any one district can be appointed.

In selecting

members of the Board, consideration is given to financial,
agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests as well
as geographical divisions of the country.

17

In the view of the AFL-CIO, the terms of office of the
Board Chairman and Vice Chairman of the System should
coincide with the terms of the office of the President of
the United States, and these officers should serve "at the
will of the President."

This change, to the. AFL-CIO, would

bring about a closer harmony between the President and the
chief officers of the government's monetary authority.
In addition, the AFL-CIO recommends that the terms of
•office of the members of the Board ^of Governors be reduced
below the fourteen-year period.

It wishes to retain the

policy of overlapping terms of office but suggested expir
ations "every year or two."

17

Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System (4fch
ed., Washington, D.C.: The Federal Reserve, 1961), pp. 7375.
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The AFL-CIO feels that there should be on the Board of
Governors a fair representation of the trade union movement,
consumers, and small business interests.

In addition, the

number of members of the Board who would come from any one
economic segment of society should be specifically and
strictly limited.

The organization believes that only

through such a change in the governing body can the System
become a truly public governmental institution, representa
tive of the "experiences and thinking of the major economic
groups in American society," rather than of a small minority
(bankers).'*'®

Federal Open Market Committee
At a level of authority equivalent to the Board, the
Federal Open Market Committee is composed of the seven
members of the Board of Governors, plus five members from
the twelve Reserve Bank presidents or vice presidents.

The

five members are elected annually by the Board of Directors

18

U.S., Congress, Hearings. Monetary Policy and Manage
ment of the Public Debt, op. cit.. pp. 819, 830; U.S., Con
gress, Hearings. The Relationship of Prices to Economic
Stability and Growth. Commentaries, op. cit.. pp. 54-55;
U.S., Congress, Hearings. The Federal Reserve System After
50 Years, op. cit.. pp. 1480, 1486.

of the Reserve Banks.

The Committee is charged with the

responsibility of deciding the extent of the open market
operations and the conditions under which the operations are
to be undertaken.

1Q

The AFL-CIO, from 1958 to 1964, significantly changed
its attitude toward the Open Market Committee.

At the

hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957, the
AFL-CIO maintained that a strict limitation should be
placed on the number of members of the Federal Open Market
Committee who came from any one economic segment of
American life.

It felt that the Committee was dominated

by bankers and big businessmen and was not representative
•

of the American people.

Of)

.

The Third Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO
in 1959 adopted a resolution concerning the Open Market
Committee.

It recommended that the Committee should be

made a public body, representative of the American people,

19

Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System,
op. cit., p. 76.
20

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings. Financial Institutions Act of 1957.
85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 1710.

, 210
or should be abolished and replaced by a more representative
Board of Governors.

21

In 1964, the AFL-CIO advocated the abolition of this
Committee and the transfer of its "current functions" to
the Board of Governors. 22

No doubt organized labor wanted

to centralize control within the Board of Governors (after
its recommended changes had been made within the Board's
. structure) and to eliminate the influence of the five bank
ers.
Also, it is the contention of the AFL-CIO that the
nineteen New York dealers in government securities "who
acted on behalf of the Open Market Committee are a private
monopoly."

These dealers handle their transactions pri

marily with multimillionaires and big commercial banks and
do not deal with the broad middle and upper-middle classes.
The AFL-CIO feels:
. . . we should develop some other method, an alter
native method, which would broaden the base of

21

AFL-CIO, Policy Resolutions, op. cit., p. 38. See
also, AFL-CIO, "The Federal Reserve— A Public System , 11
Economic Trends and Outlook. March, 1959, p. 2.
00

“ U.S., Congress, Hearings, The Federal Reserve System
After 50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1498.
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23
operations of the Open Market Committee
perhaps
through the 12 district Reserve Banks . . . that
the purchases and sales of government securities
should be broadened out at least to reach that
part of the public which wishes to purchase govern
ment securities.2^ It is organized labor's opinion that, although it does not
have the solution to "this problem," it deserves careful
examination.

The Federal Advisory Council
The Council consists of one member-from each Federal
Reserve District who is selected annually by the Board of
Directors of each Reserve Bank.

The Council is required

to meet four times a year, but may meet more often if it
wishes or if the Board requests it to do so.

It deter

mines its own procedure and elects its own officers.

The

Council serves in an advisory capacity; it confers with the
Board on business conditions and makes advisory recommendations regarding the affairs of the Federal Reserve System. 26

*JIf the Open Market Committee were abolished, the open
market operations of the Board should be broadened.
2 ^U.S.,

Congress, Hearings. The Federal Reserve System
After 50 Years, o p . cit.. p. 1500.
2 5 Ibid.,

26

p. 1501.

Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, op .
cit.. p. 77.
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The AFL-CIO feels that this is a "bankers' council"
since its members have usually been prominent bankers who
accepted the position on an honorary basis.

Organized

labor believes that the Council should be replaced by
representatives of the trade union movement, consumers,
small businesses, and farmers, but it has no further
recommendations for change.^

The Federal Reserve Banks
The twelve Federal Reserve banks are "mixed institu
tions, " i.e., public and private ownership. Although capital
stock is subscribed by the member banks at the statutory
rate of six per cent of each member bank1s capital and
surplus, only half of it had been paid in by 1964.

The

member banks 1 stock of the Federal Reserve cannot be trans
ferred and is entitled to be retired only at par in the
event of liquidation or dissolution.^®
Nathaniel Goldfinger, AFL-CIO representative at the
1964 hearings on the Federal Reserve, extended AFL-CIO

27u.S.» Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System After
50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1480; see also, U.S.,Congress, Hear
ings. Financial Institutions Act of 1957. o p . cit.. p. 1710.
2®Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, op.
cit.. pp. 66-69.
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support of House Report 3783.

This bill would permit the

return of the $500 million Federal Reserve stock to the
6000 member banks.

When questioned, he stated that he was

opposed to the "symbolism" involved in the stock ownership—
"the private ownership of a public system."

He felt that .

the Federal Reserve should be a truly public system without
"symbolic" private ownership.

OQ
7

The Board of Directors of each reserve bank is composed
of nine men.

Of the nine members, six of them, Class A

and B directors, are elected by the member commercial banks
of the district, and the three Class C directors, including
the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, are appointed by the
Federal Reserve Board.

Class A directors are bankers

representing member banks of their district, while the
Class B directors must be actively engaged in commerce,
agriculture or industry.

The general public is represented

by Class C directors; one must be a person of considerable
banking experience who serves as the Chairman.

29

U.S., Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System
After 50 Years, loc. cit.
■^Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System.
op. cit.. pp. 69-72.
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Despite the provision that Class B directors do not
include bankers, and that the Class C directors represent
the "general public," the AFL-CIO maintains that bankers
dominated the Board of Directors and changes are
in its composition.

necessary

It urges the inclusion of representa*-

tives from organized labor, small businesses,,and consumers .J31
1

Member Banks of the Federal Reserve System
The membership of the Federal Reserve consists of
national banks, whose affiliation is compulsory, and state
chartered banks, whose membership is voluntary.

However,

the state chartered banks must meet the requirements of the
Federal Reserve Board.

32

As early as 1933, organized labor supported financial
experts who recommended that all banks in the United States
become members of the Federal Reserve System.^
basic idea was advocated in 1964 by the AFL-CIO.

This same
Mr.

31

U.S.,Congress, Hearings. Federal Reserve System After
50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1486.
32

Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System.
op. cit.. pp. 64-66.
33

Supra. Chapter .IV, p. 17.
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Goldfinger, testifying for his organization, recommended
that some method be devised to make it compulsory for all
commercial banks to be members of the Federal Reserve.

When

he was questioned further, he admitted that perhaps
Federal Reserve regulation over reserve creating power of
the commercial banks would serve the same purpose as actual
membership.

He explained that his organization simply

wished to extend the control of the authority of the Federal
Reserve over all commercial banks.

34

The AFL-CIO has, also,

considered proposals pertaining to nonbank financial
institutions.

Nonbank Financial Institutions
Nonbank financial institutions have increased in size
and relative importance in the American economy.

Organized

labor sees these financial intermediaries as a potential
offset to monetary policy because of the consequent rapid ,
increase in the public's holding of liquid assets.

Changes

in the volume of these near money assets may have an

■^U.S., Congress, Hearings. Federal Reserve System
After 50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1492. For earlier statement,
see U.S., Congress, Hearings. Monetary. Credit and Fiscal
Policies, op. cit.-. p. 301.
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important effect on the demand for money balances and hence
on the velocity of money.

For this reason, the AFL-CIO

feels that the monetary authorities would have a better
control over the level of the money supply if nonbank
financial institutions were brought under the Federal
Reserve System.

Instruments of General Monetary Control
The power to buy and sell securities in the open market,
the power to fix discount rates, and the power to alter the
reserve requirements of the member banks within limits
specified by Congress are the three major instruments of
general Federal Reserve monetary control.

The AFL-CIO

believes that the Federal Reserve Board has failed to use
with flexibility all three monetary instruments for
regulation of the money supply to meet the needs of a
growing economy.

Of.

35

The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit,
Money and Credit (Encrlewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1961), p. 81, n. 1.
36

AFL-CIO, "Monetary Policy for All Americans," Labor1s
Economic Review. August, 1959, p. 42.
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Open Market Operations
The Federal Reserve's purchases or sales of readily
marketable asset claims in the open market is referred to
as open market operations.

Through these transactions, the

Federal Reserve can effect the cost and availability of
credit.
The AFL-CIO has indicated a realization of the
importance of open market operations and its effect upon
the money supply and the level of interest rates.

However,

it was opposed to the Federal Reserve's "bill's only"
policy and believes that open market operations should be
conducted in both the short- and long-term ends of the
markets.^

Stanley H. Ruttenberg, economist for the AFL-

CIO, stated in 1961:
Monetary policy as a means of encouraging expansion
is less effective than restrictive monetary policies
because of the stickiness of long-term interest
rates . . . However, if efforts were made directly
at reducing the long-term interest rates, increased
credit availability could be turned into a success
ful expansionary technique by making not only more
credit available, but available at lower long-term
interest rates.

•^Ibid.. p. 43. See also, AFL-CIO, Policy Resolutions.
o p . cit.. p. 38.
38

The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit,
o p . cit.. p. 64, n. 2.
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Discount Rates
The discount rate is the publicly announced charge
applied by the Federal Reserve Banks on discounts or
advances to member banks.

Every fourteen days, each Federal

Reserve Bank must establish, as a matter of statutory
requirement, its discount rate, subject to review and
approval by the Board of Governors.

Legally, the Board has

the power not only to approve the rates established by each
Reserve Bank but also it can take the initiative in their
determination.

In recent years, the tendency has been for

the rates to reach uniformity after some temporary lags.
Generally, changes in the discount rates are used to
support the effectiveness of open market operations.
changes tend torfollow movements in market rates.

These

However,

the relationship between the discount rate and the market
rates varies.

This could be contributed to the infrequent

change in the discount rate as opposed to the continuously
moving market rates.

Often, the result of this differential

may counter those effects of open market operations.

39

this regard, suppose the Federal Reserve were pursuing a

39

Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System.
op. cit., p. 46-50.

In
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tight monetary policy.

If market rates of interest increased

faster than the discount rate# the commercial "banks would
tend to borrow reserves rather than to seil short-term
securities.
Stanley Ruttenberg of the AFL-CIO supported a proposal
which was a compromise between the "present" discretionary
policy and a fully

automatic rule.

40

Under the compromise,

changes in the discount rate would be tied to changes in
the Treasury bill rate but the spread between the two rates
would be changed periodically on a discretionary b a s i s . ^
Mr. Ruttenberg would probably reject a fully automatic
rule because of the danger of tying the discount rate to a
single market rate.

If that particular rate moved out of. .

line with other short-term market rates, it also might pull
the discount rate out of line.

Yet, the compromise proposal

would allow for discretion on the part of the monetary
authority in making necessary adjustments.

No doubt

Mr. Ruttenberg felt that open market operations could be

^®A fully automatic rule proposes that the discount
rate should be determined automatically each week by the
current rate on short-term Treasury bills.
41
n. 1 .

. .
Commxssxon on Money and Credxt, op. cit., pp.

66,
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strengthened without the counter effects of the fully
discretionary procedure.

But, the proposal Mr. Ruttenberg

supported would actually give nothing which could not be
achieved under the fully discretionary system.

Reserve Requirements
Since 1933,^ the Federal Reserve has had the authority
to change the required reserve percentages in order to
achieve countercyclical adjustments in the reserve position
of member banks.

Yet, since 1951, the Federal Reserve has

used this instrument in a countercyclical manner only during
recessions.

43

The AFL-CIO has taken the position that reserve require
ments should play as important a role in controlling inflationary pressures,"if they exist," as the discount rate.

44

Federal Reserve authority to vary the required reserve
percentages for commercial banks was first made available on
a temporary basis in the emergency banking legislation of
1933 and was made a permanent institution of reserve banking
by the Banking Act of 1935. Board of Governors, The Federal
Reserve System, op. cit., p. 51.
^ Ibid.. p. 55.
44

AFL-CIO, "Monetary Policy for All Americans," op.
cit.. p. 48y U.S., Congress, Hearings, Employment. Growth
and the Price Levels, op. cit.. p. 3110.
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Stanley Ruttenberg commented in 1961:
It is not a wise policy for the Federal Reserve
Board to give up its use of reserve requirements
. . . I agree that major reliance should be placed
on open market operations, but it is also wise to
retain, for countercyclical purposes, reserve
requirements as well as the discount functions as
a means of regulating the level of money supply.^
Also, secondary reserve requirements have been
suggested by the AFL-CIO as an "additional and appropriate"
instrument of monetary policy.

Generally,

"secondary

reserves" are considered an analytical rather than a legal
concept.

There is no hard line of demarcation between

earning assets held by a bank and secondary reserves.
/
Yet, these reserves would be differentiated from other
assets by a banker in that they are easily convertible
into cash without a significant loss.

A bank's balance

sheet does not show secondary reserves as a separate
category.

No doubt organized labor would want legal

specification of secondary reserves in coordination with
the Federal Reserve Board's standby authority to impose
these requirements.

However, the AFL-CIO has not

specified what it would consider to be actual secondary

45
n. 1 .

. .
Commission on Money and Credit, oji. cit.. p. 67,
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reserves .4 6
In 1961, when the Commission on Money and Credit
recommended that existing statutory reserve requirements
against savings and time deposits be repealed, Stanley
Ruttenberg did not agree.

Not only did he feel that these

requirements should be maintained, but also he proposed
that the Federal Reserve Board develop techniques to apply
a similar type of reserve requirement on competing nonbank
financial intermediaries.

47

However, Mr. Ruttenberg did

not justify his reasoning for reserve requirements on nonbank
financial intermediaries.
Nor did Mr. Ruttenberg support the Commission's
recommendation that the range of reserve requirements for
demand deposits be set from eight to eighteen per cent.
The Commission felt this would give the Federal Reserve
Board power to meet the needs of growth emergencies.
However, Mr. Ruttenberg simply contested the necessity
of changing the range from the established range of seven to
4ft
twenty-two per cent but did not defend his position. °
46

.
Ibid.. p.

68

.

47 Ibid..
.
p. 6*9.
48Ibid., p. 71.

J
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Selective Controls
Organized labor has generally held the position that
more use should be made of selective monetary measures in
order to strengthen monetary policy during an inflationary
or over-investment boom situation.

In 1964, the only

selective control available to the Federal Reserve author
ities was the power to alter margin requirements on .credit
granted by any lender— banks, brokers, and dealers— for
the purpose of purchasing or carrying listed securities.
Since the 1920's, organized labor has been concerned with
stock market speculation and has supported governmental
controls over stock market activity.

Although organized

labor publications give no insight into its attitude
toward, the margin required, no doubt it would prefer high
margin requirements by the Federal Reserve.

This would

minimize the danger of excessive use of credit in financing
stock market speculation and the reoccurance of a spec
ulative stock market boom, like the one in 1929.
Stanley Ruttenberg suggested to the Commission on
Money and Credit that if margins were proper for the New
York Stock Exchange, they were also proper in the Treasury
securities market.

He concluded that stand-by authority

by the Federal Reserve to impose effective and flexible
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margins on the secondary securities market would be helpful
in preventing speculation and manipulation. 49
Organized labor maintains that an effective stabiliza
tion effort requires that there be stand-by authority to
use selective controls over consumer credit and mortgage
lending.

50

However, it feels that these instruments should

be supplemented by selective controls over loans for
inventories as well as plant and equipment expenditures.
Stanley H. Ruttenberg pointed out that if one examines the
business cycle of the post World War II period, the most
volatile sectors in the economy have been inventories and
plant and equipment.

To him, the absence of selective

credit controls over these areas "dooms monetary policy
in a complex economy to excessive general restraint during
inflationary situations."

51

Nathaniel Goldfinger has said:
. . . it is often more effective to treat the specific
causes of inflation directly at their sources, rather
than indirectly, because monetary policy is so impre
cise in its effects . ^ 2

^Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit., p. 117, n. 1.
SOg.S., Congress, Hearings, Employment. Growth, and
Price Levels, loc. cit.
^Commission on Money and Credit, pp. cit., p. 76,
n. 1, p. 257, n. 4.
co
^U.S., Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System
After 50 Years, op., cit.. p. 1474.
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Coordination of Monetary Policy
Monetary policy formulation, to the AFL-CIO, must be
brought "within the fold of the United States government
and not.left outside."

Organized labor strongly stresses

coordination between the monetary authorities, the Treasury,
the Labor Department, Commerce Department, and the lending
agencies of the United States

g o v e r n m e n t . ^3

Coordination is also desired by the AFL-CIO between
monetary and fiscal policies to achieve sufficiently
expansionary and growth-generating forces for economic
balance and strength.

It feels that balanced economic

growth generally requires an ample, increasing money supply
at relatively low interest rates.

However, if fiscal

policy is designed to encourage and monetary policy to
discourage expansion within the economy, the AFL-CIO
believes the result can be serious economic distortion.^
Yet, the AFL-CIO does not feel that countercyclical
debt management would serve as an appropriate instrument
for stabilization.

5 3 Ibid., p.
5 4 Ibid., p p .

The need to minimize the cost- of

1481. . ,, ,.
1473-1475.
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managing the federal debt must have top priority.

Therefore,

the AFL-CIO maintains only coordinated fiscal and monetary
. .
.
55
policies should be used for stabilization.
In general, organized labor has advocated monetary
f

i

ease because of its association with expansion of business
f
!
and employment. Yet, it does recognize that a tight monetary
policy is necessary when the economy is faced with an
actual demand inflation, such as in wartime.
In conclusion, the AFL-CIO feels that when its,
recommended revisions have been made within the Federal
i

Reserve System, it will be a public instrument of public
policy— "a public system."

55Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit.. p. 105,
n. 1 .

i

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The growth and development of the organized labor
movement in the United States has been a long and involved
struggle for survival, recognition, and acceptance.

This

struggle has brought forth a changing character within
American unionism which has been reflected in its attitude
toward monetary reform and monetary policy.
Organized labor's maturing approach to these mone
tary actions has progressed with the advances that have
been made in economic theory.

More specifically, the

Keynesian revolution helped to clarify the use of monetary
and fiscal policies in the achievement of economic objec
tives.
The following sections will summarize organized
labor's attitude toward monetary policy and monetary
reform, give general conclusions for the entire period
analyzed, and project organized labor's possible future
reactions.
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1866 - 1900
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
United States' economy was undergoing a persistent price
decline with occasional brief interruptions.

Certain

groups in the economy suffered at various times from this
deflation.

The laboring classes, including those who were

members ofvunions, were faced with an insufficient supply
of money, high interest rates, and during periods of
depression, high levels of unemployment.

Because of these

adverse economic conditions, the platforms of the early
labor organizations, such as the National Labor Union
(1866), the Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood
(1874), and the Knights of Labor (1878), included somewhat
radical monetary reform proposals.

Organized labor urged

the abolition of the National Banking System and the
issuance of paper money by the government.
f
'
Because of the defects in the National Banking System,
organized labor had a justifiable complaint; but it is very
doubtful that it basically understood the operations of the
System.

Organized labor's opposition to the National

Banking System can be particularly attributed to a deeprooted resentment toward bankers.

It viewed bankers with

suspicion because of their close alignment with business
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interests and their "monopoly power" over the money supply
which oftentimes resulted in high interest rates to the
.-

workers.

->

Moreover, unfortunate past experiences with

!
worthless private bank notes issued prior to the Civil
War and earlier waves of bank failures probably left a
lasting impression on union members.
This fear of bankers and worthless bank notes brought
about organized labor's appeal for governmental paper
currency.

Apparently organized labor hoped this would

break what is regarded as the "monopoly power" of banks
by transferring this power to the government.

Thus, the

issuance of paper money would be controlled by the
government in the public interest rather than by the
bankers in the private interest.

No doubt it also believed

that if the government issued paper money, there would be
more paper currency in circulation, lower interest rates,
and a relief from price deflation.

Yet, it would be

difficult to speculate whether or not the government would
have actually increased the money supply in sufficient
i

amounts to meet the demands of organized labor.
In the 1890's, the American Federation of Labor
adopted the basic views of the earlier unions with one
exception.

The Federation, apparently reflecting the basic
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conservatism of Gompers, wanted money issued "to and by the
people."

This unique proposal suffered from two primary

weaknesses.

First, it was subject to various interpretations

by the members, indicating the lack of understanding of the
proposal.

And second, the Federation gave no actual

explanation as to how this goal was to be achieved.

There

fore, it can be concluded that this proposal by the Feder
ation was more in the nature of a "radical slogan" serving
primarily to rally support for monetary reform.
The free silver movement became a topic of major
concern to organized labor during the last decade of the
nineteenth century.

Both the Knights of Labor and the

American Federation of Labor supported the free coinage of
silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 because they felt it was an
alternative method of increasing the money supply, as
contrasted to the issuance of money by the government or
"to and by the people."

But the question of the monetary

standard of the United States— bimetallic or gold— reached
a political climax with the presidential election of 1896.
Even if William Jennings Bryan had won, it is doubtful that
he could have secured the passage of a Free Coinage Act.
Shortly after the election, an expansion in the money
supply through increases in gold production brought rising

prices and returning prosperity without resorting to the
free coinage of silver.

With the passage of the Gold

Standard Act and the second defeat of Bryan, organized
labor's interest in the free silver issue declined.
Thus it can be concluded that organized labor
recognized the need for an increase in the money supply
which was a reasonably sound objective.

It responded

to the economic conditions of the time by offering
proposals for reform within the monetary system.

Yet,

because of its limited knowledge and fear of bankers, these
proposals can be considered somewhat extreme and restricted
in depth.

1900 - 1928
In the first three decades of the twentieth century,
the American Federation of Labor, reflecting the earlier
view of the previous labor organizations, switched its stand
from money "issued by the. people" to money "issued by the
government."

This reversal no doubt can be attributed to

a misunderstanding in interpretation by the union members,
the need for clarification ...on the part of the Federation,
and the lack of a definite program for achieving its earlier
proposal.

‘
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The assessment of labor's views toward monetary reform
is complicated by its lack of a clear definition of money.
Organized labor was not specific in its definition, but
one would suppose that it included gold and silver coins
and treasury notes.

However, it must be remembered that

definitions of money at that time perhaps varied from the
generally accepted definition of the 1960's.
Organized labor did not participate in the hearings on
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.

Even

after the Act was passed in 1913, organized labor continued
to push for its old idea of money "issued by the government."
During the early 1920's, organized labor faced
increased employer opposition as indicated irT the open shop
i

drives and company unions, and thus was engaged in a basic
struggle for survival.

It, therefore, devoted the greater

part of its time in pursuing primary trade union objectives
instead of pushing for monetary reform.

Nevertheless,

organized labor realized that it was still in an unfavorable
position in dealing with the bankers.

It feared that the

bankers were using their influence as members of Boards of
Directors and as financial advisors for business to dis
credit the trade union movement.

As an alternative means

of by-passing the bankers, the American Federation of Labor

1
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supported the establishment of the Postal Savings System.
Because it was ctn instrument of the government, organized
labor regarded this system as a safer place for the
workers' funds.

There had been proposals by some union

members recommending that Postal Savings handle demand .
deposits.

Its support of this System was not only a

reflection of organized labor's distrust of bankers but
was also a mild form of "boycotting" the banks.
The influence of Samuel Gompers' conservatism was
exemplified by the American Federation of Labor in-the
mid-twenties when it repeatedly rejected radical monetary
proposals at its annual conventions.

Even when the Feder

ation affiliates established their own financial institu— •
tions— labor banks— the Executive Council of the Federation
warned that these endeavors should be approached with
extreme caution.

The death of Samuel Gompers in 1924 and

the election of William Green as Federation President
did not cause a marked change in organized labor's attitude
toward monetary action.
When the American Federation of Labor realized that
the Federal Reserve System was a firmly established
institution, its pragmatism became evident.

It began

lobbying for amendments to the Federal Reserve Act which it
./
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felt would be beneficial to the laboring classes.

However,

the American Federation of Labor soon realized that it
lacked a comprehensive understanding of "monetary problems"
and needed expert advice in order to make any type of
successful assessment of monetary changes.

Often, its

attitude toward monetary reform and policy was a mirror-image
of the opifiions of financial experts to whom it turned.
The American Federation of Labor wanted the Federal
Reserve, through monetary policy, to stabilize the
purchasing power of the dollar.

Furthermore, it criticized

the high interest rates and the Federal Reserve's lack of
control over stock speculation in the.’latter part of the
1920's.
In conclusion, organized labor from 1900-1928 had made
little progress in its basic understanding of monetary
actions or even the definition of money.

It rejected the

Federal Reserve System as a solution to its monetary reform
proposals.

Yet, because of organized labor's pragmatic

nature, it supported amendments to the Act which it felt
would be beneficial to the laboring classes.

The basic

struggle for survival limited organized labor's time for
concentration on monetary objectives.

However, the Great

Depression served as a stimulent to increased interest by
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organized labor in the area of monetary reform and monetary
policy.

1929 - 1946
The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression
instilled in the leaders of organized labor the need for
further exploration and explanation of the operations of
the United States monetary system.

William Green, Federation

\

President, appealed to economists and banking experts to
submit articles for publication in the American Federationist.

His plea was answered and a number of articles appeared

for the benefit and enlightment of the members.
No doubt influenced by these publications, organized
labor supported those legislative measures which sought
to strengthen, centralize, and regulate the banking system.
In addition, it wanted to bring all banks under the control
of the Federal Reserve.

It is understandable and quite

reasonable that from a security standpoint, organized labor
would have advocated this measure.

The American Federation

of Labor rejected appeals by somas. members to lobby for
nationalization of the banking system and reaffirmed
Gompers' philosophy of working within the capitalistic
framework.
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In the area of monetary legislation, there was a
notable change in organized labor's attitude from its
support of the free coinage of silver in the 1890's.

It

was apprehensive about leaving the gold standard and the
devaluing of the dollar because it feared that-these
measures would contribute to price inflation and decline in
the purchasing power of the workers' dollar.
Regarding price inflation, organized labor might be
considered somewhat inconsistent in its views.

It

favored the Goldsborough Bill in 1932 which proposed to
raise wholesale commodity prices to the existing level
before the deflation and then to maintain the; prices at
that level.

Yet, organized labor neglected to consider

the inflationary tendencies of the bill, but supported only
that portion pertaining to price stabilization;

This

ambivalent attitude of organized labor toward prices was
a further indication of its pragmatism and its lack of
\

understanding of monetary issues".
The Federation hoped throughout the Great Depression
that the Federal Reserve's easy money policy would stimu
late business recovery.

However, it soon realized that

bank loans "were not being made to business."

Therefore, at

times it advocated stronger government action to achieve
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this end.

Organized labor1s reactionto the ineffectiveness

of monetary policy in the early 1930's could be favorably
compared with the understanding of monetary policy in the
1960's.

It is generally considered that monetary policy is

more effective during "boom" periods than recessions.
The world economic conditions brought about increased
Federation interest in international monetary reform.

It

favored the World Economic Conference and the Tripartite
Accord primarily because it believed international trade
would be stimulated, providing more work for wage earners.
The schism within the American Federation of Labor,
which led to the formation of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations in the mid-thirties, brought to the labor
movement a new militancy and changing viewpoints.

However,

it is difficult to assess the attitude of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations toward monetary policy and reform
during its early formative years because of its preoccu
pation with organizing the mass production industries.
Yet, because of the rejection of Gompers' philosophy, and
the more radical nature of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, there is little doubt but that its leaders
would probably have favored reforms such as the national
ization of the banking system.

The competition between the American Federation of
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations- and the
favorable government and middle-class position toward the
labor movement helped spur union membership in the late
thirties and into the war years.

The growth in the labor

movement undoubtedly brought an increased awareness among
politicians of the influence that organized labor could
possibly have on political issues.

No doubt the encourage

ment by politicians and the general maturing of organized
labor increased its concern with and participation in
domestic and international monetary legislation.

This

was quite evident when organized labor was represented at
the hearings and supported the Bretton Woods Agreements in
1945.

It felt the outcome would have an effect on employ

ment, income and the standard of living.
Thus, one can conclude that the Great Depression was
a turning point in the growth of organized labor's attitudes
toward monetary reform and monetary policy.

It was develop

ing an understanding of the role of a central banking
system and of the role of banking in the economy.

This can

be attributed in part to articles in labor publications by
financial experts.

Organized labor pragmatically supported

legislation to strengthen the banking system in hopes that
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these measures would be beneficial to the laboring man.
Yet, its greatest expansion into the area of monetary policy
and reform came during the Post War Years.

1946 - 1965
A stability in membership, a gradual decline in
militancy, and a more business like approach to its objec
tives characterized the organized labor movement in the
post war years.

Since organized labor has achieved general

acceptance and gained security, it has broadened its goals,
which includes greater interest in the area of monetary
policy and reform.

The growth of the labor movement to

gether with the complexities of the time contributed to
expansion in their research departments.

Such economists

as Boris Shiskin, Stanley Ruttenberg, and Nathaniel Goldfinger have helped convey organized labor's attitudes to
Congressional committees and the general public..
In the late 1940's, conflicting views on Federal
Reserve monetary policy were expressed by the American
Federation of Labor .and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations.

The American Federation of Labor wanted

the Federal Reserve to follow a tighter monetary policy.
In view of the economic situation, the Federation made
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a correct assessment of the monetary policy to be pursued
at that time.

The Federation felt there was an abnormal

increase.in the money supply which was contributing to
price inflation.

Yet, the Congress of Industrial Organ

izations differed with the Federation's reasoning and
maintained that the Federal Reserve was pursuing the proper
policy by continuing to support the long-term government
bond market.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations

feared that higher interest rates would have caused a down
turn in business activity.
During the Korean War period, the American Federation
of Labor again stressed the need for inflationary control
and supported the Federal Reserve-Treasury "Accord," which
would allow the Federal Reserve to pursue flexible monetary
policies.

In retrospect, the Federation's position on this

issue can be viewed as basically sound.

However, the

Congress of Industrial Organizations criticized the
Federal Reserve policy in 1951-1952 as being ineffective
and urged more direct monetary control in the war-time
emergency.
Both organizations and the merged AFL-CIO attacked
the tight money policies of the Federal Reserve through
out the Eisenhower administration.

They believed that
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the Federal Reserve was fighting a "phantom" inflation and
was contributing to recessions and unemployment in the
economy.

It stressed that the goals set' forth in the
I

Employment Act of 1946 should be the basic objectives of
the Federal Reserve authorities.

Organized labor would

not deny that a tight monetary policy should be used during
a period of demand inflation.

Yet, because of the high

levels of unemployment during the Eisenhower administration,
it could not classify price rises as demand induced, and
would not concede to the explanation of a "cost push"
inflation.

However, one would have to accept the fact

that inflation was present, especially during 1955-1957,
regardless of how it was caused, and the Federal Reserve
authorities were generally pursuing the correct monetary
policies.

It could, therefore, be concluded that organized

labor was not correct in its appraisal of Federal Reserve
actions.

Nevertheless, in light of organized labor's goals

of increased employment and production, an easy monetary
policy would have been correct, but excessive upward in
stability in prices would have been the sacrifice.
With the merger of the American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1955,
organizational competition was eliminated and more time
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and energy coUld be allotted for the pursuit of other
objectives.

In addition, the views of both organization'^

toward monetary policy and monetary reform.were blended.
The formation of one research department, composed'of
professional economists from both organizations, gave the
AFL-CIO greater ability to broaden its research depth and
increase its specialization.
The balance of payments problem in the 1960's has
been an object of concern to the AFL-CIO.

It was of the

opinion that the Federal Reserve policy of "operation nudge"
was not highly successful and suggested that direct controls
be used over foreign investments until effective inter
national monetary reform was achieved.

If direct controls

were used, interest rates could be lowered, production
stimulated, and employment increased.

Yet, direct controls

may be criticized in that they infringe on the rights of
private enterprise.
Since the AFL-CIO stresses the goals set forth by the
Employment Act of 1946, it urges greater cooperation and
communication between the Federal Reserve and other govern
mental agencies.

Also, the AFL-CIO feels that coordination

between monetary and fiscal policies is needed.

These

general recommendations certainly could npt be considered
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extreme, but on the contrary, could be considered wellfounded.
In order to facilitate this coordination, the AFL-CIO
has proposed that the Federal Reserve's instruments of
monetary control be strengthened and used judiciously.
The AFL-CIO has suggested for example that greater
selective credit controls be used, that frequent changes
in legal reserve requirements be initiated, and that the
Federal Reserve1s control be extended to non-bank financial
intermediaries.

However, to assess the validity of these

positions by organized labor would entail a thorough analysis
of debatable issues which are not within the scope of this
study.
The AFL-CIO has further recommended that changes be
made in the structure and composition of the Federal
Reserve System to give organized labor a greater choice and
representation in policy-making.

The AFL-CIO feels that

the composition of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Advisory Council, and the Directors of the Federal Reserve
Banks should include organized labor representatives.
Organized labor's position is well taken because the
language used in the Federal Reserve Act and amendments
is not clear in this regard, especially in light of the
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of the statutory requirements for occupational representation.
Perhaps organized labor should be permitted a voice in
policy making decisions.

It has gained prominence and

recognition in the United States society and general
maturity in its approach to economic problems. • As is
understandable, due consideration must be given to
qualifications and educational background, including
banking knowledge, of those individuals selected to
represent organized labor, whether on the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Advisory Council, or Directors of
Federal Reserve Banks.
In actuality, the problem of organized labor
representation lies not only with the terminology of the
Act and the educational specifications that are generally
needed, but with "drawing the line" as to the various
segments of society to be represented.

In other words,

if organized labor should achieve this goal, would not
small businessmen, farmers, and consumers likewise want
specific representation?
Organized labor's representation within the Federal
Reserve System is a controversial issue.

But from organized

labor's viewpoint, it is understandable that such
representation would be most

desirable.
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In addition, organized labor has suggested that the
Open Market Committee be abolished.

Yet, if this occurred,

the efficiency of open market operations could be impaired.
If organized labor did achieve a position on the Federal
Reserve Board, perhaps it would become more cognizant of the
significance of this Committee and thus retract its proposal.
In conclusion, the post-war years have found greater
participation and analysis by organized labor toward
monetary reform and policy.

This is due in part to the

great reliance placed on its professional research-staffs,
the general maturing of organized labor, and the passage
of the Employment Act of 1946.

The AFL-CIO feels that

only after its recommended revisions are made within the
Federal Reserve will it be a truly "public system" which can
fulfill the objectives of the Employment Act.

General Conclusions
Organized labor has come a long way in its approach
and attitudes toward monetary policy and monetary reform.
This growth has been in three primary stages:

1866-1928,

limited knowledge and understanding; 1929-1945, expansion
and learning; 1946-1965, increased maturity and involve
ment.

Organized labor's interest in monetary reform and
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monetary policy has generally coincided with the business
cycles of the United States economy; its views have been
more strongly expressed in reaction to periods of depression
or inflation.
Judging from organized labor's recommendations con
cerning monetary legislation during the 1866-1965 period,
it can be concluded that its primary condemnations resulted
from its early "resentment toward bankers."

Even in the

1960's, organized labor specifically pointed out that it
opposed the "bankers' control" of the Federal Reserve System.
Because of this view and its general maturing, one can
predict that organized labor will not cease the pursuit
of its goals in monetary reform and monetary policy.

Per

haps as it continues to increase in specialization and
depth within this area and continues to participate and
lobby for monetary legislation, it will become more
- tolerant toward the role played by bankers.

This tolerance

could possibly be brought about by organized labor's
representation within the composition of the Federal
Reserve System.
Yet, the future participation of organized labor in
monetary actions could well hinge on the independence of
the Federal Reserve System.

Should Congress abrogate the

. •

independence of this System and bring it under.closer
control, the persuasive political powers possessed by the
trade union movement in the United States may bring about
organized labor's representation in the System.

If this

action should be taken by Congress, then there is no
doubt that the future will bring even greater AFL-CIO
involvement in the area of monetary reform and monetary
policy.
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